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Answering the Call for Scholarship: The
Journal of International Crisis and Risk
Communication Research
Matthew W. Seeger
Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, USA

In the foundational work Normal Accidents, Charles Perrow (1984)
observed that advances and globalization of technology were creating
a form of “interactive complexity” where seemingly minor failures
could escalate and cascade throughout a system, leading to devastating accidents. Furthermore, as technology became more ubiquitous
and complex, such accidents become normal in the sense that they
are programmed into systems. Tight coupling; lack of buffers; and
interactive, unanticipated nonlinear interactions may create systemic
collapse. Simply put, crises of significant magnitude are, as Perrow
predicted, increasing in frequency and intensity (Helsloot, Boin, Jacobs,
& Comfort, 2012). The magnitude, complexity, and frequency of such
events challenge the existing conceptualization of crisis management
in general and crisis communication specifically (Topper & Lagadec,
2013). Communication is essential to understanding and managing
crises in two general ways. First, communication is necessary for meaning making around what are very uncertain and equivocal events.
Second, communication is instrumental as part of the crisis and risk
management functions (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). This includes activities such as environmental scanning for risks, creating an effective
response, resolving crises, and learning the lessons from these events.
CONTACT Matthew W. Seeger, PhD • E-mail: matthew.seeger@wayne.edu • 5104 Gullen Mall, Wayne

State University, Detroit, MI 48202
© 2018 by Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research. All rights reserved.
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Coordinated responses, cooperation, evacuations and warning, risk
education, processes of crisis planning and crisis decision-making,
memorializing and grieving, resolving, and repairing all require communication.
This journal, more than 15 years in the making, grew out of a recognition that crisis and risk communication are growing research topics
with important applied, global, and interdisciplinary dimensions. This
diverse body of research follows a variety of methodological and epistemic traditions, and although other traditional outlets for communication scholarship have been open to publishing crisis and risk research,
the volume of work warrants a dedicated journal. Topical conferences,
such as the International Crisis and Risk Communication Conference
and the biannual European Communication Research and Education
Association Crisis Communication Conference, as well as handbooks,
including the Handbook of Crisis Communication (Coombs & Holladay, 2011), the Handbook of Crisis and Risk Communication (Heath
& O’Hair, 2010), the Handbook of International Crisis Communication
(Schwarz, Seeger, & Auer, 2016), and research and theory texts, such as
Theorizing Crisis Communication (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013), are further
evidence that a focused academic journal is needed. These outlets also
demonstrate that the field is maturing and relevant.
Crisis and risk communication also have important interdisciplinary
connections, and we believe that grounding this journal in the communication field, with its tradition of eclectic approaches to inquiry,
allows investigators to make important contributions across related
fields. Psychology has contributed significantly to the literature on risk
perception, while economics has pioneered understanding of risk assessment, and both include work in risk communication. Risk Analysis
is one primary outlet for this work. Sociology and, to a lesser degree,
anthropology have focused on issues surrounding warnings, evacuation, and coordination, and much of this work appears in the Journal
of Contingencies and Crisis Management. Communication researchers
seeking outlets for their work have turned to more general journals,
such as the Journal of Applied Communication Research, Management
Communication Quarterly, or one of many journals in public relations.
The Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research
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(JICRCR) also acknowledges the close intersection of crisis and risk
communication. Several important efforts have been made to connect
what have historically been separate domains of research inquiry and
practice (Heath & O’Hair, 2010; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). Risk and
crisis communication can be understood as two interconnected processes in a larger system of managing, responding to, and understanding an emerging threat. They may also be understood as counterpoints
such that crisis is the manifestation of a risk and the failure to manage
it successfully. Heath and O’Hair (2010) described crisis and risk as
fundamentally linked. JICRCR’s attention to both phenomena creates
opportunities to explore those linkages.
The inaugural issue of JICRCR reflects the range and reach of crisis and risk communication research. This includes qualitative and
quantitative approaches to crises that are functions of organizational
decisions, natural disasters, and emerging diseases and crises that are
associated with a wide range of cultures and locations. In addition, the
journal is inclusive of local, state, federal, and international perspectives
and of work from the research, policy, and practitioner communities.
Climate change, emerging diseases, population migration and dislocation, breakdowns in civil society, aging infrastructure, rising expectations, limitations and competition for critical resources—food, water,
energy—technological complexity and collapses, and many other forms
of natural, human-caused, and interactive events will challenge and, in
many cases, overwhelm our communication processes and capacities.
Systemic research is one important element in understanding, managing, responding to, and learning from these events.
Matthew W. Seeger, PhD, is a faculty member and administrator at
Wayne State University. His research concerns crisis and risk communication; health promotion and communication; crisis response and
agency coordination; the role of media, including new media; crisis
and communication ethics; failure of complex systems; and postcrisis
renewal.

10

seeger

ORCID

Matthew W. Seeger

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5585-3081
References

Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (Eds.). (2011). The handbook of crisis communication. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
Heath, R. L., & O’Hair, H. D. (Eds.). (2010). Handbook of risk and crisis communication. New York, NY: Routledge.
Helsloot, I., Boin, A., Jacobs, B., & Comfort, L. K. (2012). Mega-crises: Understanding the prospects, nature, characteristics, and the effects of cataclysmic
events. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidents. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Reynolds, B., & Seeger, M. W. (2005). Crisis and emergency risk communication as an integrative model. Journal of Health Communication, 10, 43–55.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10810730590904571
Schwarz, A., Seeger, M. W., & Auer, C. (Eds.). (2016). The handbook of international crisis communication research. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
Sellnow, T. L., & Seeger, M. W. (2013). Theorizing crisis communication. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
Topper, B., & Lagadec, P. (2013). Fractal crises—a new path for crisis theory
and management. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 21(1),
4–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12008

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND RISK
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
2018, VOL. 1, NO 1, 11–26
https://doi.org/10.30658/jicrcr.1.1.2

Nicholson School of Communication
University of Central Florida
www.jicrcr.com

Crisis and Image Repair at United Airlines:
Fly the Unfriendly Skies
William L. Benoit
Department of Communication Studies, University of Alabama at Birmingham,
Birmingham, Alabama, USA
ABSTRACT
In April 2017, United Airlines had a passenger removed from one of its airplanes. Video of the
bleeding man being dragged off through the aisle went viral the next day. United’s initial response
attempted to downplay this offensive act (relying primarily on differentiation and mortification,
but not really apologizing for this offensive act). This stance provoked outrage and ridicule. This
study applies image repair theory (Benoit, 2015) to the discourse in this case study. United’s CEO,
Oscar Munoz, was forced to offer a “do-over,” stressing mortification and corrective action that were
actually directed to the offensive act. United finally arrived at the proper response, but it came
too late to realize its full potential. This essay argues that corrective action can be an important
strategy in crisis communication theory; it also explains that social media have changed the crisis
situation (with nearly instant and widespread criticism) and compressed the time in which those
accused of wrongdoing can respond.
KEYWORDS: Image repair; case study; United Airlines; social media; corrective action

On Sunday, April 9, 2017, United Airlines sought to substitute four
flight crew members for passengers already seated on United flight
3411 traveling from Chicago, Illinois, to Louisville, Kentucky. Three
passengers accepted travel vouchers, but United stopped short of offering the maximum amount possible, and no one else volunteered to
leave the airplane. Chicago security personnel then physically removed
a passenger, David Dao, from the flight. On Monday morning, Audra
Bridges, a passenger on the flight, “posted a video of the incident on
Facebook, which has been shared more than 49,000 times and viewed
3.8 million times” (Marotti & Zumbach, 2017). The video of the incident
showed a bloody, screaming man being dragged through the aisle and
CONTACT William L. Benoit, PhD • E-mail: wbenoit@uab.edu • Heritage Hall, University of Alabama at
Birmingham, Birmingham, AL 35294
© 2018 by Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research. All rights reserved.
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off the plane (Singh, 2017). Dao’s injuries included a “concussion, a
broken nose, and two lost teeth” (McCann, 2017).
United Airlines CEO Oscar Munoz initially tried to downplay the
situation; rather than apologizing for his company’s outrageous behavior
toward Dao, he suggested that Dao’s belligerent behavior caused the
incident. Notably, Munoz apologized to the other passengers on the
flight, but not to Dao. United’s initial response was spread via social
media, making things worse for United. A Harris Poll (2017) revealed
that the percentage of consumers who thought United Airlines had a
“bad” or “very bad” reputation soared from 7% in 2016 to 42% after the
incident. A survey from Public Policy Polls found that “40% of those
surveyed believe United is the worst airline in the country” (GonzalesRamirez, 2017). Carol Gstalder, senior vice president at the Harris Poll,
noted that “United’s six-fold increase in negative corporate reputation
sentiment shows us once again how quickly and severely a company’s
corporate reputation can be damaged” (Harris Poll, 2017). On Tuesday,
shares of United stock dropped $1.4 billion (Shen, 2017). Undeniably,
United Airlines faced a serious crisis. This article analyzes United’s attempt to repair its image in this debacle. First, I discuss corporate crisis
communication in general and research applying image repair theory
to corporate scandals. Then, I use image repair theory to analyze the
company’s statements in this case. Finally, I discuss implications of the
analysis for theory and practice.
Literature Review
Corporate Crisis Communication

Scholars have brought a number of perspectives to bear on the topic of
crisis communication. Three key works focused on crises in corporate
communication: Hearit (2006) articulated the idea of crisis communication by apology, and Coombs (2012, 2013) developed situational crisis
communication theory. The rhetoric of renewal, explicated by Seeger,
Sellnow, and colleagues (e.g., Seeger & Griffin-Padgett, 2010; Seeger,
Ulmer, Novak, & Sellnow, 2005; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Ulmer, Seeger,
& Sellnow, 2007), is another important approach to crisis communication. Because a person’s or organization’s reputation is so important,
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crises usually prompt messages to control or eliminate damage. This
analysis depends on image repair theory, so that literature will be examined more closely.
Image Repair Theory

Benoit (1995a, 1997, 2015) created image repair theory by drawing on
rhetorical theory (Burke, 1970, 1973; Ware & Linkugel, 1973; Scott &
Lyman, 1968). This approach to crisis communication discourse begins with two key assumptions: (a) Communication is a goal-oriented
activity and (b) a fundamental goal of communication is maintaining
a positive reputation. Image repair discourse is a response to actual or
anticipated threats to face. Such threats consist of two elements: (a) an
offensive act that is (b) attributed to the target (see Pomerantz’s, 1978,
analysis of complaints or Benoit, 2017; Benoit & Glantz, 2017). Image
repair theory identifies 5 general strategies and a total of 14 strategies
(see Benoit, 2015; see Table 1).
The United crisis, a video of a passenger being dragged off an airplane followed by an inept initial response, cries out for corrective
action. This strategy has been used frequently in image repair, with
mixed results. This section reviews uses of corrective action that were
relatively successful and other instances of this strategy that were less
effective.
Following the first episode of Tylenol poisoning, Johnson and Johnson used denial, bolstering, and corrective action (tamper-resistant
packaging). This image repair effort was remarkably effective. President
Reagan initially attempted to deny knowledge of the Iran–Contra affair.
He repeatedly stressed good intentions and tried to minimize perceived
harms. Ultimately, however, evidence emerged that forced him to
reverse his position, admitting responsibility and taking corrective
action to prevent recurrence of similar problems. Only then did his
popularity reverse its downward spiral.
AT&T lost its long-distance telephone service in 1991 because of a
power outage. At that time, air traffic control relied on land lines to
direct airplane movement, so, in addition to the disruption of long distance, air travel was degraded. AT&T published a full-page newspaper
advertisement that effectively used mortification, corrective action, and
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TABLE 1 Typology of Image Repair Strategies

Strategy

Definition

Example

Denial
Simple denial

did not perform act; act is
not harmful

Tylenol did not poison
capsules

Shift blame

another committed the
offense

madman poisoned capsules

Provocation

offensive act just a response
to an earlier offense

firm left state because of
new taxes

Defeasibility

lack of information or ability

executive not informed of
changed meeting time

Accident

mishap

tree fell on tracks, causing
train wreck

Good intentions

meant well

company believed changes
would help consumers

Bolstering

stress defender’s good traits
or acts

Exxon claimed “swift and
competent oil spill cleanup”

Minimization

offense less serious than it
appears

few harmed by water
pollution

Differentiation

act less offensive than
other, similar acts

Sears repairs were
preventative maintenance,
not fraud

Transcendence

act justified by more
important values

research uses animals to
help create drugs for people

Attack accuser

reduce credibility of
accuser; suggest victim
deserved offense; shift
audience attention from act

Pepsi owns restaurants
and competes for your
customers

Corrective action

fix problem or prevent
recurrence

AT&T promises to spend
billions to improve service

Mortification

apologize

AT&T apologized for service
interruption

Evade responsibility

Reduce offensiveness

Note. See Benoit (1995a, 1997, 2015).
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bolstering to repair the company’s image (Benoit & Brinson, 1994). This
strategy was employed successfully in this case.
In the early 1990s, Dow Corning was criticized for the alleged dangers of its breast implants. Its defense began with denial. Later, it used
a mild form of mortification (i.e., saying it did not express its concerns
for women adequately) without admitting to the dangers of its implants,
and finally, Dow used corrective action when it ceased production of
the implants (Brinson & Benoit, 1996). The corrective action muted
the criticism, although arguably, it should have come sooner.
In 1996, a secret tape recording of executives at Texaco was leaked to
the public. African American employees were described in the conversation as “black jelly beans” who were “glued to the bottom of the jar”
(Brinson & Benoit, 1999, p. 484). These revelations prompted outrage,
so the company developed several messages utilizing bolstering, corrective action, mortification, and shifting blame. The most interesting
strategy in its successful defense was shifting the blame to “bad apples”
in the company, who were punished.
British Petroleum (BP) put out a number of newspaper and television
ads about the Gulf of Mexico oil spill (Benoit, 2015). The company used
mortification, bolstering, and corrective action. Some of the spokespeople the company used were local residents. A novel element of BP’s
image repair effort was that it not only promised corrective action but
also gave progress reports.
Other instances of corrective action were less successful. Exxon’s
response to the Valdez oil spill shifted the blame for the accident to
Captain Hazelwood and for the delay in the cleanup to slow authorization from the state of Alaska and the U.S. Coast Guard. It attempted to
minimize the size of the problem, bolstered its image as a concerned
company, and promised corrective action to alleviate any damage.
However, the state of Alaska and the U.S. Coast Guard were poor
choices for targets for blame. Exxon’s attempts to minimize the extent
of the problem were graphically denied by television and newspaper
coverage. Similarly, description of a slow and apparently inept cleanup
undermined both its attempts to bolster its image and the credibility of
its promised corrective action. Thus Exxon’s image restoration campaign
was relatively ineffectual.
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Union Carbide’s response to the Bhopal, India, gas leak that killed
thousands and injured hundreds of thousands comprised bolstering
and corrective action in the form of aid to victims. Although these
strategies were appropriate, they failed to address a very important
question: What, if anything, would Union Carbide do to prevent another
tragedy? Failure to answer this most important question undermined
the image repair effort.
The California Department of Consumer Affairs accused Sears
Auto Centers of consumer fraud in 1992. Sears employed newspaper
advertisements, television spots, and other messages to carry its defense through two phases. At first, the company used denial and attack of accuser. When California’s accusations were corroborated by
accusations of auto repair fraud in New Jersey, Sears finally announced
corrective action. It never apologized for fraud, and the defense was
largely ineffectual (Benoit, 1995b), including corrective action that was
not employed quickly enough to be effective.
U.S. Airways flight 427 crashed in September 1994 while approaching
the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, airport, killing 132 people. The company
took out full-page newspaper advertisements to repair its image. It
made use of three image repair strategies: bolstering, denial, and corrective action. However, Benoit and Czerwinski (1997) characterized
its proposed action as “pseudo-corrective action.” The changes it proclaimed “were not designed to actually improve its safety, but simply
to convince the flying public of USAir’s current safety” (p. 51). This
defense was ineffective.
Newt Gingrich was accused of improprieties in a multi-milliondollar book deal. One of the image repair strategies he employed was
corrective action by returning the advance. Kennedy and Benoit (1997)
argued that if the book deal were on the up and up—as Gingrich
asserted—there would be no need to return the advance. Gingrich’s
action merely shifted when he would accrue the profits from the deal;
it did not ensure that the deal was proper.
Garry Trudeau’s comic strip Doonesbury advanced several criticisms of the tobacco industry, arguing that tobacco products are dangerous and addictive—and these accusations were intensified with
the argument that tobacco products were deliberately marketed to
children (Benoit & Hirson, 2001). The Tobacco Institute (an industry
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organization) created a pamphlet to respond to the attack: Smoking
and Young People: Where the Tobacco Industry Stands. The Tobacco
Institute’s message employed denial, corrective action, blame shifting,
bolstering, and good intentions. However, these strategies did not work
well together. Corrective action is not consistent with denial (there is
no need to alter marketing procedures if the companies are not marketing to children); key accusations in the attack were ignored (the public
widely believes tobacco to be dangerous); and the implementation of
the strategies in discourse was weak (e.g., the pamphlet denied that
advertising caused smoking without any evidence).
Several hundred people died in automobile crashes when Firestone
tires failed (“blowouts”). The company attempted to shift blame to
Ford (many of these accidents happened in Ford Explorer vehicles).
Firestone used bolstering and denial, strategies that were undermined
by its use of mortification and corrective action. Furthermore, the
corrective action in this case was too vague to be persuasive (Blaney,
Benoit, & Brazeal, 2002).
Hurricane Katrina caused death, injury, dislocation, and property
damage. President Bush was accused of leading a slow and inept response. He utilized bolstering, defeasibility, and corrective action to
respond to these accusations. Bolstering could not counter his slow
response, defeasibility portrayed Bush as not being in control of events,
and his corrective action was too little, too late.
Grunenthal offered image repair for the birth defects that arose
from its drug thalidomide. The company used mortification, corrective action (past and future), defeasibility, and differentiation. Its use of
corrective action was vague, and the company waited almost 50 years
before apologizing (Benoit, 2015). The New Orleans Saints football
franchise was revealed to have paid bounties to players who hurt opposing players. The organization proffered a defense of mortification,
corrective action: ineffectual, paying to hurt opposing players is terrible
sportsman [person] ship (Benoit, 2015). Rupert Murdoch’s News of the
World was shown to have engaged in relentless phone hacking, with
targets including victims of crimes. The mogul used mortification,
corrective action, and compensation. However, his defense was not
timely enough to be effective (Benoit, 2015).
These case studies indicate some of the conditions that influence
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the persuasiveness of corrective action. The defense should actually fix
(and/or prevent future occurrences of) the problem. To have the best
chance of success, the person or organization employing corrective
action should do so in a timely fashion (note that in the contemporary
environment of social media, corrective action should be used very
quickly indeed). The defense should be internally consistent (e.g., do
not deny the existence of a problem and propose corrective action).
United Airlines’s Defense

United Airlines’s image repair evolved through two phases. At first, the
discourse attempted to downplay the offense, relying mainly on differentiation and mortification. United’s initial response provoked outrage.
The second phase appeared to emerge grudgingly, using mortification
and corrective action. The “phases” of image repair have become highly
compressed with the advent of social media (consider the time it took
for the phases of President Reagan’s Iran–Contra defense to develop).
Differentiation: “Re-accommodating Passengers”

United’s CEO Oscar Munoz released a statement on the Monday afternoon following the event. He used bolstering, explaining that “all of
us here at United” were upset by the event. He also offered two apologies (mortification): “I apologize for having to re-accommodate these
customers” (Thomas, 2017; see also United News Release, 2017a) and
for the “over-book situation” (McCann, 2017). Both of these apologies
incorporated differentiation: “re-accommodate” sounds less offensive
than “drag passengers off an airline,” while “over-booked” sounds better
than “we kicked a seated passenger off an airplane to make room for
our employees.” United had not gotten off to a good start in this crisis.
On Monday, Munoz also sent a letter to United employees, which
quickly became public. In it, the CEO used provocation, characterizing
Dao as “disruptive and belligerent.” The CEO also put defeasibility into
play, stating that “our agents were left with no choice but to call Chicago
Aviation Security Officers to assist in removing the customer from the
flight” (McCann, 2017). Munoz also employed bolstering, reassuring
his employees, “I want to commend you for continuing to go above
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and beyond to ensure we fly right.” Munoz declared that “treating our
customers and each other with respect and dignity is at the core of
who we are” (McCann, 2017). These utterances clearly implied that no
wrongdoing occurred. Munoz did apologize to other passengers on the
flight, but not to Dao (McCann, 2017). Observers were unlikely to see
United’s treatment of Dao as commendable or to believe that United’s
philosophy was “treating customers . . . with respect.”
Mortification and Corrective Action: United’s “Do-Over”

On Tuesday, United’s CEO apparently realized he was piloting his company into a hurricane; he radically changed the course of his defense.
Munoz declared, “It’s never too late to do the right thing” (Mutzabaugh,
2017; see also United Press Release, 2017c). He asserted that he was “disturbed” by the events of Sunday (McCann, 2017), enacting bolstering. He
also offered another apology: “My deepest apologies for what happened.”
He explicitly included the victim (although he did not mention Dao by
name): “I deeply apologize to the customer forcibly removed and to all
of the customers aboard. No one should ever be mistreated this way.”
He also declared, “We take full responsibility” (McCann, 2017; see also
United News Release, 2017b). Thus, in his “do-over,” Munoz utilized
mortification, saying that he was disturbed, that the offensive act was
clearly wrong, and that he accepted responsibility for it (eventually).
Once United confessed that it had treated Dao badly, corrective
action was needed. Munoz declared, “We will work to make it right”
(McCann, 2017). He asserted, “I have committed to our customers
and our employees that we are going to fix what’s broken so this never
happens again.” He ended his statement by assuring his audience, “I
promise you we will do better” (McCann, 2017). This phase of the image repair effort sounded sharply different from the prior phase. This
is a clear illustration of corrective action.
On Wednesday, Munoz appeared on ABC’s Good Morning America,
saying that he felt “shame” when he watched the video, enacting mortification again. He reiterated his use of corrective action: “This can
never—will never—happen again on a United Airlines Flight. That’s
my premise and that’s my promise” (McCann, 2017). Later that day, the
CEO announced that he would give a complete refund to everyone who
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had been on the flight (McCann, 2017), an instance of compensation.
The key elements of Phase 2 were repeated on Thursday. Mortification surfaced again when Munoz said, “We continue to express our
sincerest apology to Dr. Dao.” The CEO also returned to corrective
action: We will “make this right”; “we cannot stress enough that we
remain steadfast in our commitment to make this right” (McCann,
2017; United Press Release, 2017c). United’s promise of corrective action was made more specific (Mann, 2017):
We are committing that United will not ask law enforcement officers
to remove passengers from our flights unless it is a matter of safety
and security. Second, we’ve started a thorough review of policies that
govern crew movement, incentivising volunteers in this situation, how
we handle oversold situations and an examination of how we partner
with airport authorities and local law enforcement. Third, we will fully
review and improve our training programs to ensure our employees
are prepared and empowered to put our customers first.

These instances of corrective action aimed at preventing recurrence
of the offensive act.
Evaluation

It was a mistake to drag a passenger off the airplane: The crisis probably could have been avoided if United had not waited until after
passengers had boarded to squeeze its flight crew onto the airplane
or, alternatively, if United had offered larger flight coupons to encourage passengers to deplane. Furthermore, if United had realized how
damaging the video was, Munoz would never have tried to downplay
its offense (characterizing its act as “re-accommodation” and as an
instance of overbooking). However, United’s initial response not only
failed to put out the public relations fire but actually threw fuel on the
flames, making the crisis even worse. Contrast Munoz’s characterization of Dao as “disruptive and belligerent” with his assertion that “no
one should ever be mistreated this way.”
The initial defense used an interesting, and ineffectual, combination
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of differentiation and mortification (I do not argue that it is impossible for differentiation and mortification to work together; they did
not work well in United’s defense). United did not apologize for the
actual offensive act depicted in the video but for two less offensive
actions: “reaccommodating” a passenger and “overbooking.” The millions who viewed the video would not be likely to agree that United
was merely working to “re-accommodate” a passenger. For example, as
@sassylibrarian1 wrote, “Nice to know ‘re-accommodate’ on United now
means ‘drag you violently out of your seat’” (Thomas, 2017). Furthermore, the flight was not overbooked, despite Munoz’s apology for the
“over-book situation”; United wanted to put its employees onto a fully
booked (and already boarded) flight. Munoz was correct to say that
“it’s never too late to do the right thing.” That does not mean, however,
that doing the “right thing” eventually will work as well as it would
have worked if it had been implemented in a timely fashion. United
eventually adopted a reasonable defense—apologizing for its actual
offense and detailing multiple steps to prevent similar episodes—but
this should have been its initial position.
Discussion

One implication of this case study is that the rapid rise of new technology is now a fundamental element of the crisis communication
situation. Contemporary society has embraced social media and the
capability of smartphones to record photos and/or video of instances
of misbehavior. Furthermore, the ability of the Internet and social
media to provide almost instantaneous distribution of incriminating
pictures, videos, and other accusatory messages has forever altered
crisis communication (see, e.g., Glantz & Benoit, 2017). Persuasive attacks or criticisms are an important component of the current media
environment. Corporations such as United Airlines are often very
conservative. However, that stance is at odds with the need to react
almost instantaneously to crises.
United Airlines had previously suffered Internet-facilitated damage
to its image. United baggage handlers damaged a guitar in transit; when
the victim received the run-around from United, a video called United
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Breaks Guitars went viral (Carroll, 2009) and forced the company to
address the offensive act. However, it does not appear as if the company learned its lesson. The Internet allowed the latest crisis to unfold
seemingly at hyperspeed, with the offensive act committed on Sunday,
the initial defense and outraged reactions occurring on Monday, and
the revised defense appearing on Tuesday. It is vital for corporations,
organizations, and individuals to understand the nature of our current
media environment.
Corporate image repair efforts, as in political image repair (Benoit,
1982, on Watergate; Benoit, Gullifor, & Panici, 1991, on Reagan), have
evolved through phases before (see, e.g., Benoit, 1995b, on Sears; Brinson & Benoit, 1996, on Dow Corning). The simple fact that Munoz felt
forced to enact a do-over is clear evidence that his initial stance was ineffectual. The new position was the right one; unfortunately for United,
it came too late—and shifting his position so violently undermined
Munoz’s credibility. Another implication of this case study is the idea
that it is not enough to apologize for something—one must apologize for
the perceived offense. Using mortification is likely to damage face: No
one enjoys confessing wrongdoing. Munoz’s attempt to limit the embarrassment of mortification by reducing the offensiveness of the offensive
act for which he apologized—apologizing for “re-accommodating” a
passenger rather than apologizing for dragging a bloody passenger
off the plane—backfired as the response to the video mounted. It is a
wonder that United’s stockholders have not reaccommodated Munoz
by freeing him for other employment opportunities.
Conclusion

This essay reinforces the importance of corrective action as a potential
strategy in crisis communication theory. Initially, situational crisis communication theory included corrective action as an option for crisis
communication (see Coombs, 1998; Coombs & Holladay, 2004). However, later incarnations of the theory omitted this important possibility
(Coombs, 2012; see also Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Corrective action
is not always appropriate, nor is it necessarily persuasive. However, it
must be a strategy in the toolbox of crisis communication.
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ABSTRACT
As of August 2017, approximately 684 people have died in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since the
coronavirus Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS-CoV) outbreak in 2012. Saudi Arabia became
the leading country for the number of illnesses and deaths related to MERS-CoV, making this a
health megacrisis. Early Ministry of Health (MOH) communication efforts proved ineffective and
created anger, confusion, and mistrust. Changes in command, implementation of new guidelines
and policies, and a health preventive campaign have been instrumental in the fight. The MOH
launched the “We Can Stop It” campaign in 2015. This study shares results from a survey of 875
students from King Saud University on the credibility of MOH information and effectiveness of
the campaign’s prevention recommendations. Results show that the MOH is a credible source of
information and that Saudis are following most, but not all, recommended preventive measures.
Those persons with higher perceived benefits and lower barriers are more likely to follow recommended guidelines.
KEYWORDS: Coronavirus; MERS-CoV; Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; health
belief model; health campaigns

Beginning in September 2012, a major health crisis in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (KSA) erupted. The coronavirus Middle East respiratory
syndrome (MERS-CoV), a serious and sometimes fatal infection, had
infected more than 1,668 people by August 3, 2017, and taken the lives
of 684 people in the KSA (Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia [MOH], 2017). These numbers ranked the KSA as the country
with the highest number of cases in the world, prompting the Ministry
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of Health of the KSA (MOH) to take action (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2015, 2017; MOH, 2017). The problem
is that initial responses from the MOH left KSA residents confused,
angry, and suspicious of the MOH’s mixed messages. Saudis were first
told by minister of health Abdullah al Rebeeah that he had no idea
why the disease was spreading across the KSA, but instead of offering
precautionary measures, he said that no clinical measures were needed
(Alomran, Knickmeyer, & McKay, 2014). This created a megacrisis for
the KSA, which faced a significant threat to the health of its people
without knowing why or how to stop the virus from spreading.
A megacrisis is defined as “a set of interacting crises that are severe
in impact, complex in nature, and global in fallout, with no seeming
end in sight” (Yen & Salmon, 2017, p. 1). The impact of MERS-CoV on
not only the KSA but also the world defined MERS-CoV as a megacrisis. The World Health Organization (WHO; 2016) has stated that
other countries, such as South Korea, are in states of high alert, with
fears that the outbreak could cause severe harm to health and the economic and social services of countries where health systems continue
to be unprepared. Furthermore, the WHO (2016) warned that hospital
outbreaks of MERS-CoV in the KSA “could escalate both nationally
and internationally into a perpetual global health threat” (para. 1). The
number of deaths, the absence of vaccines to treat the disease, and the
complexity of the disease and how it transmits further qualify MERSCoV as a megacrisis.
It took the firing of Abdullah al Rebeeah and the hiring of a new
minister of health before the MOH launched a comprehensive campaign on March 4, 2015, called “We Can Stop It,” on its website. The
goals of the campaign were to educate the public about MERS-CoV
and to inform them about prevention best practices (MOH, 2015). The
campaign incorporated both traditional and social media that included
key messages and specific preventive actions. This may indicate that
people started to gain trust in the information the MOH disseminated
after its initial response to the MERS-CoV crisis. Nonetheless, the extent to which this campaign has been effective in terms of education
and prevention, and in improving the MOH’s credibility, is unknown.
The purpose of this study is to assess the extent to which KSA residents are adhering to the preventive measures promoted by the MOH’s
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“We Can Stop It” campaign. Using the health belief model (HBM),
we surveyed students from King Saud University (KSU) to assess the
credibility of the MOH’s messages. We then analyzed the perceived
susceptibility and perceived severity of contracting the disease along
with the perceived benefits of and perceived barriers to following the
MOH’s prevention recommendations. We further analyzed the extent to
which the campaign messages impacted cues to action and self-efficacy
to perform the recommended preventive behaviors.
Case Study

The MOH was established in 1951 and charged with carrying out health
affairs in the kingdom, including all regulations, laws, and legislation
for all governmental and private health sectors in the KSA. It monitors
and regulates health institutions’ performance and offers training to all
health practitioners. Approximately 6%–7% of the country’s budget is
allotted annually to the MOH to develop and enhance health services
(MOH, 2017). Much of the money is spent on awareness and education campaigns, using multiple communication channels that include
traditional media and, more recently, social media.
The first case of MERS-CoV was documented in the KSA in September 2012. The WHO (2015) defined MERS as a “viral respiratory
disease caused by novel MERS-CoV” (para. 1). Its symptoms include
severe acute respiratory illness, with fever, cough, shortness of breath,
congestion in the nose or throat, and possible diarrhea (CDC, 2015;
MOH, 2017). The virus circulated mainly in countries inside the Arabian Peninsula, such as the KSA, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,
and Qatar, as well as in some Middle Eastern countries, such as Turkey
and Egypt (WHO, 2015a). Although the majority of cases of MERSCoV are attributed to human–human infections, camels are believed to
play a significant role in transmitting the disease among human beings.
However, researchers have not yet determined the exact role and route
of the transmission (WHO, 2015b).
Initial Crisis Response

When the outbreak of MERS-CoV first hit the KSA, the MOH did a
poor job of providing clear and updated information. For example,
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during a news conference, Minister al Rabeeah told the public that he
had no idea why MERS was spreading across the KSA and said that no
clinical measures were needed during pilgrim season, a time during
which the KSA hosts millions of people every year from all around the
world (Alomran et al., 2014). The MOH provided no guidelines, leaving people and health care providers panicked, confused, and angered
(British Broadcasting Corporation, 2014). There was also no precrisis
planning, meaning that the MOH had to start from scratch in understanding the virus and how to communicate preventive measures to
the public. Saudi physicians and some international virologists from
research centers echoed the public outcry, stating that poor communication and lack of accountability have hindered the KSA’s ability
to handle such crises (Reuters, 2014). Poor communication from the
MOH trickled down to other health entities, intensifying the problem
and creating a lack of communication and mismanagement between
hospitals, government departments, and laboratories. This caused delays
in reporting and recording MERS-CoV cases, according to some Saudi
physicians (Reuters, 2014). As a result, Minister al Rabeeah was fired
from his position. Two other ministers were hired and fired within a
short period of time. It was not until 2014, two years after the initial
outbreak, that people witnessed dramatic changes in how the MOH
communicated with the public. This provided new hope for change
and improvement in the MOH’s policies concerning how it handles
crisis responses (Reuters, 2014).
New Efforts, New Hope

The MOH took significant steps to reduce the spread of MERS-CoV
by implementing new communication strategies and prevention
guidelines. The MOH stated that it “put in place measures to ensure
best practices of data gathering, reporting (and) transparency are
strictly observed” and “to ensure that from now on, case information
will be accurate, reliable and timely” (Reuters, 2014, para. 5). In an effort to regain the public’s trust, the MOH established a Command and
Control Center (CCC) in June 2014 consisting of physicians, scientists,
and experts in partnership with international organizations, such as
the WHO. The CCC’s role is to conduct research, control infection,
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manage clinical operations, and conduct data analysis with regard to
MERS-CoV (MOH, 2017; Reuters, 2014). As a result, the MOH started
to establish two-way communication by releasing more accurate and
timely information to the public through multiple communication
channels, including social media in different languages.
On March 4, 2015, the MOH launched its most aggressive and com
prehensive MERS-CoV campaign, called “We Can Stop It.” The aim
of this campaign was to increase awareness about MERS-CoV and
inform the Saudi people about best practices to prevent the spread of
MERS-CoV disease (MOH, 2015). Traditional media, including radio,
television, and newspapers, and social media are being used to reach
various audience segments. Preventive messages are being conveyed
through posters, brochures, and interviews with health experts. Key
messages include (a) information on how the virus is transmitted, (b)
signs and symptoms, and (c) what to do if one feels sick. Additional
resources are also provided.
The campaign has disseminated short videos via social media to
deliver preventive and instructional health messages to encourage
individuals to wash their hands with soap for at least 20 seconds, follow a healthy diet to boost the immune system, exercise, avoid camels,
and wear masks as well as instructing them how to sneeze to avoid
the spread of germs. Table 1 provides examples of key executional and
preventive messages distributed via multiple communication channels.
The use of Twitter has been instrumental in increasing awareness
and knowledge of the disease while offering preventive measures.
People are asked to link their Twitter accounts to the “We Can Stop It”
campaign to receive and retweet weekly updated health messages from
the MOH. The number of participants on Twitter has reached more
than 8,480,718 (MOH, 2017).
The developers of this campaign further recognized the importance
of audience segmentation, a key ingredient to a successful campaign that
was missing from earlier efforts. Campaign messages were developed
specifically for high-risk groups: (a) parents and teachers, (b) patients
and their families, (c) health care professionals, (d) camel herders,
and (e) those in the workforce (MOH, 2017). Although the frequency
of coming into contact with a camel depends on individual lifestyle,
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TABLE 1 Key Preventive Messages Described in the Campaign Materials

Channel

Type of message

Message

Posters distributed in hospitals,
workplace, schools, and
shopping malls

Educational and
preventive

Definition of MERS-CoV, how
it transmits, and its symptoms;
poster also includes the MERSCoV preventive measures, such as
wearing a mask and using a tissue
when coughing and sneezing

Videos distributed via the
MOH’s YouTube channel and
social media, such as Twitter
and Facebook

Preventive

How to avoid MERS-CoV through
adopting health behaviors like
frequent handwashing

Videos distributed via the
MOH’s YouTube channel and
social media platforms

Preventive

What to do if a person develops
MERS-CoV symptoms

Videos mainly circulated via
the MOH’s Twitter, Facebook,
and YouTube accounts by
including #MERS-CoV

Educational

The proper way of wearing and
using masks

Videos mainly circulated via
the MOH’s Twitter, Facebook,
and YouTube accounts by
including #MERS-CoV

Educational

Important guidelines outlining
how to handle camels and avoid
those infected with MERS-CoV

Twitter: People were
encouraged to participate
in a campaign in Twitter by
registering their accounts with
the MOH. The MOH would
tweet about MERS-CoV weekly
on behalf of each registered
account.

Educational and
preventive

All information related to MERSCoV and healthy behaviors

TV

Educational,
preventive, Q&A

All information related to MERSCoV and healthy behaviors
discussed with health experts and
officials from MOH and different
hospitals

Radio

Updates and
reports

What the MOH is doing to reduce
MERS-CoV
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campaign messages address this audience because Riyadh and Jeddah
have the largest camel trades in the country.
Literature Review on Health Belief Model

The HBM was developed in the 1950s with the aim of explaining and
predicting individuals’ health behaviors (Champion & Skinner, 2008;
National Cancer Institute, 2005). The HBM is a psychological model developed by psychologists Hochbaum, Rosenstock, and Kegels
(1952/2016), who worked for the U.S. Public Health Service (Glanz,
Rimer, & Lewis, 2002; Janz & Becker, 1984), and was first used to gain
a better understanding of why free tuberculosis (TB) health screening
programs were not very successful (Glanz et al., 2002; Hochbaum, 1958;
Janz & Becker, 1984). Particularly, the HBM aims to aid understanding
of why individuals do not adopt disease strategies and behaviors during
health campaigns and refuse to engage in preventive behaviors (Hayden,
2013; Hochbaum, 1958; Janz & Becker, 1984; Thweatt & Query, 2005).
The HBM encompasses four dimensions: perceived susceptibility,
perceived severity, perceived benefits, and perceived risks. Perceived
susceptibility posits that the more an individual perceives the risk of
a disease, the more likely he or she will be to engage in behaviors to
decrease that risk (Glanz et al., 2002; Hayden, 2013; Hochbaum, 1958;
Janz & Becker, 1984). Perceived severity includes some evaluation of
the consequences of an illness based on medical information and
knowledge as well as some beliefs about the negative consequences
of a certain behavior or disease that might occur for an individual
(Hayden, 2013; Janz & Becker, 1984). The third dimension, perceived
benefits, suggests that individuals perceive the value and usefulness of
adopting new behaviors in regard to minimizing the risk of an illness
and will likely adopt new behaviors based on their perceptions of their
benefits in reducing threats (Hayden, 2013; Janz & Becker, 1984). The
fourth dimension, perceived barriers, is the most powerful dimension of HBM (Janz & Becker, 1984), in that individuals evaluate the
obstacles and difficulties they might encounter when adopting a new
behavior. This dimension, however, might result in individuals giving
up on adopting a new behavior (Hayden, 2013; Janz & Becker, 1984).

34

alsulaiman and rentner

Individuals usually evaluate the benefits and consequences of a new
behavior before overcoming the old one (Hayden, 2013).
The HBM also suggests that besides the four perceptions, individuals’ behaviors can be influenced by what is called a cue to action, which
includes external and internal cues. External cues are events, people,
mass media, health providers, and any external factor that can trigger
people to change their behaviors (Hayden, 2013; Janz & Becker, 1984).
Internal cues include psychological cues, such as pain and symptoms,
that trigger individuals to adopt a new behavior (Janz & Becker, 1984).
Moreover, Bandura integrated a self-efficacy dimension into the model
in 1988 (Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1988). This dimension is
concerned about an individual’s own ability and capability to make a
change, such as adopting new, healthier behaviors. Studies found that
individuals who believe in their ability to achieve, and skill in achieving, a certain goal are more likely to attain that goal (Hayden, 2013).
Recently, the HBM has been widely used in health education campaigns and programs (Glanz et al., 2002) and has shown significant
success in encouraging individuals to take preventive measures and
adopt new behaviors to address diverse health issues around the world
(see, for a study of vaccines among hemodialysis patients, Adams, Hall,
& Fulghum, 2014; for a study of reducing hypertension among women
by encouraging physical activity, Hoseini, Maleki, Moeini, & Sharifirad,
2014; for a study of a nutrition program by increasing calcium intake
among girls in high schools, Naghashpour, Shakerinejad, Lourizadeh,
Hajinajaf, & Jarvandi, 2014; and for a study of injury prevention among
high school students, Cao, Chen, & Wang, 2014). Compared to other
models, the HBM expands to support and maintain health behavior
change interventions (Champion & Skinner, 2008). Additionally, the
model has been applied to many health behaviors and in many campaigns, including in several Arab countries, such as Jordan, the KSA,
and Egypt, and has shown significant results (see, for a study of breast
cancer in Jordan, Mikhail & Petro- Nustas, 2001; for a study of colorectal
cancer screening in the KSA, Almadi et al., 2015; and for a study in the
practice of self-examination for breast cancer among Saudi women,
Abolfotouh et al., 2015).
The HBM is suitable for assessing the impact of the MOH’s messages
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on the perceived susceptibility and perceived severity of contracting
the disease and on the perceived benefits of and perceived barriers to
following MOH preventive guidelines. The following three research
questions (RQs) were derived from this review:
RQ1: To what extent is the MOH seen as a credible source of information on MERS-CoV?
RQ2: What is the impact of the “We Can Stop It” campaign on the
perceived susceptibility and perceived severity of contracting the
disease and on the perceived benefits of and perceived barriers to
following MOH preventive guidelines?
RQ3: To what extent have the MOH’s campaign messages impacted
cues to action and self-efficacy?

Method
The Campaign

The “We Can Stop It” campaign includes components on how the disease is transmitted, signs and symptoms, and what to do if one feels ill.
Additional tactics include awareness presentations in schools, shopping
malls, and universities; established school guidelines to educate parents, teachers, and students on the proper ways to prevent MERS-CoV;
presentations across the country by health experts; and social events
to teach prevention of the disease. This study focuses specifically on
key preventive messages described in the campaign materials. These
include washing hands frequently, wearing a mask when visiting sick
people, staying away from camels, getting enough sleep and exercise,
eating a healthy diet, and covering the mouth when coughing and sneezing. Many of these prevention tactics are demonstrated on posters and
in videos and are shared on the MOH’s website and on social media.
Institutional Review Board Approval

This study was reviewed and approved prior to its implementation by
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Bowling Green State University (BGSU), Bowling Green, Ohio. The study was also reviewed and
approved prior to its implementation by the Deanship of Scientific
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Research at KSU, Riyadh. After obtaining approval from the IRB at
BGSU and the Deanship of Scientific Research at KSU, the researcher
contacted the Deanship of E-Transaction and Communication to disseminate the e-mail invitation with the survey link.
Sample

A convenience online sampling method was used among college students at KSU. KSU enrolls approximately 50,000 students. The city
of Riyadh was selected because it is one of two major cities with the
highest number of MERS-CoV cases in the KSA (MOH, 2015). The
university hosts domestic students from regions across the country as
well as international students.
Data were collected at the end of the spring semester and the beginning of summer 2016. An invitation to participate in an online survey
designed through Qualtrics was sent to the Deanship of E-Transactions
and Communications at KSU, and from there, it was sent directly to
the students by e-mail. Three reminders were sent. A total 875 students
participated in the survey, with a completion rate of 63% (n = 551). All
data were analyzed using SPSS.
Instrument

The researchers used the HBM Scale (Champion, 1993) but modified
the scale to make it applicable to this study by substituting MERS-CoV
for breast cancer. For example, the original scale asked respondents to
agree or disagree with the statement “It is extremely likely I will get
breast cancer,” while in this study, the item was modified to read “It is
extremely likely I will get MERS-CoV.” The questionnaire consisted of
43 items addressing the HBM’s variables. Seven questions examined perceived severity, five questions perceived susceptibility, seven questions
perceived barriers, seven questions perceived benefits, eight questions
cues to action, and nine questions perceived self-efficacy. A 5-point
Likert scale was used, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree). Higher scores on the six scales mean greater perceived severity,
perceived susceptibility, perceived barriers, perceived benefits, cues to
action, and self-efficacy, respectively. Internal consistency of the original scale was measured using Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients,

The Health Belief Model and Preventative Measures

37

which yielded results from .80 to .93. The content validity of this scale
was also tested by three well-known judges who were familiar with
the HBM (Champion, 1993). The scale used in this study was tested
for reliability and validity and showed similar results to Champion’s
scale (Table 1). The study also adapted Meyer’s media credibility scale
of five dimensions—believability, accuracy, trustworthiness, fairness,
and completeness—to assess the credibility of coronavirus messages
disseminated across different communication channels (Meyer, 1988).
Meyer’s scale shows high reliability and high validity (West, 1994).
Respondents who never sought MERS-CoV information were
blocked from answering and assessing the credibility of communication channels (media credibility scale) as well as the likelihood of
using different communication channels to seek MERS-CoV information; they were automatically diverted to demographic questions.
The questionnaire also included the MOH’s recommended measures
to prevent MERS-CoV.
Validity of HBM MERS-CoV scale

Prior to IRB approval, the survey went through translation and validity processes. The English-language questionnaire was assessed
for content and face validity by three experts from BGSU who were
professors and experts in health communication. Changes were made
based on the experts’ recommendations. Additionally, the researcher
sent the questionnaire to a doctor and an epidemiologist to ensure
appropriateness of language used, comprehension, and correctness of
terminology. Modifications were made based on all experts’ recommendations and notes.
After the editing process, cognitive testing was conducted by giving
the survey to three English speakers. Each English speaker was asked to
review the clarity, easiness, and appropriateness of the survey language.
Comments and problems led to some revisions to the language and
format of the questionnaire. After ensuring the clarity of the language
used in the instrument, two native Arabic speakers who studied in the
United States and hold master’s degrees translated the questionnaire
into Arabic. The researcher verified the translation to ensure that the
correctness of the translation reflected the study aim and scope. Finally,
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the translation of the questionnaire was reviewed and verified by a faculty member in the Department of Arabic at KSU who held a master’s
degree in linguistic studies from the United Kingdom. Modifications
were made to several items on the Arabic questionnaire regarding word
choice and grammar. The researcher then conducted a pilot study by
asking five college students, both male and female, to take the Arabic
and English questionnaires to ensure clarity of the language. Few items
were adjusted based on students’ comments. Participants in the study
were allowed to choose the language of the study (Arabic or English).
Reliabilities of the HBM subscales in this study were analyzed using
Cronbach’s alpha. Results were similar to the original scales Champion
(1993) obtained (Table 2).
Results
Descriptive Statistics

Of the 875 students who participated in the survey, 65% were women
and 35% were men. Approximately 80% of the students were aged 18–24
years, followed by 18% who were 25–34 years old. Approximately 12% of
respondents were first-year students, 17% were second-year students,
17% were third-year students, and 16% were fourth-year students. Approximately 12% were fifth- and sixth-year students. Graduate students
accounted for approximately 26% of the respondents (Table 3).

TABLE 2 Health Belief Model Reliability

Subscale

Current data

Champion’s data

Susceptibility

.84

.93

Severity

.82

.80

Barriers

.71

.88

Benefits

.77

.80

Cues to action

.80

.83

Self-efficacy

.82

.88
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TABLE 3 Characteristics of the Study Sample

Sample characteristic

N

%

18–24

436

79.13

25–34

99

17.95

35–44

15

2.74

45–54

1

0.18

First year in college

64

11.62

Second year in college

92

16.70

Third year in college

95

17.24

Fourth year in college

88

15.97

Fifth year in college

45

8.17

Sixth year in college

25

4.54

Graduate student

142

25.77

Female

359

65.15

Male

192

34.85

163

29.58

8

1.45

Age (years)

Education

Gender

Field of study
Health or related major
Agriculture or related major

Research Question 1

Participants in the study were first asked questions related to information seeking regarding MERS-CoV. These questions asked participants
how often they sought information about MERS-CoV, where they first
sought this information, and their likelihood of using various communication channels when seeking information. The study found that
approximately 52% of participants sought MERS-CoV information
one to two times a year, 23% sought it once every other month, 10.3%
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sought it once every month, 10% sought it one to two times per month,
5% sought it one to two times a week, and less than 1% sought MERSCoV information daily.
Approximately 87% said they would first go to the Internet. Approximately 72% of Saudis say they are very likely or likely to seek
information about MERS-CoV from their doctors. The MOH Twitter
site and website ranked as the third and fourth most highly chosen
communication channels for seeking information, with 70% and 65%,
respectively. Interestingly, traditional media outlets did not rank highly
as information-seeking channels, with 40% citing TV, 17% citing radio,
and 13% citing newspapers as their likely or very likely sources for seeking information about MERS-CoV.
Participants were asked to what extent the crisis information obtained about MERS-CoV from each medium is believable, accurate,
trustworthy, unbiased, and complete (Meyer, 1988). A 5-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (not accurate at all) to 5 (very accurate) was used for
all five dimensions. Higher scores in the five dimensions mean greater
believability, accuracy, trustworthiness, unbiasedness, and completeness. Participants were given 16 communication channels, such as the
WHO, the CDC, family and friends, and doctors or health providers,
to rate credibility in regard to MERS-CoV information. The study
showed that the MOH’s website rates as the most believable (M = 4.56,
SD = 0.76), the most accurate (M = 4.44, M = 0.78), the most trustworthy (M = 4.45, SD = 0.80), and the most complete source (M = 4.13,
SD = 1.00), and it rated highly for being unbiased (M = 3.51, SD =
1.26). The MOH’s Twitter account was ranked second after its website
in regard to believability (M = 4.46, SD = 0.83), accuracy (M = 4.30,
SD = 0.89), and trustworthiness (M = 4.37, SD = 0.85) and rated highly
for being unbiased and for being complete. The MOH’s YouTube channel had strong scores on believability (M = 4.30, SD = 0.90), accuracy
(M = 4.17, SD = 0.92), and trustworthiness (M = 4.24, SD = 0.91) but
lower scores on completeness (M = 3.85, SD = 1.07) and being unbiased
(M = 3.45, SD = 1.18). The MOH’s Facebook page was not seen to be as
accurate (M = 3.97, SD = 1.00) or as trustworthy (M = 4.01, SD = 1.02)
as its website or Twitter site.
Therefore, when combining the media credibility subscale, the
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TABLE 4 Subscale Correlations

Subscale

Spearman rho

SD

M

Susceptibility

0.078

0.74

2.25

Severity

0.085*

0.77

2.59

Benefits

0.075

0.61

3.78

Barriers

−0.271**

0.69

2.43

*p < .05. **p < .001 (2-tailed).

descriptive analysis shows that the MOH’s website is perceived to be
most credible (M = 21.17, SD = 3.33), followed by the WHO (M = 20.71,
SD = 3.72), the MOH Twitter site (M = 20.63, SD = 3.61), the CDC
(M = 20.38, SD = 3.89), and the MOH YouTube channel (M = 20.14,
SD = 3.78).
Research Question 2

Kruskal–Wallis, with questions that have three choices (yes, no, I don’t
know), and Mann–Whitney, with two choices (yes, no), were run to
test the correlations between the HBM subscales and adherence to the
preventive measures that the MOH has delivered and recommended.
Frequency of handwashing. Respondents were asked about the
frequency of daily handwashing. The data for individuals’ HBM subscales were analyzed using the Spearman correlation coefficient. The
findings are summarized in Table 4.
The results show that perceived severity (p < .05) and perceived
barriers (p < .001) are significantly related with the frequency of handwashing. Perceived barriers are negatively related with the frequency
of handwashing. Thus respondents with higher perceived barriers are
less likely to wash their hands than those with lower perceived barriers. The results also show a positive relationship between perceived
severity and the frequency of handwashing. Respondents with higher
perceived severity scores are more likely to wash their hands than those
with lower scores. The relationship between perceived susceptibility
and benefits and the frequency of handwashing was not significant.
Wearing masks when visiting sick people. Respondents who said
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they visited sick people were asked if they wore a mask. The nonparametric Kruskal–Wallis test indicates that the perceived susceptibility,
χ2(2, N = 552) = 8.443, p < .001, perceived severity, χ2(2, N = 552) = 6.982,
p < .05, perceived benefits, χ2(2, N = 552) = 30.445, p <.001, and perceived
barriers, χ2(2, N = 552) = 42.996, p <.001, have significant relationships
with the preventive measure of wearing a mask when visiting sick
people. The data show that people with higher susceptibility scores
(Mdn = 13) are more likely to adhere to this behavior than those with
lower scores (Mdn = 12). The results also show that respondents with
higher benefits scores (Mdn = 28) are more likely to wear a mask than
those with lower scores (Mdn = 26). However, respondents with high
severity scores (Mdn = 18) are less likely to wear a mask than those
with lower scores (Mdn = 16). Similarly, respondents with higher barriers scores (Mdn = 18) are less likely to wear a mask when visiting
sick people than respondents with lower barriers scores (Mdn = 14).
Staying away from camels. Respondents were asked if they kept
away from camels. The Mann–Whitney U-test indicated that perceived
benefits, U = 7,747.5, p < .001, and barriers, U = 9,565.0, Z = −3.322,
p < .001, have significant relationships with this preventive measure.
Respondents with higher benefits scores (Mdn = 27) are more likely
to keep away from camels than those with lower scores (Mdn = 25).
Additionally, respondents with higher barriers scores (Mdn = 20) are
less likely to follow this preventive measure than those with lower
scores (Mdn = 16). Relationships between susceptibility and severity
and staying away from camels were not significant.
Getting enough sleep. Participants were asked if they got enough
sleep every day. Participants defined for themselves if they thought they
were getting enough sleep and answered this question yes or no. The
Mann–Whitney U-test was used to examine the association between
each subscale of the HBM and the preventive MERS-CoV measure of
getting enough sleep. The findings indicate significant relationships
between perceived severity, U = 29,095.0, Z = −2.551, p < .05, perceived
benefits, U = 29,819.0, Z = −2.837, p < .05, and perceived barriers,
U = 28,597.5, p < .01, and getting enough sleep. Respondent with high
benefit scores (Mdn = 27) are more likely to get enough sleep than respondents with lower scores (Mdn = 26). In contrast, respondents with
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high barriers scores (Mdn = 17) and severity scores (Mdn = 19) are less
likely to get enough sleep than those with lower scores (Mdn = 16 and
Mdn = 18, respectively). No significant relationship was found between
perceived susceptibility and this particular behavior.
Following a healthy and balanced diet. The Mann–Whitney
U-test was used to examine the relationship between each subscale
of the HBM and the preventive MERS-CoV measure of following a
healthy and balanced diet. A significant relationship was found for
the perceived severity, U = 33,935.0, Z = −1.960, p < .05, and perceived
barriers, U = 30,888.0, Z = −3.602, p < .001. Respondents with higher
severity scores (Mdn = 18) were more likely to follow a healthy and
balanced diet than those with lower scores (Mdn = 17), whereas those
with higher barriers scores were less likely to follow a healthy diet
(Mdn = 16). The relationship between susceptibility and a healthy and
balanced diet is not significant.
Covering the mouth or using a tissue when coughing or sneezing. The Mann–Whitney U-test indicated that there is a significant

relationship between perceived benefits and the preventive measure
of covering the mouth or using a tissue when coughing or sneezing,
U = 10,754.5, Z = −4.785, p < .001. Respondents with high perceived
benefits scores (Mdn = 27) are more likely to cover their mouths when
sneezing than those with lower scores (Mdn = 25). The Mann–Whitney
U-test also showed a relationship between perceived barriers and the
preventive measure of covering the mouth when sneezing, U = 11,727.0,
Z = −3.993, p < .001. Those with high barriers scores (Mdn = 19) are less
likely to cover their mouths when sneezing than respondents with lower
barriers scores (Mdn = 16). However, the Mann–Whitney U-test indicated that neither perceived susceptibility nor perceived severity is significantly related with covering the mouth when sneezing or coughing.
Taking time to exercise weekly. The data for the individuals’ HBM
subscales were analyzed using the Spearman correlation coefficient.
Results indicate significant relationships between perceived severity,
p < .01, perceived benefits, p < .01, perceived barriers, p < .01, and the
preventive measure of exercise. Perceived severity and perceived barriers were negatively correlated with time spent on exercise. In contrast, perceived benefits was positively correlated with time devoted to
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exercise every week. The relationship between perceived susceptibility,
p = .279, and time spent on exercising was not significant.
Research Question 3
Frequency of handwashing. Respondents were asked about the

frequency of daily handwashing. The data for the individuals’ HBM
subscales were analyzed using the Spearman correlation coefficient.
The results show that cues to action, p < .001, ρ = .190, and self-efficacy,
p < .01, ρ = .145, are positively correlated with the preventive measure
of handwashing. Respondents with higher cues to action and selfefficacy scores are more likely to wash their hands than respondents
with lower scores.
Wearing a mask when visiting sick people. Respondents who
said they visited sick people were asked if they wore a mask. The
nonparametric Kruskal–Wallis test indicated that cues to action,
χ2(2, N = 552) = 35.698, p < .001, and self-efficacy, χ2(2, N = 552) = 38.884,
p < .001, are significantly related to the preventive measure of wearing a mask when visiting sick people. The data show that people with
higher cues to action scores (Mdn = 36) are more likely to adhere to
this behavior than those with lower scores (Mdn = 32) or those who do
not visit sick people (Mdn = 33). The results also show that respondents
with higher self-efficacy scores (Mdn = 39) are more likely to wear a
mask than those with lower scores (Mdn = 35).
Staying away from camels. Respondents were asked if they kept
away from camels. The Mann–Whitney U-test indicated that cues to
action, U = 10,652.0, Z = −2.336, p < .05, and self-efficacy, U = 7,620.0,
Z = −5.088, p < .001, are significantly related with this preventive
measure. Respondents with higher cues to action scores (Mdn = 33)
are more likely to keep away from camels than those with lower scores
(Mdn = 32); however, respondents with higher self-efficacy scores
(Mdn = 36) are less likely to follow this preventive measure than those
with lower scores (Mdn = 33).
Getting enough sleep. Participants were asked if they get enough
sleep every day. The Mann–Whitney U-test was used to examine the
association between each subscale of the HBM and the preventive
MERS-CoV measure of getting enough sleep. The study indicates
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significant relationships between cues to action, U = 26,772.0, Z =
−3.878, p < .001, and self-efficacy, U = 28,106.0, Z = −3.117, p < .01, and
getting enough sleep. Respondents with high cues to action scores
(Mdn = 33) are more likely to get enough sleep than respondents with
lower scores (Mdn = 32). Respondents with high self-efficacy scores
(Mdn = 36) are more likely to get enough sleep than those with lower
scores (Mdn = 35).
Following a healthy and balanced diet. The Mann–Whitney
U-test was used to examine the relationship between cues to action, selfefficacy, and the preventive MERS-CoV measure of following a healthy
and balanced diet. A significant relationship was found for the perceived
cues to action, U = 22,755.0, Z = −7.987, p < .001, and self-efficacy,
U = 28,228.0, Z = −5.036, p < .001. Respondents with higher cues to
action scores (Mdn = 35) are more likely to follow healthy and balanced diets than those with lower scores (Mdn = 31.5). Also, respondents with higher self-efficacy scores (Mdn = 37) are more likely to
follow healthy and balanced diets than respondents with lower scores
(Mdn = 36).
Covering the mouth or using a tissue when coughing or sneezing. The Mann–Whitney U-test indicated that there is a significant re-

lationship between perceived cues to action and the preventive measure
of covering the mouth or using a tissue when coughing or sneezing,
U = 12,067.5, Z = −3.719, p < .001. Respondents with high cues to action
scores (Mdn = 33) are more likely to cover their mouths when sneezing than those with lower scores (Mdn = 30). The Mann–Whitney
U-test also shows a positive correlation between self-efficacy and the
preventive measure of covering the mouth when sneezing, U = 11,018.5,
Z = −4.566, p < .001. Those with higher self-efficacy scores (Mdn = 36)
are more likely to cover their mouths when sneezing than respondents
with lower scores (Mdn = 33).
Taking time to exercise weekly. The data for both cues to action
and self-efficacy scales were analyzed using the Spearman correlation
coefficient. The data show significant relationships between cues to action, p < .001, ρ = .240, and the time devoted to exercising every week.
The data also show that self-efficacy, p < .01, ρ = .122, also is positively
correlated with time devoted to exercising every week.
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Discussion
MOH as a Credible Source

The results show that the MOH website and social media are likely places for Saudi people to seek information on MERS-CoV, after
Internet searches. Physicians ranked third. Interestingly, although
physicians ranked third for seeking information, they ranked sixth
as most credible source. The MOH website ranked first as the most
credible source for MERS-CoV information, followed by the WHO,
the MOH’s Twitter page, the CDC, the MOH’s YouTube channel, and
doctors and health care providers. This finding is compatible with
the report recently released by the Saudi online newspaper Makkah,
which stated that the MERS-CoV topic was among the most searched
on the MOH’s website (“Seasonal Influenza,” 2017). This may indicate
that the MOH was able to regain trust when it implemented strategic
communication during the “We Can Stop It” campaign, thus showing
high Web traffic from users searching for MERS-CoV information.
Although these findings indicate that the MOH is seen as a credible
source, five credibility measures were applied to better understand if
there are differences in believability, accuracy, trustworthiness, being
unbiased, and completeness among the 16 communication channels.
The MOH website and MOH Twitter account ranked first and second,
respectively, for most believable, accurate, and trustworthy. The MOH
website also ranked first for most complete information on MERS-CoV.
Perceived Susceptibility and Severity

Only one preventive measure was significantly related to susceptibility.
Those who perceived a higher risk of contracting MERS-CoV were
more likely to wear a mask and see the benefit of doing so. As part of
the campaign, posters depicted people wearing a mask when visiting
sick people, thus indicating that this guideline was being followed.
The severity of contracting the virus is positively correlated with
handwashing and eating a healthy and balanced diet, meaning the
more people perceive they are at risk for contracting MERS-CoV, the
more likely they are to wash their hands frequently and eat healthier.
Surprisingly, wearing a mask, getting enough sleep, and getting enough
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exercise are negatively correlated. This means that although people
perceive the severity of contracting MERS-CoV as being great, they
have not been influenced to get more sleep or exercise, eat a healthier
diet, or wear a mask when visiting sick people. Perhaps this disconnect
is due to a mentality of believing that they will not get sick, or perhaps
they have not yet encountered anyone with the virus. This warrants a
second phase of this campaign, which should focus on susceptibility to
the disease. Campaign messages based on Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980)
theory of reasoned action could be useful in moving people toward
practicing the MOH’s recommended preventive behaviors (Ajzen, 2012).
Perceived Benefits and Barriers

Five preventive measures were associated with benefits of practicing the
behaviors. These were wearing a mask when visiting sick people, staying
away from camels, getting enough sleep, getting enough exercise, and
covering the mouth or using a tissue when coughing or sneezing. Key
campaign messages providing step-by-step guidance through verbal
and visual methods may have contributed to these healthy practices.
Interestingly, the practices of frequent handwashing and eating a healthy
and balanced diet were not significant.
Not surprisingly, if barriers to practicing these recommendations
are high, people are less likely to practice them. This is the case for
washing hands frequently, staying away from camels, getting enough
sleep and exercise, eating a healthy and balanced diet, and covering the
mouth or using a tissue when coughing or sneezing. Several explanations can be offered here. For camel herders, it is not possible to stay
away from camels—their livelihood. If people are working long hours
at a job and/or tending to family needs, sleep and exercise may suffer. If people do not have access to a tissue, they may cough or sneeze
into their hands, which is an unsanitary practice. Decreasing barriers
to practice is probably the greatest challenge this campaign faces, as
many situations, such as being a camel herder or being a working parent, cannot be changed. At the same time, campaign messages should
continue to remind people to practice these healthy behaviors when
possible.
Interestingly, wearing a mask when visiting sick people is seen
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as a barrier, yet people are also more likely to practice this behavior.
This is the only barrier that respondents say they are willing or able to
overcome, meaning practicing this behavior is important to them in
preventing the spread of MERS-CoV.
Cues to Action and Self-Efficacy

Respondents with higher cues to action, both external and internal, are
more likely to perform all of the recommended preventive guidelines
than those with lower scores. These included washing hands frequently,
staying away from camels, getting enough sleep, getting enough exercise,
eating a healthy and balanced diet, and covering the mouth or using a
tissue when coughing or sneezing.
External cues are those factors that trigger people to change their
behavior and may include events, people, mass media, and health
providers, among other factors. Internal cues include psychological
cues, such as pain and symptoms that trigger individuals to adopt a
new behavior. It is reasonable to argue that, to some extent, the external cues the “We Can Stop It” campaign provided contributed to
the practice of the behaviors. It is also reasonable to argue that many
health providers adopted the MOH guidelines and that use of traditional and social media helped moved the campaign messages into the
public sphere.
Self-efficacy was positively correlated with five of the six recommended preventive guidelines; that is, Saudi people are more likely
to wash their hands frequently, get enough sleep, get enough exercise,
eat a healthy and balanced diet, and cover the mouth or use a tissue
when coughing or sneezing if they have higher levels of self-efficacy.
The campaign messages teach people how to perform a new behavior
and stress that they have the ability and capability to make change. The
more people believe in their ability and skill to achieve a certain goal,
the more likely they will be to attain that goal. Key campaign messages
may have contributed to providing the self-efficacy people needed to
perform these behaviors.
Self-efficacy was negatively correlated with staying away from
camels. This makes sense in that those who work with or around camels
would not have the ability to stay away from them.
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Overall Impact

In the “We Can Stop It” campaign, two-way communication replaced
the MOH’s one-way model of communicating during the megacrisis
of the initial MERS-CoV outbreak. Although no benchmark study is
available with which to assess credibility levels of the MOH at the beginning of the crisis, media coverage, public outrage on social media,
and the firing of the minister of health all pointed to failures to communicate effectively. Since launching the “We Can Stop It” campaign,
the MOH has become the first place Saudis go to seek information
on MERS-CoV, after Internet search engines. This is consistent with
Fox and Duggan’s (2013) study that found that the majority of Internet
users in the United States go first to the Internet search engines, such
as Google and Yahoo!, to seek health information. Ranking the MOH
as the first place to seek MERS-CoV information after the Internet
search engines also is consistent with crisis communication guidelines
in which an organization should position itself as the main source of
information to tell its side of the story during a crisis (Coombs, 2014).
Being the main source of information during a crisis ensures that an
organization will be in charge of handling the flow of accurate information (Coombs, 2007). The MOH, in fact, declares its website to be the
main hub for MERS-CoV information. Furthermore, the study found
that the MOH’s website is seen as the most credible source of information among 15 other communication channels, including international
organizations. This success could partially be attributed to the implementation of a strategic communication plan and effective policy that
emphasizes transparency, accountability, accuracy, and engagement
with the public, as seen in the “We Can Stop It” campaign.
The study also found that the majority of participants are more likely
to use social media to seek information about MERS-CoV than traditional media. This is consistent with the Pew Research (2016) findings
that traditional media in the United States are witnessing a dramatic
decrease in use among younger generations, especially newspapers.
Those aged between 18 and 29 years, the primary demographic of this
study, depend less on traditional media for information than any other
age group. This age group is more likely to use digital media, apps,
and social networking sites to seek information, according to the Pew
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research report. The emphasis on social media, especially Twitter, has
allowed the public to be more interactive with the MOH. For example,
the MOH tweets weekly updates on new cases and provides specific tips
on how to avoid the virus. People are then encouraged to retweet these
health messages, providing others with consistent, accurate, and timely
updates. With approximately 8.5 million followers, the MOH Twitter
site has proven to be an effective two-way communication tool. What
has shown to be the least effective of MOH’s communication tools is its
Facebook page, which ranked lowest of all the MOH’s communication
channels. Facebook, in general, ranked low on all measures of credibility, indicating that Facebook is not the strongest or best method to
reach Saudi people with pertinent health information.
Regarding campaign messages, participants who had high scores
on the HBM five dimensions (susceptibility, severity, benefits, cues to
action, and self-efficacy) were more likely to comply with the MOH’s
guidelines and instructions. For instance, people with higher selfefficacy, cues to action, and perceived severity were more likely to wash
their hands than those with lower scores. Respondents with high HBM
scores were more likely to wear a mask when visiting sick people. Such
findings are consistent with Champion’s (1990) correlations between
high HBM scores and the frequency of breast self-examination.
The study also found that respondents with high barriers scores
are less likely to follow the MOH’s MERS-CoV preventive measures,
hence the importance of reducing these barriers by addressing the challenges and obstacles that prevent Saudis from performing the MOH’s
recommended behaviors. Further studies could help the MOH better
understand what people need to overcome the barriers and then provide
effective communication strategies to address these needs.
The study showed that Saudis have the self-efficacy to follow the
campaign’s recommendations, except for staying away from camels.
This shows the importance of campaigns providing the necessary tools
to change a behavior.
Limitations

This study had three limitations. The first was the use of a convenience
sample. Although a convenience sample is less expensive than other
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types of sampling, it can provide useful information for researchers
in a short period of time (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). Cost was the
prohibitive factor in gaining a sample from the larger population. The
second limitation was the use of college students as the unit of analysis.
It is worth noting, however, that KSU is located in Riyadh, the city with
the largest number of MERS-CoV cases. It is the largest university in
the country and hosts both domestic students from various regions and
international students. Third, nonresponse bias was another limitation
of this study. Although the e-mail invitation to participate in this study
was sent to all KSU students, only 875 participated in the study, leaving
a large number of KSU students who might carry different perspectives about the topic under study. Fourth, the study did not include
baseline data or a control group to assess the credibility of the MOH’s
MERS-CoV messages; rather, it relied on participant self-report after
the MERS-CoV crisis.
Finally, we recognize that people may have been practicing preventive behaviors before the campaign or are practicing them without having been exposed to the campaign; however, we assert that the MOH’s
strong credibility has positively influenced attitudes and behaviors in
following preventive recommendations.
Conclusion

The results from this study indicate that the MOH has gained credibility
since hiring a new minister of health and launching the “We Can Stop
It” campaign. The results further illustrate that the campaign is having a positive impact in that the majority of participants are practicing
most, but not all, of the preventive guidelines set forth in the campaign.
Campaign planners facing megacrises can learn from this study how
best to develop effective campaigns. The first step is to be sure that
the organization’s key constituents see it as credible. The second step
is to provide a strong theoretical framework from which to develop
the campaign. Finally, campaigns that address perceived susceptibility
and severity of contracting a deadly virus and that identify perceived
benefits of and barriers to practicing recommended preventive health
guidelines are more likely to be successful.
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ABSTRACT
Framing of crisis events is to a large extent contested, with multiple sources and conflicting
messages. Theories of crisis communication acknowledge how people try to deal with these
competing messages, and this article seeks to deepen the understanding the process of sense
making of crisis events by connecting crisis communication to the spiral of silence theory. The
spiral of silence theory, founded by Elisabeth Noelle-Neuman, proposes that people are less
willing to express their opinions if they believe their beliefs are shared by a minority. This will lead
to a spiral in which those who feel their opinions are popular are more inclined to express their
opinions, and those who perceive their opinions are unpopular among the public become more
silent. This study analyzed changes over time in the willingness to express opinions about the
refugee crisis in Europe using a two-wave Web-panel survey (N = 1,185) in Sweden in 2015–2016.
The focus is the impact of changing government policy, which moved from a generous refugee
policy toward a more restrictive policy. Changes toward a more restrictive refugee policy did
not seem to change the overall picture. Those supporting a more restrictive policy were still less
inclined to speak their true opinions about the refugee crisis, even if the policy had changed in
their favor. On the other hand, respondents supporting a more generous refugee policy seemed
to become more cautious about expressing their opinions about the refugee crisis after the policy
change, especially when talking to strangers.
KEYWORDS: Spiral of silence; crisis communication; opinion change; refugee crisis;
interpersonal communication

Framing of crisis events is to a large extent contested (Boin, t’Hart,
& McConnell, 2009; Frandsen & Johansen, 2017; Seeger & Sellnow,
2016). Even if risk and crisis communication research largely focus
on how to create best practices for designing and disseminating crisis
communications and reaching a common public understanding of
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crisis situations, it is also pointed out that crisis events take place in
situations of framing contest (Frandsen & Johansen, 2017; Heath &
O’Hair, 2010; Seeger & Sellnow, 2016). Questions of contest can be, Is
there actually a crisis going on? Who is responsible for the upcoming
situation? How can it be solved? What is the proper way of dealing
with the crises? These questions will be addressed by decision makers,
organizations, news media, and citizens, and crisis decisions are thus
made in an environment of competing messages (Boin, t’Hart, Stern, &
Sundelius, 2005).
When discussing citizens’ perceptions of crisis events, we have to
consider how this frame contest affects the sense making of a crisis. Risk
and crisis communication has shown how people use different strategies to make sense of an uncertain situation (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013;
Vigsø & Odén, 2016). One example of these strategies is convergence
theory, which focuses on the ways in which individuals make sense of
competing information by collecting and contemplatinge information
from different sources and discussing this information with family,
friends, and neighbors (Anthony, Sellnow, & Millner, 2013; Sellnow,
Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009). However, one possible problem with
the process of sense making might be that all these communication
opportunities are not always at hand. In crises with competing frames,
people might not always be comfortable expressing what they really
think about different aspects of the crisis. Some speak out and discuss
controversial issues with their families, friends at work, or even people
they do not know. Others stay silent and are afraid to let others know
what they really think about the issue at hand.
This article seeks to deepen the understanding the process of sense
making of crisis events by connecting crisis communication to the spiral
of silence theory. Even if theories of crisis communication acknowledge
that people try to deal with competing messages, it has not taken into
consideration the social dynamics of the sense-making process. The
spiral of silence might be a way to further understand how people react
to and communicate in times of crisis.
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Literature Review
The Spiral of Silence

The spiral of silence theory proposes that people are less willing to
express their opinions when they believe their beliefs are shared by a
minority (Noelle-Neuman, 1984). We are sensitive to our surrounding
social environment and will not speak out if we fear becoming socially
isolated. This will lead to a spiral in which those who feel their opinions are popular are more inclined to express their opinions and those
who perceive their opinions are unpopular among the public become
more silent.
The spiral of silence is seen as one of the most influential theories
of communication and political communication over the last halfcentury (Donsbach, Salmon, & Tsfati, 2016) and has been tested in
numerous studies. The general conclusion of meta-analyses shows a
general but weak relationship between the perceived opinion climate
and respondents’ willingness to express their opinions (Glynn, Hayes,
& Shanahan, 1997; Glynn & Huge, 2016).
But the theory has been criticized and studies have been contested
for a number of reasons. The spiral of silence theory is so complex and
contains so many assumptions that the whole theory has never been
(and probably never will be) comprehensively tested (Matthes & Hayes,
2016). Scholars have, over the years, separated the model into manageable parts, but still, after almost 40 years of research, we find research
criticizing everything from the assumptions and the generalizability
to the design and how to measure key concepts of the theory (Hayes,
2007; Matthes & Hayes, 2016; Neuwirth, Frederick, & Mayo, 2007).
One major critical point in previous research is how research has
failed to capture the dynamics of the theory. As Matthes and Hayes
(2016) argued, research has neglected to observe the spiral in the theory
because of improper research design. Most studies use cross-sectional
data or aggregate data; the former can only capture a frozen moment of
the phenomena, and the latter have an ecology fallacy problem (Matthes & Hayes, 2016). Whether people actually change their willingness
to speak out because of the opinion climate is, to a large extent, still
unknown.
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As stated previously, the general aim of this article is to use the spiral
of silence in studying crisis communication, but the purpose is also to
deepen the knowledge of the dynamics of the spiral of silence theory.
Therefore this work builds on panel data from Sweden in 2015 and 2016
in which respondents were asked questions about their willingness to
express their opinions about the refugee crisis in Europe.
The Swedish government changed its refugee policy from an “opendoor policy” to one of the most restrictive in Europe in late fall 2015
(Ghersetti & Odén, in press).1 Because of the policy change, we are
able to measure people’s readiness to share opinions about the refugee
crisis just before the policy changed and after the change was made.
This makes it possible to evaluate whether respondents changed their
willingness to speak out when the opinion climate changed.
By studying the refugee crisis, the study also fulfills one of the
important assumptions of the spiral of silence—the requirement of
a value-laden issue. Immigration and refugees have a strong moral
component and are controversial and therefore in line with NoelleNeuman’s argument that it is only from a moral or normative element
that one can fear the threat of isolation (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015;
Noelle-Neuman, 1984; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). This will of course
also be a good example of an issue were there are competing frames
and opinions. The empirical aim is therefore to analyze to what extent
individuals change their willingness to express their opinions when
government policy concerning a value-laden issue changes.
The organization of the article is as follows. The next section reviews the key assumptions and results of spiral of silence research. This
framework is used in more detail to discuss some shortcomings and
criticisms of spiral of silence research. On the basis of previous findings,
a number of hypotheses are proposed, and thereafter the methodology
and measures used in the study are described. After presenting the results, the article ends with conclusions, a discussion of the limitations
of the study, and implications of the results for crisis communication.
The Spiral of Silence: Theory and Previous Findings

One of the important needs of the spiral of silence theory is a value-laden
issue. As said earlier, fear of isolation is only relevant when the question

Expressing Opinions About the Refugee Crisis in Europe

61

at hand is controversial. In spiral of silence research, immigration is
categorized as a transitory issue (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015). Transitory
issues are not constantly in the public eye but reemerge from time to
time. The issue salience of immigration has increased during the last
decade in Sweden and Europe in general (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup,
2008). Immigration in 2015 was, for the first time, viewed as the most
important societal issue among Swedish citizens (53% mentioned immigration as an important societal issue; Ohlsson, Ekengren, & Solevid,
2016), and immigration was also the most prominent issue during the
2014 election campaign in the news media (Johansson, 2017). Analyses
of the news media content of the election also indicates a strong focus
on immigration, and the refugee crisis was the dominant news story
during fall 2015 (Ghersetti & Odén, in press).
Some studies of the spiral of silence have focused on immigration
to test the theory. Matthes, Morrison, and Schemer (2010) analyzed the
national referendum about the naturalization of Swiss immigrants. The
results provided empirical support because those perceived as being
a minority expressed their opinions to a lesser extent. This tendency
was especially prevalent among those who were less convinced of their
opinions. Similar empirical support was also found in a study using
Asian immigration to Australia as a case (Louis, Duck, Terry, & Lalonde,
2010). Gearhart and Zhang (2015) also included a question on immigration (if undocumented immigrants should have the opportunity
to receive permanent residency) when testing different types of issues
and the spiral of silence theory. The authors found robust support for
the spiral of silence theory related to both immigration and the other
investigated issues (abortion and gay marriage).
A recurrent criticism of spiral of silence research is the lack of longitudinal studies. In most cases, research uses cross-sectional data and
can only, as Matthes and Hayes (2016) put it, analyze the social conformity hypothesis. Cross-sectional data measure at a single moment the
difference between respondents expressing their opinions and those
being silent. However, this does not capture the dynamics of opinion
change, which is one of the central aspects of the theory. To investigate
if the opinion climate leads to changes in the willingness to speak out
(the change hypothesis), studies over time are needed. Noelle-Neuman
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(1984) used trend survey data to demonstrate how aggregate opinions
increased or decreased depending on the opinion climate. As Matthes
and Hayes (2016) noted, this might give an intuitive understanding of
the phenomenon, but it is not a proper way to study changes on an
individual level and might also suffer from ecology fallacy. Trend survey
data are therefore not appropriate to study the dynamics of the spiral
of silence theory. A few studies have used panel data. Shamir (1997)
used a two-wave panel to investigate the spiral of silence and climate
change, and McDonald, Glynn, Kim, and Ostman (2001) used a fourwave panel from 1948 and conducted a secondary analysis on opinion
climate and candidate preference.
The asylum regime in Sweden has been generous and sometimes
described as an “open-door policy” (Ghersetti & Odén, in press). The
policy had broad support among the political parties, and only the
nationalist-populist Swedish Democrats (13% in the 2014 general election) opposed the policy. It should also be noted that Swedes are more
open to immigrants and welcoming refugees compared to citizens in
the rest of Europe (Sides & Citrin, 2007).
The refugee situation escalated during fall 2015, when 10,000 refugees arrived in Sweden every week and Migration Agency of Sweden
estimates claimed that 190,000 would seek asylum in Sweden in 2015
(in reality, it was 162,000).2 The Dublin Convention states that refugees should seek protection in the first European Union (EU) land
they enter,3 but most EU countries let refugees move to other countries. Sweden and Germany were considered popular because of their
generous refugee policies, but the number of refugees caused strong
tensions in the asylum-seeking process in Sweden (and Germany), not
least in terms of housing. The Swedish government (a coalition of the
Social Democrats and the Green Party), therefore, decided to change
the policy, and in November 2015, identity checks were imposed on all
modes of transport to Sweden, and the right to bring families to Sweden
was severely restricted. In one day, Sweden had changed its refugee
policy from being the most generous in the EU to being one of the
most restrictive. The only party that opposed the new policy was the
Left Party, with less than 10% support (Ghersetti & Odén, in press). The
refugee situation in Sweden (and Europe) can therefore these years be
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described in terms of a crisis as defined by Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger
(2007): “a specific, unexpected, non-routine event or series of events
that creates a high level of uncertainty and a significant or perceived
threat to high priority goals” (p. 7).
From what we know from opinion research, we can expect changes
in public opinion when policies change. Zaller (1992) discussed the elite
dominance in the news and concluded that the public reacts to elite
perspectives on information, and even if not everyone changes his or
her mind, changes in elite opinions will have a major impact on citizens’
views of societal issues (Zaller, 1992; see also Bennet, 1990; Iyengar &
Kinder, 1987). In fall 2015, many political parties abruptly changed their
refugee policies. Results also indicate that media coverage also generally
follows the framing of the changed policy (Ghersetti & Odén, in press).
Thus, in line with the spiral of silence theory, we would, before the
policy change, expect a greater willingness to express opinions about
the refugee crisis among respondents supporting a more generous
refugee policy compared to those holding a more restrictive view. This
scenario would probably change because of the changing policy, and
we would expect that those favoring a more restrictive view would be
more willing to share their opinions. Following this logic, the respondents supporting a more generous policy would be silenced. The study
hypotheses follow:
H1: Opinion congruency in refugee policy between respondents’ opin-

ions and government policy will be positively related to a willingness
to express opinions about the refugee crisis.
H2: When government policy changes to a more restrictive refugee
policy, respondents supporting a restrictive policy will increase their
willingness to express their opinions about the refugee crisis.
H3: When government policy changes to a more restrictive refugee
policy, respondents supporting a generous policy will decrease their
willingness to express their opinions about the refugee crisis.

The spiral of silence phenomenon is generally tested on speaking out
in front of unknown people (“talking to a stranger on the bus” is often
used in survey questions) and is generally believed to be weaker when
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it is related to the social groups to which the individual belongs. The
fear of isolation tends to be less pronounced when it comes to talking
with family, friends, and work colleagues and classmates (Hampton et
al., 2014). Against this background, we would expect the willingness to
express an opinion about the refugee crisis to be more accepted when
it comes to family and friends than other reference groups:
H4: The willingness to express opinions about the refugee crisis will
be more accepted when talking to family and friends, compared
with work colleagues and classmates and people respondents do not
know so well.

Because the elite opinion changed and the news media seemed to
report this change without challenging the dominant frame (Ghersetti
& Odén, in press), the two waves can be viewed as capturing the change
in opinion climate on an aggregate level. In this sense, one could argue that the design follows Noelle-Neuman’s (1984) original measure
of opinion climate, where she emphasized that the opinion climate is
about the factual gain or loss of ground among the population, not if
the individual also perceives this process. However, in most spiral of
silence research, a common way to measure the opinion climate is to
ask respondents how they perceive the general opinion position on
the issue and compare these answers with their own issue position
(Matthes & Hayes, 2016). Even so, there have been many suggestions
about how to measure the opinion climate. Some have asked about the
opinion among the general public (Shamir, 1997), while others have
focused on different reference groups (Moy, Domke, & Stamm, 2001;
Oshagan, 1996). An interesting and maybe also troublesome aspect in
previous research is the lack of mass media indicators in many studies.
Matthes and Hayes (2016) highlighted that only a few studies actually
include media content in their analyses and fail to establish a connection between the media content to which respondents are exposed
and their perception of the opinion climate. However, there are a few
examples of studies where the climate of opinion is measured as seen to
be conveyed through the mass media (Matera & Salwen, 1992). To arrive
at a more thorough understanding of the processes, the design of this

Expressing Opinions About the Refugee Crisis in Europe

65

study also includes an analysis of those respondents who changed their
inclination to speak out (see also Gearhart & Zhang, 2015) to evaluate
to what extent this disposition may be related not only to the changing
opinion climate but also to perceptions of the news media’s reporting
(media congruency), which can be viewed as a subjective measure of
the opinion climate. A proposed research question is as follows:
To what extent can respondents’ willingness to express their opinions
about the refugee crises be related to media congruency?
Method

To try to overcome some of the critical points referred to earlier, this
study of the spiral of silence in crisis events uses (a) a two-wave panel
study to be able to investigate changes in willingness to express opinions; (b) analysis of a real-world event—not a hypothetical—which
makes the situation more real for respondents (see Hayes, 2007); and,
because there was a dramatic change in elite opinion of the refugee
issue, where all major parties changed their opinions and decided to
change the policy, (c) observations of whether the change of (elite)
opinion climate also affects willingness to speak out.
Data Collection

Data for this study were collected in November 2015 (before the policy
change) and April 2016 (after the policy change) and were generated
by the Laboratory of Opinion Research (Lore) at the University of
Gothenburg using a Web survey panel of Swedish citizens. The panel
contains both self-recruited respondents (approximately 60,000) and
respondents recruited from probability-based population samples
(approximately 10,000).4
The chosen sample (2,500) was randomly selected from the citizen
panel and was stratified to reflect the general population according to
gender, age, and education. The first wave of the survey was collected
between October 26 and November 5, 2015, with a response rate of
63%. The second wave was sent out to respondents (who answered
the first survey) between April 21 and May 3, 2016. The response rate
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of the second wave was 71%. In both panel waves, 1,185 respondents
answered the questions.
The design using a two-wave panel (i.e., interviewing the same persons two times) enhances the possibility to track individual trajectories
over time. It makes it easier to rule out other factors that might affect
the results and strengthens claims of causal interpretations (Berrington,
Smith, & Sturgis, 2006).
Measures
Willingness to speak out. The criterion variable in this study was

measured by three questions capturing different social spheres: (a) family and friends, (b) work colleagues and classmates, and (c) strangers.
The following question was posed: “To what extent do you feel you
can speak out about the refugee crisis with your family and closest
friends?” Respondents were given a 5-point scale on which to place
themselves, ranging from 1 (to a very large extent) to 5 (to a very small
extent; Wave 1, M = 4.56, SD = 0.80; Wave 2, M = 4.57, SD = 0.78). The
same scale was used to ask if respondents were willing to speak out
about the refugee crisis with people at work and in school: “To what
extent do you feel you can speak out honestly about the refugee crisis
with work colleagues and classmates?” (Wave 1, M = 3.87, SD = 1.22;
Wave 2, M = 3.79, SD = 1.21).
To measure the willingness to speak out in relation to strangers,
the third question asked, “To what extent do you feel you can speak
honestly about the refugee crisis with people you don’t know well?”
Respondents were given a 5-point scale on which to place themselves,
ranging from 1 (to a very large extent) to 5 (to a very small extent; Wave 1,
M = 3.21, SD = 1.37; Wave 2, M = 3.04, SD = 1.38).
Own opinion. Respondents were asked to express their opinions
about the refugee issue by measuring to what extent they would favor
a more restrictive, status quo, or generous refugee policy. The question
was posed, “How well do the following statements comply with what you
think of the refugee reception?” Respondents answered using a 5-point
scale to express their opinions about the refugee issue, ranging from 1
(we should receive far fewer refugees than today) to 5 (we should accept far
more refugees than today; Wave 1, M = 2.77, SD = 1.42; Wave 2, M = 2.68,
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SD = 1.43). The variable was computed as a dichotomous variable in the
analysis (restrictive/generous policy opinion). Respondents with the
opinion of receiving fewer refugees in both waves and being pleased
with the present level in Wave 2 were considered as supporting a restrictive policy. With the same logic, respondents claiming Sweden
should accept more refugees in both waves and being content with the
present level of refugee reception in Wave 1 were coded as supporting
a generous policy. This recoding will of course create a loss of data
concerning attitude change, but the rationale is to be able to include
those changing their minds due to the policy change.
Perception of media congruency. As pointed out previously,
there is a discussion in spiral of silence research about the importance
of perceptions of opinion climate. The measure of media congruency
(evaluation of news media reporting) is viewed as an alternative way to
measure the subjective perception of the opinion climate. Even if this
is not a straightforward question of how a respondent’s own opinion
is related to the general opinion, we know from previous research that
people tend to generalize media content to the general view of societal
problems and their effect on public opinion (Gunther & Storey, 2003;
Perloff, 2015; Schulz & Roessler, 2012). Evaluation of news media reporting can therefore be seen as a proxy for the respondents’ views on
the opinion climate in society.
The respondents were asked to evaluate the news media reporting
of the refugee crisis with the question, “How do you think the news
media so far has reported on the refugee situation?” The scale had 7
points, ranging from 1 (not good at all) to 7 (very good; Wave 1, M = 4.22,
SD = 1.48; Wave 2, M = 3.89, SD = 1.45).
Noelle-Neuman (1984) raised the question of the importance of
personal traits related to the spiral of silence phenomenon (Neuwirth
et al., 2007; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). Controlling some of these aspects
by inclusion in the analysis were political interest, education, gender,
and age.
Political interest. A respondent’s political interest was measured
by the 4-point-scale question “How interested are you in politics?”
ranging from 1 (great interest) to 4 (no interest). The panel consisted of
respondents with a greater interest in politics compared with the general
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public (M = 1.74, SD = 0.66). This is related to the recruitment process
and the questions asked in the panel, where societal issues dominated.
Education. In the survey, respondents answered a question about
their highest level of education with fixed response alternatives (only
elementary school; high school, less than 3 years; high school, 3 years
or longer; postsecondary education [not university], less than 3 years;
postsecondary education [not university], 3 years or longer; college/university, less than 3 years; college/university, 3 years or longer; PhD). Even
if the scale was ordinal, it was treated as interval in the analysis. The sample contained a larger number of people with college/university educations compared to the overall Swedish population (M = 6.91, SD = 1.87).
Gender. This variable is measured by a self-reported question with
three alternatives: woman, man, and other. Only four respondents
chose the last option, and they were excluded from the analysis. The
sample had a larger proportion of male respondents compared with
the general population (M = 1.52, SD = 0.50).
Age. Age was measured by the panelists’ self-reported years of
birth. The sample contained respondents aged between 18 and 72 years
(M = 47, SD = 13.99), which means that the sample contained more
middle-aged and fewer young (<30 years) and old (>70 years) people
compared with the population as a whole.
Results

The results in Table 1 indicate strong support for the proposed difference in the preparedness to give voice to opinions about the refugee
crisis dependent on to whom a person talks. Overall, respondents are
willing to express their opinions among family and friends, and the
policy change did not change this attitude at all (Wave 1, M = 4.56;
Wave 2, M = 4.57). As predicted in H4, respondents are a little less
comfortable speaking out on this issue when talking to their colleagues
and classmates, and over time, they tend to be less willing to express
their opinions (Wave 1, M = 3.87; Wave 2, M = 3.79). But even after the
policy change, a majority feel they can express their opinions when
talking to people they meet at work or school.
This tendency is even clearer when asking about talking to people

1.22
1.39

3.87
3.18

People you do not know so wellc

a

n = 1,124. bn = 1,110. cn = 1,123.

Work colleagues and classmates

0.80

SD

4.56

M

Wave 1

b

Family and friendsa

and People You Do Not Know So Well

3.03

3.79

4.57

M
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1.38

1.21

0.78
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4.38

2.43

−0.35
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TABLE 1 Willingness to Express Opinions About the Refugee Crisis When Talking to Family and Friends, Work Colleagues and Classmates,
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respondents do not know so well, both in terms of generally being less
willing to speak out and changing toward being more silent after the
policy change (Wave 1, M = 3.18; Wave 2, M = 3.03). On this general
level, we therefore discover a significant tendency toward a more silenced public opinion, in terms of being willing to express opinions
outside the family setting. Even so, the effect size (d = .013, d = .07)
indicates that the magnitude of the policy change on the willingness
to speak opinions in public is rather low. It should also be noted that
a majority of all respondents feel they can talk about the refugee crisis
even if they talk to people they do not know so well, both before and
after the policy change.
But are these tendencies uniform, or do they, as H1, H2, and H3
predicted, depend on the opinions about the refugee issue among the
respondents? In Table 2, the analysis is separated among those who
support a generous and a more restrictive refugee policy.
Moving on to the first (H1) hypothesis, we expected to find a correlation between supporting the government policy on the refugee issue
and a willingness to speak out. However, the results show that those
favoring a more generous refugee policy to a larger extent are willing
to express their opinions about the refugee crisis, both before and
after the policy change (family and friends, M = 4.86/4.81; work colleagues and classmates, M = 4.48/4.30; people you do not know so well,
M = 3.97/3.68). The difference compared with respondents favoring
a more restrictive policy is significant, where a clear majority instead
are less comfortable expressing their opinions (family and friends,
M = 4.33/4.37; work colleagues and classmates, M = 3.33/3.37; people
you do not know so well, M = 2.46/2.46). On the basis of these two
measurement points, it seems like those supporting a more restrictive
policy are less likely to express their opinions, even if the policy has
changed, favoring their position. H1 can therefore only be partly supported.
The second (H2) and third (H3) hypotheses focused on changes of
expressing opinions, not the majority/minority position. H2 must be
rejected because there was no change among those supporting a restrictive policy before and after the policy change, independent of whom
they talk to. Even if the policy change supported their opinions, they
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Note. The group categorized as rejecting restrictive refugee policy contains respondents claiming they want Sweden to accept more refugees in
both waves and those stressing the present level of refugee reception is acceptable in Wave 1. The group categorized as supporting a restrictive
refugee policy contains respondents claiming they want Sweden to accept fewer refugees in both waves and those stressing the present level
of refugee reception is acceptable in Wave 2.
a
n = 496. bn = 491. cn = 495. dn = 303. en = 297.
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Predictors That Impact the Willingness to Express Opinions About the Refugee
Crisis in Conversations with Family and Friends, Work Colleagues and Classmates, and
People You Do Not Know So Well
TABLE 3

Willingness to
speak out before
policy change

Willingness to speak
out after policy
change

Decreased
willingness to
speak out

Family and friends
Own opinion (generous policy)

.33***

.29***

−.11**

Media congruency

.03

.07*

−.04

Political interest (low)

−.01

−.08**

.06
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−.07

−.07*

.00

Gender (woman)

−.07

−.06

.03

.02

.06

−.04

Age
Adjusted R² (%)

10

9

1

N

816

818

815

Work colleagues and classmates
Own opinion (generous policy)

.48***

.43***

−.01

Media congruency

.08*

.12***

.02

Political interest (low)

−.03

−.10**

.08*

Education (high)

−.04

−.10**

.04

Gender (woman)

.01

.02

−.01

Age

.04

.04

.00

Adjusted R² (%)

20

12

0

N

815

811

807

People you do not know so well
Own opinion (generous policy)
Media congruency

.50***

.12**

.09*

.05

−.04

−.09*

.06

Education (high)

.03

−.05

.02

Gender (woman)

−.02

−.06

−.03

.04

−.01

Political interest (low)

Age

.11**

.45***

.08*

Adjusted R² (%)

28

19

2

N

816

817

814

Note. Values are ordinary least squares, standardized regression coefficients. The dependent
variables are created by computing the variable willingness to speak out in the two waves, where
respondents could be more/less willing to speak out. The dichotomized variable for decreased
willingness to speak out comprises those less inclined to express their opinions compared with
those having the same opinion in both waves and those being more motivated to speak out.
The media congruency measure is the absolute difference in opinion about the media reporting
and respondents’ own issue opinions in both waves. Tests to see if the data met the assumption
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of collinearity indicated that multicollinearity was not a concern (values ranging between the
four regression models, own opinion, tolerance = .78–.82, VIF = 1.22–1.28; media congruency,
tolerance = .85–.90, VIF = 1.12–1.18; political interest, tolerance = .93–.94, VIF = 1.06–1.07; education,
tolerance = .90–.91, VIF = 1.05–1.10; gender, tolerance = .88–.89, VIF = 1.13; age, tolerance = .95,
VIF = 1.05–1.06).
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

still felt hesitant to speak out in public about their opinions. Moving
on to H3, we find clear support for what was expected. Respondents
supporting a more generous policy have to some extent been silenced.
After the policy change, significantly fewer respondents were willing to
express their views on the refugee crisis. This can be found independent
of social sphere, even if the tendency is clearly related to social groups
outside family and close friends.
To further examine the mechanisms of the spiral of silence, Table 3
shows to what extent changes in the willingness to speak out are related
to a person’s own opinion and perception of media congruency. We
also control the results by demographics, which sometimes are treated
as personal traits with a possible influence on willingness to speak out
in public.
The results of three regression models are shown in Table 3, where
the dependent variable measures respondents’ willingness to express
their opinions, both at and between the two measurement points.
The first two models analyze the data as cross-sectional data to see if
media congruency affects the predisposition to speak out before and
after the policy change. The last model analyzes changes and whether
media congruency has an impact on opinion change (i.e., less willing
to express opinions).
In all three social spheres, we find that issue position has an impact
on the respondents’ willingness to reveal their opinions about the refugee crisis, both before and after the policy change (family and friends,
β = .33/.29; work colleagues and classmates, β = .48/.43; people you do
not know so well, β = .50/.44). The more a person supports a generous policy, the more willing he or she is to speak out. This is the same
tendency we saw in Tables 1 and 2.
Also, media congruency has an impact on the tendency to speak
out. Respondents who are more critical toward the media reporting
also seem to be less inclined to reveal their opinions. This is found in
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all social spheres after the policy change (family and friends, β = .07;
work colleagues and classmates, β = .12; people you do not know so
well, β = .09). Before the change of policy, the effect of media congruency was significant for talking to people at work and in school,
β = .08, and strangers, β = .11, but not in discussions among family and
friends, β = .03.
Political interest also affected this opinion, especially after the policy
change. Those less interested in politics seem to be more inclined to
hide their opinions, independent of whom they talk to (family and
friends, β = −.08; work colleagues and classmates, β = −.10; people you
do not know so well, β = −.09). The same holds for lower educated
respondents, but only when speaking with family members and close
friends, β = −.08, and people at work and in school, β = −.10.
When analyzing the change of willingness to speak out, the results
indicate overall a weak relationship between the proposed variables
(i.e., low explained variance). The most important factor is a person’s
own opinion on the issue, but the effect goes in different directions,
depending on social sphere. Among family and friends, we find that
supporting a more generous policy does not lead to a decreased inclination to reveal opinions, β = −.11, but it does so when talking to strangers,
β = .12. Moreover, there seems to be no direct effect on the inclination
of changes in speaking out related to how news media performance
was evaluated and the respondents’ own opinions (media congruency). If someone changed his or her willingness to express his or her
views, this change may not be related to the person’s perceptions of
news media reporting. This does not, of course, rule out a possibility
of indirect media impact in line with the spiral of silence theory. As
said before, the media effect in the spiral of silence theory might be
unconscious.
The other predictors show no significant effect, except that increasingly age seems to be related to less willingness to talk about the
refugee issue with strangers. Being a man or a woman, being low or
highly educated, or having an interest in politics does not seem to
matter.
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Discussion

The spiral of silence is one of the most influential media effect theories
of the last half-century. Noelle-Neuman’s theory on how the media
influences people’s willingness to speak their minds in public has been
subject to many studies all over the world. However, the theory has been
criticized in terms of conceptualization (Neuwirth et al., 2007), design
(Matthes & Hayes, 2016), and generalization (Scheufele & Moy, 2000).
The present study analyzed changes over time in the willingness to
express opinions about the refugee crisis in Europe using a two-wave
Web-panel survey in Sweden in 2015–2016. In focus was the impact of
the changing government policy, which moved from a generous refugee
policy toward a more restrictive policy.
The posed hypotheses had mixed support. Government changes
in policy toward a more restrictive refugee policy did not change the
overall picture. Those supporting a more restrictive policy were still less
inclined to speak their true opinions about the refugee crisis, even if
the policy had changed in their favor. On the other hand, respondents
supporting a more generous refugee policy seemed to be more cautious
about expressing their opinions about the refugee crisis when talking
to strangers after the policy change. The tendency to hide opinions
about the refugee crisis was stronger when talking to strangers and less
pronounced in relation to work colleagues and classmates, and a vast
majority felt they could talk about the issue with family and friends.
When analyzing the research question about the extent to which
media congruency affects willingness to speak out over time, there was
no such influence. It is, however, important to understand the difference
between analyzing changes and the situation at a given moment. Media
congruency had a clear impact on the willingness to share opinions,
both before and after the policy change, but media congruency did not
affect changes in preferences to talk about the refugee crisis before and
after the policy change.
What might need further discussion in relation to the spiral in
the spiral of silence theory is the time lag in the process. Most studies include, in line with Noelle-Neuman’s suggestions about capturing dynamics of the opinion climate, measures used to understand
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respondents’ perceptions of whether their opinions are likely to become
majority or minority (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015; Jeffres, Neuendorf, &
Atkin, 2010; Noelle-Neuman, 1984). People who feel their opinions are
about to reflect the majority position are more inclined to speak out.
The change in the predisposition to express opinions on the refugee
issue follows this pattern for those rejecting a restrictive policy but
not among those supporting a restrictive policy. Five months after the
policy change, one could expect that those persons who were more
critical about accepting refugees would be more eager to speak out. But
according to the results, we do not see this development. In line with
what previous research has shown in asking about opinions being on
the rise or in decline, we should have seen such a change.
Situational explanations can be proposed to explain this lack of
willingness to speak out among those supporting a restrictive refugee
policy. Even if the policy has changed, many might still be uncertain if
this opinion is shared among the general public, not least because the
government made the decision with regret and claimed the restrictive
policy was not intended to be permanent. A fear of stigmatization might
therefore still be possible. Because the restrictive policy has not changed
since April 2016, more measurement points could clarify if there is a
time lag in processes of the spiral of silence. Over time, those favoring a
more restrictive policy might speak out, but the opinion change process
might be slower than 5 months. To further understand the dynamics
of the spiral of silence, one might therefore need more measurement
points. This also highlights that there might be different dynamics depending on respondents’ perceptions of whether they are in a majority
or minority position. Regarding the refugee issue, willingness to speak
out first changes among those who have the majority position. They
feel uncertain and become more silent as the refugee policy changes
to a position that is different from their own. Maybe those having the
minority position will change, but it will take longer before they dare
to speak out. They are not sure this change of policy position will last,
and even if there is a change of tone in the news media, reporting the
process of experiencing a majority position might take a while.
This might indicate there are different time lags in the spiral of silence dynamics depending on if one is to become part of the majority
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or minority opinion. Further research on the spiral of silence would be
beneficial to better emphasize the dynamics to be able to understand
how the spiral in the spiral of silence actually works. Other shortcomings of the present study can also be discussed. In terms of generalizability, a partly recruited panel of respondents might overestimate the
willingness to express opinions. Participating in a panel with surveys
predominately about politics will be more attractive to people interested
in politics, and dropout from the panel will be higher among those less
interested in politics.
Conclusion

Let us at last move back to where we started. What are the consequences for crisis communication and, more specifically, citizens’ sense
making of a crisis related to the spiral of silence? In the introductory
section of this article, concerns were raised about the possible difficulty discussing a controversial issue, such as the refugee crisis, in
the sense-making process. Strategies proposed by convergence theory
were addressed in terms of how people find and use information from
different sources, not least in discussion with other people to handle
competing information (Anthony et al., 2013; Sellnow et al., 2009). The
present study does not support the raised concerns. It seems like most
people are willing to discuss a controversial issue among both family
and friends and people with whom they work and go to school. People
even dare to expose their opinions about a value-laden issue like the
refugee crisis to people they do not know well. Even if there is a tendency toward a more silenced public opinion, it is not alarming when
talking to family and friends. So even if there is a spiral of silence, it
does not seem to undermine citizens’ sense-making processes in times
of crisis.
Bengt Johansson, PhD, is a professor in journalism and mass communication at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. His research focus
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chair for the section Political Communication Research at the IAMCR.
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Notes

1. See https://www.migrationsverket.se/
2. https://www.migrationsverket.se/
3. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu
4. For more information about the panel, see http://www.lore.gu.se/
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ABSTRACT
Two separate studies used quasi-experimental procedures to examine how college students learn
about campus shootings from press releases, television news, or exposure to both. The first study
found that women tend to report higher levels of learning than men and that participants generally learn the most when exposed to messages delivered through multiple media. The second
study extended the findings to include consideration of the impact of learning on organizational
reputation. Taken together, the results of both studies offer further evidence that knowledge
acquisition can help mitigate against the formation of negative impressions of an organization
in crisis. They also offer that the relationship between learning and attitude formation may be
mediated by sex. The results are discussed in terms of message placement strategy and sex differences in mediated learning processes. Implications for the relationship between these learning
processes and organizational reputation are addressed.
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U.S. college campuses have seen an array of deadly shootings in recent
years (Braggs, 2004; Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson, & Weiss, 2010;
McIntyre, Spence, & Lachlan, 2011), including more than 400 active shooter incidents between 1992 and 2015 (Mazer et al., 2015). Such situations
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evoke terror and uncertainty for students, faculty, administration, and
the surrounding community. “Right now, I feel helpless. . . . I’m 22 years
old and scared to be on a college campus,” admitted a Northern Illinois
University student when asked for her reaction to the shooting on her
campus (Kelleher, 2008, para. 2). In responding to the Virginia Tech
shooting, a student remarked, “You would think that a school or even
a classroom would be a safe place, but over the past 10 years we have
seen otherwise” (Montgomery, 2007, para. 7). Though crisis situations
like school shootings often result in human losses and culminate in
uncertainty for those associated with the school, organizations in crisis
have the ability to foster learning for their publics, facilitate learning
as a means to restore their image, and use public-focused learning as
a means to grow as an organization. While past studies have relied on
exposure to single stimuli or post hoc surveys to assess the impact of
campus shooting messages on learning and attitudes (e.g., McIntyre et
al., 2011), few have explored the impact of simultaneous stimuli delivered through different media. Furthermore, although sex differences in
responses to these messages are articulated in the literature, they have
for the most part been omitted from the experimental literature. The
two studies herein seek to explain how organizations may create and
utilize messages through varying media so that, in times of crisis, the
organization is able to reduce uncertainty for stakeholders by providing accurate information. Study 2 also examines the mediating effect
of sex on the relationship between knowledge acquisition and attitudes
toward the organization.
Campus Shootings

Compared to other crises, little is known about communication
processes associated with the crisis life cycle of campus shootings
(McIntyre, Spence, & Lachlan, 2011). In particular, there is a gap in our
understanding about ideal message placement and the effectiveness
of different message placement strategies in engendering learning.
Omilion-Hodges and McClane (2015) extended research in this area
by examining how university media selection subsequently influenced
stakeholders’ own choices in message content and media choice for
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information dissemination. The authors found that regardless of the
initial channel through which they learned of the university crisis,
students were able to retain and communicate accurate information
regarding the crisis. They were also most likely to utilize a phone call
or a text message to immediately connect with others before turning
to social media. However, despite the fact that social media is gaining
attention in the area of crisis communication and school shootings
(Mazer et al., 2015; Omilion-Hodges & McClane, 2015), legacy media
are still the dominant source for information concerning most crises
and disasters. Because social media often contains misinformation
about crises (Lachlan et al., 2014), some organizations are understandably reluctant to adopt it as a tool for crisis communication. Moreover,
it may not be an appropriate medium for postcrisis communication,
as affected audiences may be more likely to resort to traditional media for expanded coverage and detailed information. It may also be
the case that audiences first become aware of a crisis or risk through
interpersonal exchanges, then turn to other sources for updates or
additional information (see Greenberg, Hofshire, & Lachlan, 2002;
Seeger, 2006).
Although college campuses often rely on press coverage and press
releases to inform the public, the question remains of which strategy
is most effective in engendering learning. The current studies test the
effectiveness of three different placement strategies—press release,
televised news, and a combination of both—in fostering learning about
a campus shooting. Furthermore, given past research suggesting sex
differences in informational needs and responses following crises, the
current studies investigate whether men and women will differ in terms
of which medium fosters the most learning under the circumstances
(Nelson, Spence, & Lachlan, 2009; Spence et al., 2006). There is also
evidence of sex differences throughout the risk sciences literature. For
example, Slovic (1997) and colleagues (Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, &
Satterfield, 2000) have offered that, on the whole, men tend to perceive
risks as less threatening and may form unique opinions or vary in terms
of their behavioral intentions. Given documented sex differences in
both the communication and risk sciences literatures, Study 2 extends
the first investigation to examine the separate and combined effects of
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gender and knowledge acquisition on subsequent attitudes toward the
organization in question.
Crisis Communication

Broadly, crisis and risk communication can each be considered subcomponents of strategic communication, as they are pieces of larger
scale communication plans—taking place throughout the crisis life
cycle—designed to both deal with negative psychological responses
and minimize the harm experienced by those affected. Given the sudden, unexpected nature of campus shootings, response messages are
universally tied to the trigger event and acute crisis stage, when it has
become clear that something is very wrong and that routine conditions have been cast asunder (see Fink, 1986). Under these conditions,
anxiety reduction is paramount, and effective risk and crisis messages
satisfy the public’s need for control by offering clear, factual information that can be easily retained and acted upon. Crisis messages must
detail tangible steps that can be taken by individuals to minimize their
susceptibility to risk. Thus there is a critical learning component to
successful crisis messages. Inaccurate or incomplete communication
of risk will hinder individuals’ ability to make good choices in volatile,
high-risk circumstances. Of equal importance is message placement:
Learning cannot take place if the message does not reach its intended
audience (Lachlan & Spence, 2014; Spence, Lachlan, & Burke, 2011).
Furthermore, it may be the case that audiences will respond differently to messages delivered in different media formats (see later), thus
making placement strategy a critical consideration. Communication
efforts during crises and emergencies should facilitate learning on the
part of the audience, offering tangible procedural recommendations
and other advice (Spence, Lachlan, & Griffen, 2007).
A long history of research suggests that during crises and emergencies, the mass media can be expected to serve as the primary source of
information for those affected (Brashers et al., 2000; Burke, Spence,
& Lachlan, 2010; Murch, 1971; Spence et al., 2006; Spence et al., 2005).
The active process of searching for information through the media will
bring about a sense of empowerment and control over the situation, and
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knowledge acquisition is remarkably effective in reducing uncertainty
under most circumstances (Brashers et al., 2000). Acquiring information from mediated sources sets off several processes (Seeger, Sellnow,
& Ulmer, 2003), one of which is observing the behavior of others. For
all intents and purposes, this is a type of learning that begets both selfefficacy and the ability to exert some control over the situation. Selfefficacy, as Bandura (1994) noted, can be described as the belief someone
has about his or her capability to take an action that provides influence
over events that directly affect the person’s life. Bandura outlined four
main sources of influence; most relevant to this study is the idea that
self-efficacy can be achieved through vicarious learning or behavioral
modeling. The role and benefits of self-efficacy in the crisis and risk
literature are well established (Lachlan, Spence, & Lin, 2013; Neuwirth
et al., 2000; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014;
T. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2010, 2013; Spence, Lachlan, & Griffen, 2007;
Spence, Nelson, & Lachlan, 2010; Witte, 1992).
Facilitating self-efficacy is considered an important aspect of numerous functional and theoretical crisis frameworks and is considered a
“best practice” in crisis communication (Houston et al., 2015; Seeger,
2006; Veil, Reynolds, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2008). Learning about a crisis
can impact an individual’s perception of control over the situation and
reduce concerns regarding vulnerability (Seeger, 2006). When a disaster
peaks, self-efficacy can be enhanced through instructional communication (Frisby, Veil, & Sellnow, 2014; T. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2010), such as
a press release or media report. Also, engendering learning can potentially save lives by helping the public manage risk through informed
decisions (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005) and stress reduction (Veil, 2007).
When crises present some sort of real and tangible danger, people
will seek information in an active and engaged manner (Brashers et al.,
2000). While initial alerts may come through interpersonal channels,
people typically have a repertoire of trusted sources that they will rely
upon for these messages, and they will continue to scan these sources for
additional information as the conditions of the crisis change (Lachlan,
Spence, & Seeger, 2009). When audiences seek information about crises
and initiate learning processes, they often turn to the media (Heath,
Liao, & Douglas, 1995; Murch, 1971).
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Unfortunately, it may be the case that new media outlets underutilize
the opportunity for disseminating information that can engender selfefficacy and maximize positive outcomes, perhaps owing to a lack of
solidity in institutional linkages between government organizations and
these outlets (see Samarajiva, 2005). Mobilizing information (Lemert,
Mitzman, Seither, Cook, & Hackett, 1977)—that which is designed to
capitalize on existing schema in terms of threat location, individuals
impacted, and tangible steps that can be taken—may be present in less
than half of the content concerning these types of events, and online
resources may be inclined to use identificational information as opposed
to tactical (Tanner, Friedman, Koskan, & Barr, 2009). However, this
same research has suggested that when mobilizing information does
appear, it is more likely to appear in syndicated and wire stories and
is equally likely to appear in print or online (Hoffman, 2006). Thus,
if such information is to be found anywhere, it may likely be located
in wire stories, such as those generated by the Associated Press (AP),
UPI, or Reuters.
Mediated Learning Processes

Mediated learning processes likely occur as a combination of direct
instruction and observational, or vicarious, learning. Recent research
in observational learning has suggested a biological component to
these knowledge acquisition processes, including one that is driven by
emotion and other “old-brain” functions (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008).
This body of research, along with classical social psychology work in
vicarious learning, provides both biological and behavioral explanations for learning from media (Nelson et al., 2009). Even in instances in
which a person is relatively uninterested in the matter at hand, highly
specified learning can still take place (Zukin & Snyder, 1984).
As with all forms of learning, there are likely a myriad of individuallevel variables that affect learning about crises and emergencies. Of
particular interest is biological sex. Although little research has directly
addressed sex differences in mediated learning processes, evidence
exists of consistent sex differences in preferred information sources.
This research has suggested that women may be drawn to less vivid
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media for information, especially information that is particularly sensitive or issue relevant (Jensen, 1988; Keinan, Sadeh, & Rosen, 2003;
Morley, 1986).
Furthermore, there is some evidence that women may be better
equipped than men to interpret nonverbal cues and may be more reliant on these cues when negotiating interactions (Burgoon & Dillman,
1995). There is also evidence that women may be generally more risk
averse than men, relationally oriented, and inclined to seek information related to both emotional needs and mitigation against risk
(Burke, Spence, Lachlan, & Seeger, 2008; Lachlan, Spence, & Nelson,
2010; Spence, Lachlan, & Westerman, 2009). If this is the case, then
the sexes may be quite different not only in their preferred sources of
information but in the observational processes they use to understand,
interpret, and retain this information. Differences in preferred media
sources and processing style thus necessitate an investigation of the
separate and combined impacts of source and biological sex on learning. Furthermore, the preceding arguments force us to consider the
role of emotion and arousal in these processes.
Emotion, Arousal, and Mediated Learning

Under conditions of extreme duress, it is typically assumed that mediated information will serve to reduce this anxiety and uncertainty. This
is consistent with Weick’s (1995) argument that observing the actions
of others under the same circumstances can help people make sense
of terrifying circumstances to which they have no understanding of
how to respond. At the same time, some have argued the opposite: that
media exposure may exacerbate these negative psychological responses.
Some have presented evidence that repeated exposure to crisis information may itself constitute a traumatic event (Ahern, Galea, Resnick,
& Vlahov, 2004) and that repeated exposure to such information may
lead to symptoms consistent with posttraumatic stress disorder (Pfefferbaum et al., 2001; Saylor, Cowart, Lipovsky, Jackson, & Finch, 2003).
There may also be a traceable relationship between these strong
emotional reactions and learning processes. Zillmann’s (1999, 2002)
work on exemplification theory, for example, has offered that visual
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media rely on highly emotional, arousing images that elicit immediate
judgment of issues. In doing so, highly arousing imagery may lead to
inaccurate perceptions of likelihood and magnitude of risk, as audiences may be inclined to generalize to entire events from a single image
or message (Zillmann, 2002). Evidence of the overestimation of risk
under the arousal induced by mediated exemplars is well documented
in the literature (Aust & Zillmann, 1996; Zillmann, 2002; Zillmann,
Gibson, & Sargent, 1999).
Furthermore, there is evidence that people are inclined to remember
general (or “gist”) information after a moderately arousing event but
will lose details when pushed to extreme levels of emotional arousal
(Zoladz & Diamond, 2008). Because emotional arousal may augment
or impair learning depending on the circumstances, past research
has not clearly indicated how much people will learn from coverage
of a crisis, especially if they are directly affected. Even less clear is the
relationship between medium of choice and learning. If we are to assume that television coverage is in itself a traumatic event, as per the
arguments of Ahern and colleagues (2004), then it may be the case
that those watching televised coverage learn less than those who obtain
information through other forms of media, such as official statements
or press releases. It may also be the case that when affected publics
receive information from both television and other sources, television
coverage serves to attenuate the degree of learning experienced by
those individuals.
Officials and organizations responding to crises must meet the
public’s need for information and initiate learning processes so that
those affected can make sound decisions (Omilion-Hodges & McClane, 2015). In fact, recent research (Omilion-Hodges & McClane,
2015) has convincingly argued that organizations in crisis may in fact
best meet stakeholders’ need for information by involving them in the
information dissemination process. Although television news coverage
and official statements are the two venues through which postcrisis
messages are typically transmitted under these circumstances, our
knowledge of the impact of arousal suggests that other factors may be
at play. If television coverage does in fact induce high levels of anxiety,
it may be the case that it actually inhibits learning. Moreover, relying
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solely on television coverage reduces an organization’s ability to frame
messages for its stakeholders. As previously noted, past research has
provided mixed results in terms of differences between men and women
in learning responses. Thus, to inform future message placement strategies under these circumstances, the following research questions (RQs)
are posed:
RQ1: Will audiences learn more from emergency information embedded in (a) a press release, (b) a televised news story, or (c) a
combination of the two?
RQ2: Will men and women learn more from different sources?

Study 1

To explore these questions, a quasi-experiment was used to determine
the effectiveness of different placement strategies in engendering learning. Participants were 180 undergraduate students at a medium-sized
university in the Midwest who were randomly assigned to one of
three conditions examining postevent communication. In Condition 1,
participants were asked to watch a 2-minute AP news feature about a
university shooting and to fill out a self-administered survey; AP news
features were used given their ecological validity as content in which
mobilizing information may be embedded (Hoffman, 2006; see earlier).
Condition 2 asked participants to watch the same news feature as in
Condition 1, then read an official university press release designed to
provided tangible safety measures, followed by a self-administered
survey. Condition 3 required participants to fill out a self-administered
survey after having only read the press release. The press release restated
the facts of the shooting and outlined measures of self-efficacy individuals can take to protect themselves. The news clip included a short
message from the university’s president explaining safety procedures on
campus, followed by faculty members and students explaining if they
felt safe or not prior to and following the shooting. The video ended
with a narrator explaining the university’s capabilities for maintaining
safety on campus.
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Measures

After viewing the induction, participants were asked to fill out a selfadministered survey evaluating their responses to the stimuli. These
responses included a series of items measuring learning from the press
release and the news clip, adapted from previous research (McIntyre et
al., 2012; Nelson et al., 2009). For each medium, respondents were asked
if they learned something about their university’s emergency response,
how people can protect themselves during a shooting, how lockdowns
work, how they should respond in a similar situation, more about their
personal safety, how they should travel around campus, and how to help
others during a shooting; respondents replied on a 5-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Items from each
of these subscales were averaged to produce a scale for learning from
TV (α = .78) and learning from the press release (α = .82).
Results

The questionnaire included demographic items, including information
such as race, gender, and age. Caucasian (n = 136, 79.1%) was reported
as the highest, followed by African American (n = 19, 11%), other
(n = 13, 7.6%), and, finally, Asian American (n = 4, 2.3%). Women
(n = 114, 63.7%) participated more in this study than men (n = 65,
36.3%; M = 1.64). A total of 56 participants were assigned to the TVonly condition, 64 were assigned to the combined condition, and 60
were assigned to the press release condition. Participant ages ranged
from 18 to 56 years, with a mean of 20.69.
The RQs were examined using a series of t-tests. For the first research
question, the condition in which participants were administered both
the press release and the television news story was used as a comparison
group. Against this group, the mean score for learning from the media
was compared with the television-only condition. The dependent variable for learning from the press release was evaluated by comparing
this group to the press release–only group.
For learning from media, the results indicate that those in the TVonly condition reported less learning (M = 3.7, SD = 0.7) than those in
the combined condition (M = 3.0, SD = 0.8), t(114) = 5.34, p < .001. For
learning from the press release, those in the press release–only condition
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also reported less learning (M = 2.4, SD = 0.5) than did those in the
combined condition (M = 2.00, SD = 0.6), t(117) = 3.75, p < .001. As an
exploratory analysis, an aggregate measure of learning was computed
by taking the mean score across all learning items in the analysis. A
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) then compared the mean scores
across all three conditions. A priori power analysis performed using
G*Power (see Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) demonstrated
marginally adequate power for effect sizes as small as .05, 1 − β = .77.
The results indicated strong effects for condition on total learning,
F(2, 177) = 32.66, p < .001, η2 = .54. Bonferroni post hoc analyses revealed that those in the TV-only condition (M = 3.7, SD = 0.7) reported
learning substantially less than those in the press release (M = 2.4,
SD = 0.5) or combined condition (M = 2.5, SD = 0.5).
To explore the second research question, a 3 × 2 ANOVA explored
the impact of condition and sex on the aggregate learning measure.
Power analysis suggested 1 − β = .85 for each main effect and 1 − β = .77
for the interaction effect between sex and condition. The results indicate
main effects for participant sex, F(1, 178) = 6.57, p < .01, η2 = .04, and
condition, F(2, 178) = 98.37, p < .001, η2 = .53, but no interaction effect
between the two, F(2, 178) = .735, p < .472, n.s. The results of this analysis
provide further support for the findings from RQ1. Furthermore, men
learned significantly less on the whole (M = 3.0, SD = 0.3) than did
women (M = 2.8, SD = 0.2).
Study 2

The results of Study 1 offer preliminary insights into the role of message
order in the learning processes associated with crises and disasters. They
also underscore the importance of providing information concerning
organizational response to a developing crisis, in an environment in
which the news media will likely paint an unflattering portrait of the
organization in question.
Each audience has unique needs for information, while media outlets
also have specific agendas after the initial crisis event (Omilion-Hodges
& McClane, 2015). In a volatile crisis, immediate and timely information
is needed about the event, and the media can become a first source for
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what actions to take (McIntyre et al., 2012; Nelson et al., 2009). The
literature supports the notion that learning can be fostered at any point
throughout the crisis life cycle. When an organization has caused or is
perceived to have caused a crisis, it must respond with accounts, excuses,
or actions to repair or retain its image (Benoit, 1995, 1997). However,
one area that has not received attention is the relationship between an
organization’s attempt to foster learning it its publics after a crisis and
organizational image (public reputation). Unflattering depictions of
the organization typically take place in the later stages of an organizational crisis, when the public has developed a more comprehensive
understanding of the events that took place and their ramifications for
various stakeholders. Study 2, then, attempted to replicate and extend
the findings from the first study by fully crossing the design in terms
of the presentation of a news feature and press release. Study 2 also
sought to examine the subsequent impact of learning on participants’
perceptions of the organization. In an attempt to replicate the results
of Study 1 and to extend the findings to include consideration of the
impact of learning on organizational image, the following hypotheses
and RQ are offered:
H1: Participants who are provided a press release from an organization

in the aftermath of a crisis will have more positive perceptions of the
organization than participants who are not provided a press release.
H2 : Participants receiving the press release before watching a news
report about a crisis will have more positive perceptions of the organization than those who read the press release after watching the
news report.
H3 : Women will learn more about the organization regardless of the
presence of a press release or order of presentation.
RQ: What is the separate and combined impact of order of presentation
and biological sex on learning and perceptions of the organization?
Method
Participants. A total of 203 participants from undergraduate communication courses took part in the current study; students were drawn
from the same required course as in Study 1, but more than a year later;
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thus it is highly unlikely that any student participated in both. Of the 203
participants, 29.7% (n = 58) were men, with 70.3% (n = 137) female participants (8 gave no response), with a mean age of 22.89 years (SD = 5.42).
Procedure. Participants were provided the study’s URL, where they
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions examining postevent
communication. The intricacies of each condition are described in the
following pages; however, participants in each condition completed an
identical self-administered survey after being subjected to the stimulus.
Participants in Condition 1 watched a 2-minute news feature from the
AP about a university shooting, whereas participants in Condition 2
watched the same news feature but also subsequently received a press
release that reiterated the facts of the shooting. Additionally, the press
release provided tangible safety measures a person could take during
campus shootings to protect himself or herself and increase his or her
self-efficacy. In Condition 3, participants received the press release before watching the news feature that was utilized in Conditions 1 and 2.
In Condition 4, participants were only administered the press release
and asked to fill out the questionnaire.
Instrumentation. To examine perceived learning from the AP news
feature in Conditions 1, 2, and 3, participants were presented with seven
Likert-type questions on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree)
to 5 (strongly disagree). Questions included topics asking if respondents
learned how to protect themselves, how lockdowns work, how to help
others, about personal safety, about campus travel after a shooting,
about university emergency response, and how to respond in a similar
situation. The questions were also used in Conditions 2, 3, and 4 to
obtain data about perceived learning from the university press release.
Items from each of these subscales were averaged to produce a scale for
learning from TV (α = .77) and learning from the press release (α = .90).
To examine participants’ perceptions of the organization, 12 items
were adapted from the Organizational Reputational Scale (Coombs
& Holladay, 1996). The items were measured on a 5-point Likert-type
scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Items such
as “This organization is basically honest” and “I do not trust the organization to tell the truth about this incident” are typical of the scale.
Alpha reliabilities for the Organizational Reputational Scale were α = .81.
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Results

The analyses began with a simple bivariate correlation looking at the
relationship between the dependent variables under consideration. The
indicator for total knowledge was strongly correlated with attitudes
toward the university in the AP news feature, r = −.190, p < .008. Given
that the knowledge items were reverse scored, this indicated that those
who acquired more information tended to hold higher opinions of the
university. Next, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted examining the effect of condition on both learning and attitudes toward the
institution. A priori power was determined to be 1 − β = .73 for effect
sizes of .05. First, participant age, sex, and income were entered on the
first block to serve as control variables. Condition was then added to
the second predictor block to examine the difference in variance accounted for in the two models.
For aggregated learning, the first predictor block failed to account for
a significant proportion of the variance, F(3, 184) = 1.34, n.s. However,
adding condition to the second predictor block did produce a significant
model, F(4, 184) = 2.39, p < .04, ΔR2 = .03. Similar results were detected
for attitudes toward the university. The first block failed to produce a
significant model, F(3, 184) = 2.20, n.s., while adding condition to the
predictor block significantly improved the model, F(4, 184) = 3.50,
p < .009, ΔR2 = .08.
Given that the dependent variables were significantly correlated,
a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was then conducted
to examine the means for both dependent variables across all four
conditions; power analysis indicated 1 − β = .73. While the analysis for
learning did not produce significant results, F(3, 195) = 1.62, n.s., the
model did account for 3% of the variance and indicates some evidence
of linear trend in the data; the least amount of learning was reported
in the feature-only condition, M = 2.42, SD = .743, followed by those
who saw the feature and then read the press release (M = 2.31, SD =
.469), then those who read the press release before seeing the feature
(M = 2.23, SD = .465), with the greatest amount of learning taking place
in the press release–only condition (M = 2.155, SD = .581).
Significant effects were detected for attitudes toward the institution,
F(3, 195) = 2.43, p < .05, η2 = .04. The pattern of means suggested a pat-
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tern consistent with the relationship between knowledge and attitudes.
Those in the feature-only condition reported the least positive attitudes
toward the institution (M = 3.35, SD = .495), followed by those who saw
the feature and then read the press release (M = 3.47, SD = .422), then
those who read the press release before seeing the feature (M = 3.53,
SD = .510), with the most positive attitudes found in the press release–
only condition (M = 3.64, SD = .433).
Path Analysis

Following the consistency in the findings across both studies, a path
analysis was used to investigate the separate and combined effects of
presentation order and learning on perceptions of the organization.
Given past research indicating that men and women process risk information differently, and that women may be more inclined to experience both empathic responses to risk messages and internalize more
information, the indirect effects of gender on organizational image
were also included in the model (see Lachlan et al., 2010; McIntyre et
al., 2011; Spence, Lachlan, Nelson, & Shelton, 2010; Spence et al., 2009).
Evidence was found to support the proposed model, CMIN/df = 1.76,
RMSEA = .06, CFI = .91. Statistically significant paths were detected
between experimental condition and learning, β = −.168, p < .02; condition and image, β = .163, p < .02; and learning and image, β = −.142,
p < .05. Standardized indirect effects of .03 were detected for both
condition and sex on image, mediated by learning. Given the scoring
of the indicators, order of presentation led to greater learning about
the circumstances surrounding the shooting, and this knowledge was
positively related to impressions formed of the institution. Female
respondents were more likely to acquire information concerning the
shooting, and subsequently, those who did were slightly less likely to
form unfavorable opinions about the institution (see Figure 1).
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–.171*
Learning
8
–.16

Condition

–.16

4*

.163*

Image

CMIN/df = 1.76
RMSEA = .06
CFI = .910
FIGURE 1 The effects of presentation order and learning on image.

Discussion

Taken together, the results offer some initial insight into both the message placement strategies that may facilitate learning in the aftermath
of a crisis and differences between men and women in their learning
responses and subsequent assessments of the organization in question.
The results are in some ways surprising and in others shed new light
on contradictory arguments in the literature.
First, the findings concerning medium and placement shed some
light on discrepancies in past research concerning the role of television
in mediated learning processes. Although a substantial body of research
has suggested that people use the news media to reduce uncertainty
following crises, there is also some evidence in the literature that the
use of television news in particular may lead to negative emotional and
psychological reactions. These negative emotional and psychological
reactions, if demonstrated, would logically predict that less learning
would take place from television than from other, less vivid media.
The current findings suggest that this may be the case. In both
comparative analyses, individual respondents reported more learning
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when print press releases and television media were combined than
from television alone. In other words, the aggregate presentation of
information leads to learning. At the same time, the analyses comparing all conditions in both studies seem to indicate that audiences
learned the least in the television-only condition. This would suggest
that the television-only condition may be heavy on images and content
that participants found to be distressing. In instances in which simple
written descriptions were given through a press release, or in which
emotionally disturbing video content was accompanied by factual written information, respondents reported learning more. It is worth noting
that this finding is largely supportive of the argument that individuals
may learn less from television if the graphic and vivid nature of the
medium leads to emotional and psychological distress.
If this is the case, the findings from both studies also shed light on the
degree of arousal that may be expected by different mediated accounts of
a crisis. Because past research has suggested that emotional arousal augments or impairs learning, it may be the case that printed information
concerning a crisis of this magnitude is alarming enough; presenting
graphic and vivid images of the threatening and uncertain crisis, without
complementing them with “cool” media accounts of the events, may
lead to an excessive level of arousal that inhibits learning. This would
be consistent with the curvilinear relationship between arousal and
learning posited by numerous authors (see Zoladz & Diamond, 2008).
The analyses in both studies also shed light on the sex differences, or
perhaps lack thereof, that may be expected under the circumstances. The
ANOVA analysis for sex and condition in Study 1 revealed strong main
effects for both factors but not a significant interaction term between
the two. This finding is supported in Study 2, where the path analysis
reveals a mediation process whereby women are learning more about
the organization and are therefore forming less unfavorable opinions,
regardless of condition. This is somewhat consistent with past research
indicating that women are prone to seek more information during crises. If this is the case, it may be that women are more prone to actually
attend to the information given their standing desire for information
on the matter.
What is not consistent with past research, however, is the absence
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of an interaction effect between sex and medium. Past research has
suggested that women may respond more favorably to less vivid media.
This body of research has also suggested that while women place a
value on both vivid and nonvivid media, they may be less interested in
television news, attend to less television news, and express a preference
for other media. In this instance, women were just as likely as men to
have learned more from the combined condition. For both sexes, in
both sets of analyses, the least amount of learning was reported in the
TV-only condition. One explanation for this observation may be that
women’s desire for information cancels out any differences in medium
preference. In other words, if we know that women are more likely to
want information, and we know that men prefer vivid media, it may be
the case that women’s desire for information attenuates any difference
in channel preference.
There are limitations with the current studies, as they only explore
the responses of men and women to particular media. Radio, e-mail,
the Internet, and other media are not considered in the current data.
While this decision was made because crisis practitioners typically rely
on these specific media when disseminating crisis information, it would
be of worth to replicate the study across multiple media to investigate
which combination of media makes the most sense in terms of message
placement. Furthermore, the studies are confined to news coverage of
one particular incident type and were not conducted on the campuses
in which the incidents took place. Participants were asked how they
would respond under the circumstances but were not actually in the
middle of a crisis themselves when responding. Future studies should
attempt to gather data from those who have been immediately affected
by crisis to shine more light on these mediated learning processes.
Nonetheless, the authors would argue that these studies, taken together,
are a good first step in evaluating ideal message placement strategy following a crisis and the differences between men and women that may
be relevant considerations under the circumstances.
Practical Implications

The current findings also offer practical implications for organizations dealing with crises and, more specifically, for college campuses
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preparing for and responding to active shooter incidents. More than
anything, they offer empirical support for the long-standing maxim
that organizations facing crises need to provide information quickly,
not only to ensure the safety of those impacted by the crisis but also
to bolster their reputation to the extent possible. The current findings
suggest that getting information to the public ahead of some kind of
news report may impact both retention of information and attitudes
toward the institution. In this sense, organizations in crisis have the
ability to frame their messages in the manner of their own choosing,
allowing them to play a more active role in shaping stakeholders’ understanding of the event and their perception of the organization. Thus
organizations in the midst of a crisis may benefit by disseminating quick
and accurate information, because this same language is likely to be
recycled by the external news media.
In terms of the sex differences reported in the current studies, both
crisis communication practitioners and first responders should consider
that men are less likely to retain information concerning the event and
more likely to form negative opinions regarding the organization. Thus
information campaigns and responses may wish to appeal to men in
terms of providing information to reduce anxiety, promote learning,
and develop a more positive impression of the organization. Audiences
will be better able to make rational decisions under equivocal circumstances if they are provided with information and brought around to
an appropriate level of arousal and fear (see Lachlan & Spence, 2007,
2009, 2010).
Conclusion

The findings of both studies add some degree of empirical evidence
to old public relations maxims that have been followed for decades;
as an organization experiencing crisis, it may be best to tell a story
before the news media gets a chance to do so, or at the very least, an
organization should present its response alongside media reports. The
current findings offer evidence not only that this is important but that
it may be particularly risky to issue no response at all. These findings
are, however, restricted to one particular crisis scenario and explore the
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use of ecologically valid, yet situationally specific messages. The extent
to which these findings can be replicated to other campus shootings,
and across other types of emergencies that take place with little to no
warning, remains to be seen. It is also the case that campuses do not
respond to emergencies in a vacuum; while the current studies build
on previous work by exploring responses to multiple messages, the
number of messages and their placement were chosen in an attempt to
create easily manipulated quasi-experimental conditions; future studies
should vary the number of messages, media, and content characteristics
to further explicate these complex processes. Finally, researchers and
practitioners alike may wish to consider replicating these findings and
extending them to other, less volatile crisis scenarios to examine whether
the presentation order and sex differences documented herein replicate
across organization, crisis type, and stakeholder group.
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ABSTRACT
Message sidedness, including its later format inoculation, and conclusion explicitness have been
identified by researchers as two prominent message factors that may influence advocating effects.
Two-sided messages, which contain both supporting and opposing information about the issue,
particularly those containing inoculation components that refute the negative side, are found to
be more effective than one-sided messages. Messages with explicit conclusions are also found to
be more persuasive than those that let the audience draw the conclusions themselves. This study
tested the persuasion effectiveness of message inoculation and conclusion explicitness on a new
scientific concept, the water–energy–food (WEF) nexus, of which the public has little knowledge.
This study used five randomly assigned groups (total N = 524) and found that messages with
explicit conclusions are more persuasive than those with implicit conclusions; however, it found
no difference between the effectiveness of one-sided messages and of refutational two-sided
messages. The study suggests that a clear conclusion is necessary to communicate the WEF nexus
for a better approach to managing the megacrisis of water, energy, and food security.
KEYWORDS: Water–energy–food nexus; inoculation theory; conclusion explicitness

The scientific concept of the water–energy–food (WEF) nexus is fairly
new. It first emerged in 2011 at the Bonn Nexus Conference, which
officially announced water, energy, and food as the three pillars of the
nexus (Endo, Tsurita, Burnett, & Orencio, 2017; Hoff, 2011). Following
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the Bonn Conference, the German federal government launched the
website Water, Energy, and Food Security Resource Platform.1 The
World Economic Forum’s (2011) Water Initiative published a book
Water Security: The Water–Food–Energy–Climate Nexus. The United
Nations and its departments have also adopted the idea quickly. Its
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific issued the
discussion paper “The Status of the Water–Food–Energy Nexus in
Asia and the Pacific” (United Nations [UN], 2013b), and its Food and
Agriculture Organization published the book An Innovative Accounting Framework for the Food–Energy–Water Nexus: Application for the
MuSIASEM Approach to Three Case Studies (UN, 2013a) and the report
The Water–Energy–Food Nexus: A New Approach in Support of Food
Security and Sustainable Agriculture (UN, 2014). At the same time, the
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD, 2013) published a report titled The Water–Energy–Food Security Nexus: Towards
a Practical Planning and Decision-Support Framework for Landscape
Investment and Risk Management. In only a few years, the concept has
become central to academic and policy discussions regarding sustainable development and green economy (Biggs et al., 2015).
The idea of the WEF nexus is proposed to solve the conflict between the growth of human population, along with urbanization and
globalization, and the constraint of resources. The traditional approach of managing natural resources only focuses on solving crises
of a single resource and ignores the possible detrimental effects on
other resources. For instance, policy makers favoring the traditional
management approach are likely able to foresee that, with the current
trend of rapidly increasing demand, global agricultural production will
have to increase approximately 70% by 2050, and energy production
will need to increase approximately 50% by 2035. However, they may
not foresee the impacts of such increases on water resources, land resources, and climate (Hoff, 2011; UN, 2014). They may also fail to take
some critical natural resources into policy consideration. Water, for
example, received attention in the green economy discussion only a few
years before the nexus concept was launched at the Bonn Conference
(Endo et al., 2017; Hoff, 2011). In fact, water, energy, and food are intricately linked. Agriculture uses approximately 70% of global freshwater,
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food production and transportation account for approximately 30% of
global energy consumption, and energy generation also consumes a
large share of water (UN, 2014). The nexus approach, with a systematic view that water, energy, and food security are interdependent and
not easily disentangled (IISD, 2013), will improve WEF security and
ensure a more consistent and coherent governance by identifying and
managing trade-offs and building synergies (UN, 2014).
As significant as it may be, the WEF nexus is still unknown to the
public and has no fixed interpretation (Endo et al., 2017). This new
scientific concept needs to be promoted to the global public so that key
stakeholders can be actively engaged in building a policy framework
based on the nexus approach (UN, 2014). This study explores the effectiveness of two traditional but understudied message techniques,
inoculation and conclusion explicitness, on audience knowledge, attitude,
and behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus. Because the topic is
significant but little known to the public, findings of this study can be
considered more valid and less influenced by predisposition or other
unknown confounding factors.
Literature Review

Many factors, from the details of message components to the sequence
of multiple messages, may have a role in constructing a persuasive
message (O’Keefe, 2016). Among these factors, message sidedness,
from which the inoculation research was developed, and conclusion
explicitness were two that received much attention at the milestone
Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program presided by social
psychologist Carl Hovland (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949;
Hovland & Mandell, 1952). They remain intriguing and perplexing
aspects of strategic communication research (Belch & Belch, 2012),
in part because research has not reached a consensus how these two
message factors impact persuasion effects (O’Keefe, 2016).
Message Sidedness and Inoculation

Message sidedness addresses whether the persuasive message contains
two sides (both positive and negative sides) or just one side (only the
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positive side) of the story. Hovland and colleagues’ (1949) pioneer
studies in their Yale Project found that two-sided messages were more
effective than one-sided messages in changing the attitude of individuals
who were initially opposed to the issue. They also found that one-sided
messages worked more effectively than two-sided messages with individuals who were already convinced of the position being advocated
or with those who were poorly educated.
Many following studies involved two-sided advertising (Crowley
& Hoyer, 1994) and found that two-sided ads tend to be viewed as
more credible (Eisend, 2006; O’Keefe, 2016; Pechmann, 1992). Even in
celebrity-endorsement ads, two-sided ads are deemed to be significantly
more credible and effective than their one-sided counterparts (Kamins,
Brand, & Hoeke, 1989).
However, conclusions on the effectiveness of two-sided ads vary,
which is demonstrated in two frequently cited studies. In one study,
Pechmann (1992) found that when the opposing point was important
(but less important than the promoting point), two-sided ads for a new
brand of ice cream led to better brand evaluation, whereas when the opposing point is perceived as trivial, no difference in brand evaluation is
caused by one- or two-sidedness. When the opposing point is negatively
correlated with the promoting point, the two-sided ads have the greatest
effect. Similar studies have even found that two-sided ads’ effectiveness
increases with greater consumer exposure (Bohner, Einwiller, Erb, &
Siebler, 2003). In another study, however, Crowley and Hoyer (1994)
found that for receivers who have a positive preexisting attitude but
are aware of the negative information covered in those two-sided ads,
the two-sided ads are about as effective as the one-sided ads. If the
negative attributes are important to the receivers, the effectiveness of
those two-sided ads is lower than it is for their one-sided counterparts.
Inoculation research, first proposed by Hovland’s student William
McGuire (1961, 1964), studies the persuasive effects of a special type of
two-sided messages, in which the opposing points are weakened and
refuted to resist future exposure to that type of opposing message (Niederdeppe, Gollust, & Barry, 2014). The persuasion effectiveness of those
refutational two-sided messages, according to inoculation researchers
(McGuire, 1961; Miller & Levine, 1996), is much stronger than that of
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their one-sided counterparts. In the inoculation approach, the message
first provides some threatening ideas that are strong enough almost to
turn the persuadees against the idea. It then equips them with arguments refuting those threatening ideas and defending the original idea
(Dillard, 2010). Inoculation researchers have concluded that, in many
cases, no matter whether the threatening ideas are refuted, two-sided
messages seem to be more persuasive than one-sided messages. However, they also acknowledge that in some studies, one-sided messages
appear to be more persuasive (Szabo & Pfau, 2002).
Several meta-analyses on the effectiveness of one versus two-sided
messages have been conducted and have also produced mixed results.
Allen (1991) examined 67 experiments and found that when opposing
points are raised and refuted (inoculation), two-sided messages are
more persuasive than one-sided messages. However, when the opposing points are raised and not refuted, two-sided messages are less
persuasive. Eisend (2006) analyzed 34 studies on consumer advertisements from 1960 to 2004 and confirmed that two-sided advertising
is generally more effective than one-sided advertising, although the
effects are rather small. Such effects of two-sided advertising can be
explained by attribution theory, which states that negative information
in the messages may cause the audience to perceive the persuaders’
motivation to be to tell the truth instead of to make a profit (Burgoon,
Pfau, & Birk, 1995; Eisend, 2006).
O’Keefe (2016) has concluded that no persuasive difference exists
between one- and two-sided messages based on his own meta-analyses
and synthetic literature review. When refutational (inoculation) and
nonrefutational two-sided messages are differentiated, consistent with
Allen (1991) but contradictory to Hovland et al. (1949), nonrefutational
two-sided messages are less persuasive, whereas refutational two-sided
(inoculation) messages can be more persuasive compared with their
one-sided counterparts (O’Keefe, 2016). Nonrefutational two-sided
advertisements, nevertheless, have no difference compared with their
one-sided counterparts. O’Keefe also concluded that none of the possible moderating variables identified in previous studies, such as preexisting attitude, education, or topic involvement, change persuasion
effectiveness.
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The WEF nexus approach, which scientists and international organizations view as a better concept with which to manage global water,
energy, and food security, is relatively new to the public. Compared
with other well-known and rather politicalized scientific topics, such
as climate change or stem cell research, the WEF nexus rules out predisposition, a critical confounding factor discussed in the literature.
Thus, in this study, we aimed to determine if one-sided and refutational
two-sided (inoculation) messages have different effects in promoting
the WEF nexus.
Message Conclusion Explicitness

Conclusion explicitness research investigates whether messages with
explicit conclusions (closed ended) and those with implicit conclusions
(open ended) have different persuasion effects. Although terminology
may vary in this literature (some studies, such as O’Keefe, 1997, used the
terms standpoint explicitness, conclusion articulation, and conclusion
specificity), closed-ended messages with explicit conclusions contain a
direct statement of a conclusion, whereas open-ended messages with
implicit conclusions do not (Martin, Lang, & Wong, 2003). Messages
with explicit conclusions generate accurate understanding but may be
perceived as threatening or insulting. By contrast, even though messages
with implicit conclusions can sometimes generate misunderstanding,
they may also be perceived as respectful and inviting and, therefore,
as more persuasive (Martin et al., 2003; O’Keefe, 1997).
Hovland also initiated research on conclusion explicitness in his
Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program and found that
messages with explicit conclusions are more effective in changing audience opinions in the desired direction (Hovland & Mandell, 1952).
Later, some researchers found that such differences between closedended messages with explicit conclusions and open-ended messages
with implicit conclusions were often moderated by variables such as
education (intelligence), preexisting attitude, audience involvement in
the topic, and the complicity of the topic (Armstrong, 2010; Belch &
Belch, 2012). Well-educated or highly ego-involved audiences are more
likely to be persuaded by open-ended messages with implicit conclusions, which provide room for them to make up their own minds,
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whereas less educated or ego-involved audiences are more prone to
closed-ended messages that provide explicit directions (Kardes, 1988;
Sawyer & Howard, 1991). If the topics of the messages are too complex,
however, even well-educated or highly involved receivers may need
assistance and be more persuaded by messages with explicit conclusions (Belch & Belch, 2012). For example, Ahearne, Gruen, and Saxton
(2000) found that when the product is complex, such as a CD player,
no difference in brand attitude is shown between ads with and without
explicit conclusions.
However, again, the findings vary. For instance, Chebat, Charlesbois,
and Gelinas-Chebat (2001) found that ads with implicit conclusions
generate greater persuasive effects even with low-involvement consumers, as long as those consumers have prior knowledge on the topic.
Kardes (1988) found that highly involved consumers exposed to ads with
implicit conclusions can generate brand attitude as favorable, as when
they are exposed to ads with explicit conclusions, only brand attitudes
formed based on ads with implicit conclusions are stronger and more
accessible from memory. Other variables, such as the need for cognition
and argument quality, have also been identified as moderators of the
effectiveness of message conclusion explicitness (Martin et al., 2003).
Even several recent meta-analyses on the role of conclusion explicitness have disagreed with each other. O’Keefe (2016) concluded that little
evidence supports the traditionally speculative advantage of messages
with implicit conclusions over their counterparts with explicit conclusions. Messages with implicit conclusions are ambiguous and therefore
actually encourage receivers to perceive the information as advocating a position either closer (assimilation effect) to or more discrepant
(contrast effect) from their position than the messages actually do. In
either case, messages with implicit conclusions are less effective than
messages with explicit conclusions (O’Keefe, 2016).
Armstrong (2010), nevertheless, believed that O’Keefe’s (1997, 2016)
conclusion is only valid when no resistance is expected among receivers.
When resistance is expected, as in the case of advertising, open-ended
messages with implicit conclusions (soft sell) are more advantageous
than closed-ended messages with explicit conclusions (hard sell), as
traditional advertising wisdom holds. When the audience’s freedom
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of drawing conclusions is restricted by ads with explicit conclusions,
the audience reasserts its original opinion and rejects persuasion
(Armstrong, 2010).
Knowledge, Attitude, and Behavioral Intention

Research has shown that persuasion effects take place at different levels.
Rogers (2003) described five steps of persuasion effects: knowledge,
persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation. Knowledge
means persuadees’ awareness and cognitive understanding of the idea;
persuasion means the generation of a (favorable or unfavorable) attitude toward it. On the basis of these two steps, decisions will be made
to adopt or reject the idea. If the idea is adopted, actions will then be
taken (implementation/confirmation). McGuire (1989) maintained
that persuasive information needs to climb up 12 levels, from exposure
to postbehavioral consolidation, to go through the whole processing
procedure in the audience’s mind. It loses about half of its audience advancing each level. But in practice, researchers normally use three levels
to summarize those cognitive, affective, and conative levels: knowledge,
attitude, and behavior (Xu et al., 2010). Most previous studies on persuasion inoculation and conclusion explicitness have focused on one
or two levels of effects. This study measures three levels: knowledge,
attitude, and behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus. On the basis
of the literature reviewed, we plan to test the following hypotheses:
H1: Subjects exposed to a message about the WEF nexus have a higher
level of (a) knowledge, (b) supportive attitude, and (c) supportive
behavioral intention toward the nexus approach, compared with
those who are exposed to no messages on the nexus.
H2 : Refutational two-sided message exposure, compared with onesided message exposure, is associated with a higher level of (a) knowledge, (b) supportive attitude, and (c) supportive behavioral intention
toward the WEF nexus.
H3 : Closed-ended message exposure, compared with open-ended
message exposure, is associated with a higher level of (a) knowledge,
(b) supportive attitude, and (c) supportive behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus.
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Method

This study used a 2 × 2 factorial design with a control group and was
administrated through SurveyMonkey.com. Students from a mid-sized
southwestern public university were invited to participate through Web
links and e-mails. From December 1 to 24, 2016, 625 responses were
collected, of which 524 were used, after incomplete or invalid responses
were removed. Among the 524 subjects, ages ranged from 18 to 72 years.
Freshmen accounted for 19%, sophomores for 16%, juniors for 20%,
seniors for 33%, master’s students for 5.4%, doctoral students for 2.7%,
and all-but-dissertation students for 2.7%.
Procedure

Subjects were invited to SurveyMonkey.com to answer a group of
questions, which took about 15 minutes to complete. In the middle of
the process, a question with five options was embedded. Four options
represented four types of message stimuli; one option had no message
and served as the control. The five options were designed to be randomly shown, with equal chance, to the subjects.
The four types of messages as stimuli were refutational two-sided
open-ended, refutational two-sided closed-ended, one-sided openended, and one-sided closed-ended. All four types were adopted from
a short essay on the website of UN Water (n.d.). The essay was about
positive evidence supporting the WEF nexus. To produce the two
refutational two-sided messages, a paragraph adopted from the UN
(2014) was added at the end. The paragraph contained a criticism that
the WEF nexus was just “the same old wine in new bottles” (p. 6) and
its refutation (inoculation) that the WEF nexus was different from the
traditional integrative approaches, which still only explicitly focus on
one resource. For the two open-ended messages, the headlines and the
ending paragraph both read, “Should we adopt a nexus approach?”
For the two closed-ended messages, both the headline and the ending
paragraph read, “Let’s adopt a nexus approach!”
Subjects could not go back once they passed the page with the
stimulus. Among the 524 participants, 111 were exposed to the refutational two-sided open-ended message, 99 to the one-sided open-ended
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message, 99 to the refutational two-sided closed-ended message, 104
to the one-sided closed-ended message, and 91 to no message. Twenty
subjects withdrew from participation before being exposed to the
stimulus. After receiving the stimulus, four groups of questions measuring subjects’ knowledge, supportive attitude, supportive behavioral
intention to promote the WEF nexus, and general behavioral intention
to reduce WEF consumptions in daily life were administrated.
Dependent Variables
Knowledge. Five true–false questions based on the messages were

used to measure respondents’ recall of the information in the message.
Answering a question correctly earned 1 point. Thus the index ranged
from 0 to 5 (M = 1.64, SD = 1.44, α = .63).
Supportive attitude. Respondents’ supportive attitude toward the
WEF nexus was measured with an index of six questions, which asked
respondents if it was urgent, serious, important, and useful to treat water,
energy, and food as a nexus, if the WEF nexus was just another new
bottle for old wines in science (reversely coded), and if the respondent
was concerned about the WEF nexus. This index ranged from 6 to 30
(M = 20.41, SD = 3.97, α = .90), with higher values standing for higher
levels of attitudinal support for the WEF nexus.
Supportive behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus. Respondents’ behavioral intention to promote the approach of the WEF
nexus was measured with an index of five items. These items asked
respondents to rate the likelihood that they would help promote the
WEF nexus approach, solve the problems in the nexus, donate to support the nexus approach, tell people about the nexus approach, or urge
people to support the nexus approach. The index ranged from 5 to 25
(M = 14.82, SD = 3.52, α = .89). Higher values represented a higher level
of behavioral intention to promote the WEF nexus.
The indices of the supportive attitude and behavioral intention were
adopted and revised from Gastil and Xenos (2010). To better understand
persuasion effectiveness at the behavioral level, the following dependent
variable was also measured and analyzed.
Supportive behavioral intention in general. Nine items were used
to measure how much the respondents would change their life pattern
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to reduce water, energy, and food consumption. The index ranged
from 9 to 72 (M = 39.43, SD = 14.27, α = .90). Higher values stand for
higher levels of behavioral intention to reduce water, energy, and food
consumption in daily life.
Manipulation Check

After being exposed to each type of message or no message, respondents
were asked to select if the message (a) provided both positive and negative opinions about the WEF nexus with a clear conclusion, (b) provided
just the positive opinions with a clear conclusion, (c) provided both positive and negative opinions with no clear conclusion, (d) provided only
positive opinions with no clear conclusion, or (e) was not shown. The
actual message types and the subjects’ perceptions of the message types
were tabulated for a chi-square independent test, χ2(16, N = 524) = 291.0,
p < .001. The results of the manipulation check are in Table 1.
In each cell of Table 1, the count and the adjusted standardized
residual are reported. Adjusted standardized residuals can be roughly
treated as the z-values that help tell if, in the cell, the discrepancy between the count and the expected count is statistically significant. Like
z-values, adjusted standardized residuals with an absolute value of 1.96
or higher refer to statistical significance at the 95% confidence level,
and absolute values of 2.56 or higher stand for statistical significance
TABLE 1 Manipulation Checks on the Message Sidedness and Conclusiveness
Closed
ended/two
sided

Closed
ended/one
sided

Open ended/two sided

18, −0.2

15, −1.3

34, 3.6

24, 1.5

4, −3.9

Open ended/one sided

5, −1.2

11, 1.1

12, 1.3

12, 1.7

0, −3.1

Exposure to/perception
of the message

Open
ended/two
sided

Open
ended/one
sided

No message

Closed ended/two sided

49, 4.0

49, 3.5

30, −1.5

34, 0.4

3, −6.6

Closed ended/one sided

19, 0.8

22, 1.4

23, 1.4

17, 0.2

2, −4.1

No message

8, −4.1

7, −14.6

12, −3.7

12, −3.1

82, 16.3

99

104

111

99

91

Total

Note. Entries are the counts and the adjusted standardized residuals from a cross-tabulation
analysis. The adjusted standardized residuals can be roughly treated as z-values that indicate
the statistical significance of the differences between the counts and the expected counts in the
cells (Gerstman, 2015). For the overall tabulation, χ2(16, N = 504) = 291.0, p < .001. The two-sided
messages contain refutations (inoculations).
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at the 99% confidence level. As can be seen in Table 1, subjects who
were exposed to the open-ended refutational two-sided message were
much more likely to report that the message they read provided both
positive and negative opinions with no clear conclusion (counts = 34,
adjusted standardized residual = 3.6). Subjects exposed to the closedended two-sided message tended to report the message as providing
both positive and negative opinions with a clear conclusion (counts = 49,
adjusted standardized residual = 4.0). Subjects exposed to the onesided messages did not report the distinctive message types correctly.
However, as O’Keefe (2003) has argued, manipulation checks on message characteristics do not hurt the validity of the stimulus even if they
do not fit the expected pattern. A one-sided message is one sided, no
matter how the subjects perceive it.
Results

Because the hypotheses involve four dependent variables (knowledge,
attitude, behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus, and general
behavioral intention toward reducing water, energy, and food consumptions), four one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to see the differences in the four dependent variables across
the five groups. Statistically significant differences exist in knowledge,
F(4, 499) = 14.68, p < .001; attitude, F(4, 469) = 2.48, p = .04; and general
behavioral intention, F(4, 457) = 2.41, p = .049, but not in behavioral
intention toward the WEF nexus, across the five groups. Fisher’s least
significant difference (LSD) post hoc comparisons further revealed the
differences between the groups (Table 2).
H1 hypothesized that reading any version of the message would
increase knowledge, supportive attitude, and supportive behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus. The hypothesis was partially supported.
As shown in Table 2, the knowledge score of the no-message group
was lower than the scores for any of the groups that read a version of
the message (Differenceno message − open-ended two-sided = −0.98, p < .001;
Differenceno message − open-ended one-sided = −1.18, p < .001; Differenceno
message − closed-ended two-sided = −1.12, p < .001; Differenceno message − closedended one-sided = −1.37, p < .001). This significant difference held even
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TABLE 2 Difference in Knowledge, Attitude, Behavioral Intention toward the WEF Nexus, and

General Behavioral Intention in Water, Energy, and Food Consumptions Across Five Groups
Message version

Knowledgea

A (open ended, two
sided)

D = −0.39*

General behavioral
intentionc
E = −4.37*

E = 0.98***

B (open ended, one
sided)

E = 1.18***

C (closed ended,
two sided)

E = 1.12***

D (closed ended,
one sided)

A = 0.39*

E (no message)

Attitudeb

D = −1.71**

D = −4.39*

E = −1.31*

E = −5.13*

B = 1.71**

B = 4.39*

B = 1.31*

A = 4.37*

E = 1.37***
A = −0.98***
B = −1.18***

B = 5.13*

C = −1.12***
D = −1.37***
Note. Entries are mean differences generated from Fisher’s LSD post hoc tests of the one-way
ANOVAs. With the more conservative Scheffe post hoc tests, only the difference of knowledge
scores between the no-message group and the message group still holds. The two-sided messages contain refutations (inoculations).
a
F(4, 499) = 14.68, p < .001. bF(4, 469) = 2.48, p = .04. cF(4, 457) = 2.41, p = .049.
***p < .001. **p < .01. *p < .05.

with the more conservative Sheffe’s post hoc test, which controls the
experiment-wise error rate (Rao, 1998). Meanwhile, the no-message
group also had a lower attitude compared with the open-ended onesided group (Differenceno message − open-ended one-sided = −1.37, p < .001)
and, surprisingly, a higher general behavioral intention than the two
open-ended groups (Differenceno message − open-ended two-sided = 4.37,
p < .05; Differenceno message − open-ended one-sided = 5.13, p < .05).
H2 hypothesized that the refutational two-sided (inoculation) messages, which the audience might perceive as more respectful, were more
persuasive than the one-sided messages. That was not supported, as no
difference was found between the refutational two-sided groups and
the one-sided groups.
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H3 predicted that closed-ended messages, with explicit conclusions,
would be more persuasive than the open-ended messages with implicit
conclusions. This hypothesis was partially supported. The open-ended
refutational two-sided group gained less knowledge than the closed-ended one-sided group (Differenceopen-ended two-sided − closed-ended one-sided =
−0.39, p < .05). The open-ended one-sided group, compared with the
closed-ended one-sided group, had a lower attitude (Differenceopenended one-sided − closed-ended one-sided = −1.71, p < .01) and general behavioral
intention (Differenceopen-ended one-sided − closed-ended one-sided = −4.39,
p < .05). Even compared with the no-message group, although the two
open-ended groups increased the knowledge scores, they still showed a
lower attitude (Differenceopen-ended one-sided − no message = −1.31, p < .05)
and general behavioral intention toward reducing consumption of water,
energy, and food (Differenceopen-ended two-sided − no message = −4.37, p < .05;
Differenceopen-ended one-sided − no message = −5.13, p < .05).
Discussion

Population growth, urbanization, and globalization, among other factors, are creating drastic burdens on indispensable natural resources,
particularly water, energy, and agricultural resources. By 2030, it is
estimated that demands for water, energy, and food will increase by
40%, 50%, and 35%, respectively (Endo et al., 2017; Hoff, 2011; U.S.
National Intelligence Council, 2012). At the same time, water, energy,
and food demands are intricately interwoven, and the concept of the
WEF nexus is necessary to capture the complex interrelation of these
global resources (UN, 2014). The WEF nexus has emerged as a useful
concept that takes a central place in the latest discussion of sustainable
development and green economy (Biggs et al., 2015).
At the same time, the concept is unfamiliar to the public. On Google
Trend, “water–energy–food” is not even a search term, compared with
“water security,” which generates, on average, two searches a day, or
“climate change,” which generates, on average, 38 searches a day. In the
sample for this study (N = 524), on a scale ranging from 1 (I have never
heard about the water–energy–food nexus) to 10 (I am very knowledgeable about the water–energy–food nexus), 75.9% chose 1 and 90.3%
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chose 4 or lower. The concept of the WEF nexus enables a better
understanding and a systematic analysis of the interactions between the
natural environment and human activities as well as more coordinated
management and use of natural resources (UN, 2014). It is crucial to
promote this concept to the public, because public endorsement is
key to adopting policy concepts (Endo et al., 2017). The lack of public
knowledge regarding the WEF nexus, on the other hand, makes it an
ideal topic to test the functions of message inoculation and conclusion explicitness in the effects of strategic promotions, because it rules
out the possible moderation of audience predisposition (Armstrong,
2010; O’Keefe, 2016). Unlike heavily politicized scientific topics, such
as climate change, the WEF nexus is essentially unknown and clear of
political controversy, which eliminates a multitude of possible confounding factors, including audience predisposition.
This study was designed to test if message inoculation (two sided
with refutation vs. one sided) and conclusion explicitness (open ended
vs. closed ended) make a difference in knowledge, attitude, and behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus as well as general behavioral
intention toward improving water, energy, and food security. The study
used an experimental design with five randomly assigned groups: one
receiving no message and four each receiving an open-ended refutational two-sided, open-ended one-sided, closed-ended refutational twosided, and closed-ended one-sided version of the message, respectively.
As a major point of interest, the data of this study suggest, consistent
with O’Keefe (2016) but in contrast to Armstrong (2010) and Belch and
Belch (2012), that closed-ended messages with explicit conclusions are
more effective in generating desirable results in audience knowledge and
attitude toward the WEF nexus as well as the general behavioral intention toward lowering water, energy, and food consumption. Although
people tend to think that recognizing an audience’s freedom of thinking
by providing room for the audience to reach a conclusion themselves
may persuade more effectively, it is clear from the evidence generated in
this study that messages with an explicit conclusion are more persuasive
overall than messages with an implicit conclusion. The evidence was
seen in the LSD post hoc tests but not the more conservative Scheffe
post hoc tests. However, since the evidence was generated from using
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only one short essay as the stimulus, and the results were consistent
with each other, we still deem this finding interesting. Messages with
explicit conclusions may appear more confident and therefore heuristically more persuasive. At the same time, conclusion explicitness reduces
assimilation effects and/or contrast effects, generating little confusion
among the audience (O’Keefe, 2016). By contrast, open-ended messages
with implicit conclusions may make both supporters and opponents of
the concept of the WEF nexus believe that the message argues for their
point of view. Confusion is therefrom produced. The recommendation
from that finding is that science communications—at least, communications promoting the WEF nexus—will be better served by including
an explicit conclusion.
Message inoculation is not found to make a difference in persuasion
effects. Providing criticism of the concept of the WEF nexus and then
refuting it does not persuade the audience any more than just arguing
for the WEF nexus approach. Researchers have maintained that providing both sides of the story may enhance the credibility of the message
in the minds of the audience (Armstrong, 2010; Eisend, 2006) and that
refuting a weakened opposing side may enhance the persuasiveness
of the supporting side of the message (Dillard, 2010; McGuire, 1964;
O’Keefe, 2016; Szabo & Pfau, 2002). That argument is not supported in
this study. The failure to find inoculation effects in this study may be due
to the lack of a preexisting favorable attitude toward the WEF nexus, a
new topic of megacrisis, or a perception of threat against it among the
subjects. Some scholars hold the preexisting favorable attitude or the
perception of threats to be the ideal situation for inoculation effects to
occur (McGuire, 1964; Niederdeppe et al., 2014). It may also be because
the inoculation treatment is not strong enough or because a typical
posttest-only method, in lieu of the three-wave method widely used
in inoculation studies (first, measuring preexisting attitudes; second,
applying inoculation to the experimental group; and third, delivering
a subsequent attacking message), was used to measure the inoculation
results (Niederdeppe et al., 2014). We are aware, of course, that no difference in communication effects found between the one-sided groups
and the refutational two-sided groups in this study means that we fail
to support the argument for inoculation messages to be more effective
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than their one-sided counterparts. We cannot, however, simply conclude
that no difference exists between inoculation messages and one-sided
messages. Further studies on the inoculation effects on new scientific
topics need to be accumulated.
It is also worth noting that being exposed to any type of message
generates more knowledge on the WEF nexus in the audience’s mind.
This is the only finding that can be confirmed with the conservative
Scheffe post hoc tests. The post hoc analyses also reveal that knowledge is positively correlated with attitude, r(474) = .22, p < .001, and
general behavioral intention toward reducing water, energy, and food
consumption, r(462) = .14, p < .01, but not behavioral intention toward
promoting WEF nexus. Attitude, however, is substantially positively
correlated with both behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus,
r(465) = .66, p < .001, and general behavioral intention toward reducing water, energy, and food consumption, r(451) = .47, p < .001. That
provides some evidence for the deficit model, which holds that providing information on scientific topics to the public increases the public’s
scientific knowledge and therefrom changes its attitude toward science
(Sturgis & Allum, 2004). It is true that groups exposed to a version
of the message generate higher levels of supportive attitudes, except
the open-ended one-sided group, which generates a lower attitude
(Differenceopen-ended one-sided − no message = −1.31, p < .05) than the nomessage group. But if knowledge on the WEF nexus of all groups
exposed to a version of the message increases, knowledge is positively
correlated with attitude, and attitude is positively correlated with behavioral intention, it is reasonable to expect that when the informational stimuli turn stronger than just a short essay, public attitude and
behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus may increase accordingly.
Conclusion

In summary, this study confirms that messages with explicit conclusions
are more effective in promoting knowledge and attitudes toward the
WEF nexus as well as the general behavioral intention toward reducing
water, energy, and food consumption, whereas sidedness (inoculation)
has no persuasive effects. Providing more information about the WEF
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nexus no doubt increases public knowledge on the nexus approach.
When knowledge increases, the public attitude toward the nexus approach may turn more supportive, and the public may have higher levels
of intention to do something in support of the nexus approach. The
results, although valuable, may be limited in the experimental context
with one essay as stimulus. More studies on how message sidedness
(inoculation) and conclusion explicitness impact persuasion effects and
how persuasion effects travel along the cognitive, affective, and conative
levels in the hierarchy of effects should be conducted.
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ABSTRACT
The Ebola outbreak and its rapid spread throughout West Africa and other countries was a
megacrisis that imposed numerous challenges to those communicating to nonscientific publics
about the epidemic. This article examines the instructional risk messages offered in the days that
followed the 2014 infection and death of Liberian national Thomas Eric Duncan in Dallas, Texas.
More specifically, we apply the IDEA model for effective instructional risk and crisis communication
embellished by exemplification theory to conduct a thematic analysis of messages offered locally
(Dallas news stories and press releases), nationally (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Live Chat Twitter posts), and internationally (website content from the World Health Organization,
the United Nations Children’s Fund, and Doctors Without Borders). Our conclusions reveal that the
majority of messages offered from each organization privileged the element of explanation over
internalization and action as well as negative over positive exemplification. On the basis of these
conclusions, and informed by previous research, we propose a number of potential implications
and recommendations for offering a balanced representation among internalization, explanation,
and action as proposed in the IDEA model. We also suggest that positive exemplification could
be used strategically to motivate receivers to attend to these messages (internalization), reduce
potential misunderstandings (explanation), and take appropriate self-protective actions (action).
Agency spokespersons and media reporters may find the conclusions and recommendations
drawn from this analysis to be useful when crafting similar instructional risk preparedness and
crisis response messages.
KEYWORDS: IDEA model; exemplification theory; Ebola; megacrisis; instructional risk and
crisis communication

Instructing nonscientific publics to take appropriate self-protective
actions during risk and crisis events is an ongoing challenge for crisis
communicators (e.g., Coombs, 2009; Rowan, Botan, Kreps, Samoilenko,
& Farnsworth, 2009). This is due, in part, to the imminent threat
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imposed, the potential consequences of wrong actions or inaction, the
need to translate scientific information accurately and intelligibly to
disparate nonscientific publics, and the short response time afforded
for delivering such instructions (e.g., Seeger, 2006; D. D. Sellnow &
Sellnow, 2014b; T. L. Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). More specifically, some
of the major challenges communicators face when instructing nonscientific publics during a risk or crisis event focus on (in)accessibility of
some people and groups to receive the messages delivered via certain
channels, lack of motivation among some people and groups to attend
to them, misinformation in and misinterpretation of messages, distrust
of the message source, and a lack of clarity about what actions to take
for self-protection. Consequently, instructional risk and crisis communication is emerging as an insightful body of research for measuring the
affective, cognitive, and behavioral learning outcome effectiveness of
such messages (e.g., Frisby, Sellnow, Lane, Veil, & Sellnow, 2013; Frisby,
Veil, & Sellnow, 2014; D. D. Sellnow, Lane, Sellnow, & Littlefield, 2017;
D. D. Sellnow, Limperos et al., 2015; D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, in press).
The rise of megacrises in recent years has increased both the sense
of urgency felt during risk and crisis events and the complexity of
communicating instructions successfully during them (Helsloot, Boin,
Jacobs, & Comfort, 2012). Megacrises “defy boundaries, limits, neat
demarcations, patterned connections and linear consequences” (p. 5).
Moreover, because megacrises do not respect preconceived boundaries
or national borders, they often have an extensive global impact. Consequently, timely and effective responses are even more critical, as well as
more difficult to achieve. Some of the most compelling examples include
health epidemics and pandemics such as AIDS, BSE, SARS, and H1N1.
A case of the Ebola virus disease appeared in a small village in Guinea
in December 2013 but was not identified as Ebola until March 2014.
In the months that followed, the world would experience a megacrisis
epidemic as the disease spread quickly throughout the region and to
several other countries (World Health Organization, 2015). Although
travel warnings and bans were put into place in an attempt to contain
the spread of the virus, the gestation period can range from several
weeks to months (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015).
Thus travelers could (and did) easily spread the disease unknowingly.
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Containing the transmission of Ebola and communicating accurate
and effective instructional messages for self-protection became serious challenges.
When Liberian native Thomas Eric Duncan traveled from Liberia to
Dallas, Texas, in September 2014 and then died from the Ebola disease
one month later, the megacrisis became a real perceived threat in the
minds of the American people. Hysteria ruled as nonscientific publics wrestled with uncertainty about the disease. News media offered
wall-to-wall coverage of the virus, politicians and pundits weighed
in urging travel bans of all persons arriving from Africa (not just the
affected regions), parents withdrew their children from schools, and
people living in the same apartment complex as Duncan were scared
for their own health and safety.
The apartment of the first nurse to contract Ebola from Duncan,
Nina Pham, was quarantined. Neighbors were alarmed, and some even
moved away. Another nurse who treated Duncan, Amber Vinson,
studied nursing at Kent State University (KSU) in Ohio. When Vinson
contracted Ebola, officials at KSU banned both her mother and two
other family members who worked at the university from campus for
21 days because of their contact with Ms. Vinson. The airline that Ms.
Vinson flew on to and from Ohio forced employees who had been in
contact with her to take paid leave. Other passengers were worried
about potentially contracting the disease from Ms. Vinson, although
she had received permission from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) to travel prior to doing so.
Communication experts agree that much of the hysteria was exacerbated by the conflicting and contradictory messages the public got
from the media, Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital officials, and the
CDC. This article examines instructional risk messages communicated
to nonscientific publics during the 2014 Ebola crisis as a means to improve such messages when megacrisis epidemics arise in the future.
We begin by describing the Duncan case, as it illustrates how the Ebola
epidemic moved from a crisis event in West Africa to a megacrisis
crossing national borders. We then clarify the IDEA model for effective
instructional risk and crisis message design grounded in experiential
learning theory and embellished with exemplification theory as well
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as the methods we employed to answer our research questions. Next,
we describe the results of our analysis of (a) messages sent via a CDC
live chat on Twitter, (b) news stories and press releases distributed in
the Dallas–Fort Worth area, and (c) messages offered on the websites
of the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans
Frontières; MSF) during the peak of the crisis in the United States.
Finally, we offer a discussion as to how this analysis can inform future
decisions about effective instructional risk and crisis messages during
megacrisis events, as well as propose suggestions for future research.
The Case

When Liberian national Thomas Eric Duncan sought medical care at
Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas on September 25, 2014,
for a sharp headache, fever, and other symptoms, no one predicted that
he would be the first Ebola victim identified in Texas. Duncan allegedly
traveled knowingly to the United States after having contracted Ebola
in Liberia. A few weeks earlier, Kent Brantly and Nancy Writebol, both
medical missionaries who contracted Ebola while working in Liberia,
were airlifted to Emory University Hospital in Atlanta, treated with the
experimental drug ZMapp, and made full recoveries. Duncan, however, was sent home from the Dallas hospital with antibiotics. Three
days later, on September 28, Duncan was rushed to the hospital in an
ambulance and placed in isolation.
During this time, Duncan’s apartment was not decontaminated, and
family members in the apartment were not quarantined nor told to take
any precautionary actions. News media broadcast speculations about
the prospect of others contracting the disease. The Richardson Independent School District near Dallas pulled from school three children
who had reportedly had contact with Duncan. Many parents worried
about the safety of their own children and withdrew them from the
Richardson schools as well. Meanwhile, Duncan’s health deteriorated.
He died on October 8, 2014.
Two days after Duncan’s death, Nina Pham, a 26-year-old nurse who
had treated Duncan at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital, reported
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fever symptoms. She was immediately placed in isolation at the same
hospital. Her dog was seized and quarantined. Her frightened neighbors told television reporters that they had no information about what
precautions to take. Fortunately, Pham was discharged as healthy on
October 24, as documented in photos taken of President Obama hugging her in the Oval Office.
Despite complaining of a fever, another nurse who had treated
Duncan, 29-year-old Amber Vinson, was cleared by the CDC to fly
from Dallas to Ohio to visit family. After returning to Dallas, Vinson
began experiencing Ebola symptoms, was admitted to the hospital, and
was placed in isolation. However, some parents believed Vinson may
have been in contact with some schoolchildren before she was admitted to the hospital and pressed the schools to shut down. Passengers
who flew on the same plane as Vinson to and from Ohio were equally
concerned. The inconsistent and contradictory messages coming from
the CDC and the Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital, the frightening
images of hazmat-clad health and emergency workers that played out in
the media, and the politicians and pundits declaring gloom and doom
heightened public fears about the virus.
Although the hospital, the city of Dallas, the Dallas news media, and
the CDC eventually improved their messaging, the mismanagement
of key risk communication during these crucial first few hours and
days of the breaking crisis caused considerable anxiety and confusion
among members of the public. Thus this project focuses on improving
instructional risk and crisis communication messages offered in times
of urgent threat (real or perceived) to individuals and groups using this
Ebola event as a case study. More specifically, we conducted a thematic
analysis of messages disseminated to the public according to the IDEA
model of effective instructional risk and crisis communication embellished by exemplification theory as they may influence affective learning
(perceived value/utility/relevance), cognitive learning (comprehension/
understanding), and behavioral learning (self-efficacy/behavioral actions). The following section provides a rationale for grounding our
analysis theoretically in the IDEA model and exemplification theory.
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Theoretical Grounding

This study is grounded in the IDEA model for effective instructional
risk and crisis messages (D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014b) and extended
with exemplification theory (Zillmann, 1999). The IDEA model is
grounded in experiential learning theory as first conceived by John
Dewey (1938) and then extended by David Kolb (1984) and colleagues.
The components of the IDEA model are internalization (perceived
value and relevance via proximity, personal impact, and timeliness),
distribution (multiple channels—such as TV, radio, social media, smartphones—through which such messages are/should be delivered), explanation (accurate science from credible sources translated intelligibly
to nonscientific publics), and action (specific steps to take/not to take
for self-protection in a given risk or crisis situation; D. D. Sellnow &
Sellnow, 2014b). In the case of a health crisis event, effective instructional risk messages would include mention of the potential effects of
the disease on people who become infected, how much time one has
to notice symptoms and to seek medical help, and where the disease
is appearing (internalization). Such messages would also explain what
the disease is and how it is contracted in simple, nonscientific language
(explanation). Finally, such messages would propose specific actions to
take (or not to take) to avoid contracting the disease as well as what to
do (or not to do) if one has been exposed to an infected individual or
is experiencing any of the symptoms (action). This consistent message
ought to be delivered by a variety of credible sources via multiple channels (distribution) to ensure as many people as possible receive it and to
reduce the number of inaccurate, misleading, or conflicting messages.
We selected the IDEA model because it has demonstrated its utility across risk and crisis types, among disparate cultural groups, and
across international borders (e.g., Frisby et al., 2014; Littlefield et al.,
2014; D. D. Sellnow, Iverson, & Sellnow, 2017; D. D. Sellnow, Johansson, Sellnow, and Vigso, 2016; D. D. Sellnow, Limperos et al., 2015; T. L.
Sellnow, Sellnow, Lane, & Littlefield, 2012). In essence, the IDEA model
provides a framework for designing effective messages when the goal
is to instruct nonscientific publics to take appropriate actions for selfprotection during risk and crisis events.
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Exemplification theory (Zillmann, 1999) is also used in this analysis
as it enhances several elements of the IDEA model. Exemplification
theory centers on the notion that everyone is familiar with examples
and how examples can represent large and complex ideas in comprehensible ways. The key to exemplification is the “recognition of shared
features between an example (aka exemplar) and the exemplified, as well
as between all possible examples of the exemplified” (p. 72). Exemplars
are essentially evocative words, phrases, images, and sometimes sounds
that serve as cognitive shortcuts to glean meaning about complex ideas
or situations (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Zillmann, 2002, 2006). In other
words, they are easy to understand and process with limited (if any)
analytic thought. Exemplification operates in three distinct ways.
First, exemplification theory argues that information is evaluated
subjectively, relying on biases in making risk assessments rather than
assessing risk systematically (Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). It also supposes that risk perception is altered through exposure to exemplars.
Exemplars are made memorable through the use of “visually vivid and
emotionally strong” (Aust & Zillmann, 1996, p. 788) words and images.
Exemplars can come in the form of “any combination of image and
text” (Zillmann, 2006, p. S224) that influences risk perception when
viewed frequently and recently.
Second, an exemplar represents a group of similar cases through
one instance (e.g., one individual who suffers the effects of fetal alcohol
spectrum disorder represents all fetuses that have the potential to be
born with similar disadvantages if the mother chooses to drink alcohol
while pregnant). Zillmann (2006) argued that exemplification theory
functions by means of a “quantification heuristic,” suggesting that frequency of exemplars are continually monitored and the prevalence of
a particular exemplar directly impacts its retrieval from one’s memory.
Third, exemplars can have a positive (e.g., “superfood” as healthy
foods) or negative (e.g., “Frankenfood” as unhealthy foods) valence.
In the case of the Ebola megacrisis, we argue that negative exemplification fueled misperceptions and triggered fear among a variety of
publics about its symptoms, how it is spread, how to protect oneself
from contracting it, and how to treat it.
Exemplification theory in combination with the IDEA model is
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particularly suitable for examining the instructional risk messages
sent during the fall 2014 Ebola outbreak that occurred in the United
States. By understanding how exemplars were used in the context of
the IDEA model, the ways in which exemplars may affect individuals’
understanding of a crisis event like Ebola as well as their decisions to
follow recommended self-protective actions may become apparent. To
clarify, the use of exemplars may help people internalize the relevance
and potential impact of Ebola on them and their loved ones. Similarly,
exemplars might serve as effective cognitive shortcuts to increase understanding of complex information about the virus (explanation) and,
ultimately, to foster appropriate self-protective actions (Spence, Lachlan,
Lin, Sellnow-Richmond, & Sellnow, 2015).
On the basis of the implications of the messages sent during the
Ebola megacrisis in the United States and the tenets of the IDEA model
and exemplification theory, the authors sought to answer the following
four research questions (RQs):
RQ1: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed by the CDC
during a live chat on Twitter employ elements of the IDEA model for
effective instructional risk and crisis communication?
RQ1a: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed by the CDC
during a live chat on Twitter employ elements of internalization?
RQ1b: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed by the
CDC during a live chat on Twitter employ elements of explanation?
RQ1c: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed by the
CDC during a live chat on Twitter employ elements of action?
RQ1d: In what ways is exemplification used in communicating
internalization, explanation, and action during the CDC Ebola
live chat on Twitter?
RQ2: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via Dallas area
news stories and press releases employ elements of the IDEA model
for effective instructional risk and crisis communication?
RQ2a: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via Dallas
area news stories and press releases employ elements of internalization?
RQ2b: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via Dallas
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area news stories and press releases employ elements of explanation?
RQ2c: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via Dallas
area news stories and press releases employ elements of action?
RQ2d: In what ways is exemplification used in communicating
internalization, explanation, and action in the Dallas area Ebola
news stories and press releases?
RQ3: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via websites
sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF employ elements of the
IDEA model for effective instructional risk and crisis communication?
RQ3a: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via websites sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF employ elements
of internalization?
RQ3b: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via websites sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF employ elements
of explanation?
RQ3c: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via websites sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF employ elements
of action?
RQ3d: In what ways is exemplification used in communicating internalization, explanation, and action about Ebola on the websites
sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF?
RQ4 : What similarities and differences exist regarding IDEA model
components embellished by exemplification in Ebola crisis messages
distributed via the CDC live Twitter chat, Dallas news stories and press
releases, and websites sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF?
Method

The research team conducted a thematic analysis of all messages sent by
several key entities during the first hours, days, and weeks of the 2014
Ebola outbreak in the United States. More specifically, all messages sent
during a CDC-hosted live question-and-answer Twitter chat on October
2, 2014; all Dallas news stories and press releases published between
September 24 and October 31, 2014; and all website content published by
the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF during that same period were examined.
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Before conducting the analysis, the researchers consulted with Ebola
experts at the CDC to collect accurate information about the infection,
how it is spread, its symptoms, and the actions people should take for
self-protection. To ascertain the kinds of information being shared
with general publics, the researchers also collected information from
the Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas, official documents
from the city of Dallas, Dallas newspapers and TV reports, and news
releases from universities and schools in the Dallas–Fort Worth area.
Doing so ensured ecological validity, accurate scientific information,
and a comprehensive understanding of what messages were being
conveyed at the time.
Sample

Because research has suggested that different publics perceive different
entities as more and less credible (T. L. Sellnow & Seeger, 2013), the
research team examined messages from multiple sources: the CDC,
Dallas area news media and health agencies, and three international
health organizations (WHO, UNICEF, and MSF). Also, on the basis of
previous research suggesting that different publics seek information via
a variety of media channels (Anthony & Sellnow, 2011, 2016), messages
distributed via a variety of channels (Twitter, traditional news media
and press releases, and organization websites) were examined. Finally,
the research team focused on messages that may be accessed easily
online (as well as via other outlets) because the Internet is becoming
an increasingly popular source for both relaying news and seeking
information (Rosenstiel, Mitchell, Purcell, & Rainie, 2011).
The authors collected all of the tweets exchanged during the CDC
question-and-answer Twitter session held on October 2, 2014. To clarify,
the CDC hosted a live chat for individuals concerned about contracting
the Ebola virus after Duncan was reported to have tested positive. The
authors also collected all Dallas area news stories and press releases
discussing the virus and this incident from September 24 to October
31, 2014. Finally, all Ebola-related material posted on three international
organizations’ websites (WHO, UNICEF, and MSF) was collected and
used to contextualize the messages about the Ebola virus from the
perspective of the global community. In all, this comprehensive census
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of data collected from September 24, 2014, through October 31, 2014,
yielded 282 tweets, 31 local news stories, and 38 international organization website articles.
Procedure

An etic approach was used to analyze the content of messages distributed from these disparate sources via these diverse channels (Lindlof &
Taylor, 2011). To clarify, an etic approach uses established “conceptual
categories provided by our disciplinary knowledge and theory” (p. 95).
In this case, message content was coded according to the internalization,
explanation, and action components described in the IDEA model as
well as for the use of positive or negative exemplars within each component. Two researchers developed a codebook, which was then used
to examine all message content (see the appendix). Any disagreements
were resolved through discussion. The messages were examined for
the presence (or lack thereof) of each element as well as the role of
exemplification in them. From these results, conclusions and implications were drawn regarding instructional risk messages conveyed in
this case as well as for informing similar message content and design
in future crisis and megacrisis events.
Results
Research Question 1

To evaluate the use of the IDEA model elements in the CDC’s Twitter live chat, 282 tweets were thematically coded for internalization,
explanation, and action as well as the incorporation of exemplification within each of these elements.1 Of these 282 tweets, 61 (21%)
incorporated elements of internalization. For example, Jacin tweeted,
“Press conference said asymptomatic people aren’t contagious; Travel
guidance on CDC site suggests otherwise. What gives?” The CDC responded, “People aren’t contagious during incubation period; they’re
only contagious when they start having symptoms.” Jacin’s fears appeared to be averted: “Then there is no need for United Airlines to
be contacting all of those passengers? Simply over-abundance of precaution?” And the CDC confirmed, “Since the patient didn’t develop
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symptoms until AFTER travel, there was no risk to other passengers.”
Of these 282 tweets, 250 (88%) focused on elements explanation.
For example, in response to Rawlings’s question about how patients
are being treated, the CDC responded, “Patients are given supportive
care. Some experimental treatments are being tried.” And in response
to Apodaca’s query about Ebola surviving on sterile surfaces for 6 days,
the CDC responded that it cannot do so unless it is in body fluid, does
not survive long outside of the body, and is only contagious if a person
is experiencing active symptoms. In numerous other exchanges, CDC
experts not only responded but also pointed to websites where participants could get more information and explanation about the virus,
how it is spread, and what is being done to contain it.
Of these 282 tweets, 53 (19%) incorporated elements focused on action steps. For example, Em D tweeted, “Does ebola respond to ‘Purell’
and alcohol based sanitizer, or soap and water? How about bleach?”
The CDC responded that “alcohol-based hand sanitizer and chlorine
can kill Ebola.” Sometimes, however, the action steps were not specific,
as was the case when the CDC responded to Galiano’s query about
how to properly disinfect and what product to use by saying, “Use an
EPA-approved hospital grade disinfectant.” Finally, as was the case
with internalization, many times the CDC experts responded to queries about self-protective actions by pointing participants to a website
for more information. For example, when Victory Healthcare asked,
“What symptoms should someone look out for, in regards to Ebola?”
The CDC responded with, “Here are new resources: go.usa.gov/vEwP.”
In terms of exemplification, only 9 (less than 1%) of the 282 tweets
used exemplars, and 8 of the 9 instances represented negative rather
than positive exemplification. More specifically, only 3 (less than 1%) of
the 61 tweets that focused on internalization incorporated exemplars,
and all 3 were negative. For example, Robrod4g wrote, “I have a 7 yr.
old & a 7 mo. pregnant wife who works in the health care community.
YES! I AM SCARED!!” The CDC responded, “Understandable, #Ebola
is scary. New threat & deadly disease.” Six (less than 1%) of the 250
tweets focused on explanation-incorporated exemplars. Only one of
these was coded as a positive exemplar by using a graphic illustration
as a cognitive shortcut regarding how the Ebola virus is contracted
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FIGURE 1 Positive explanation exemplar.

(see Figure 1). No exemplars were identified in the tweets that focused
on action steps. Ultimately, a majority (88%) of the live chat tweets
emphasized explanations of the situation and events, and fewer than
1% offered exemplars.
Research Question 2

In total, 31 news stories and press releases focused on Ebola were published in the Dallas area between September 24 and October 31, 2014.
These reports were collected and thematically coded for internalization,
explanation, and action as well as the incorporation of exemplification
in each of these elements. Of these 31 publications, 10 (32%) incorporated internalization. For example, an initial statement published by
the Dallas Independent School District (2014) began with a note of
compassion by saying, “The health and safety of our students is always
our top priority” and then addressed proximity and personal impact
by revealing that the five students who may have had contact with
the infected individual had “been advised to stay home from school.”
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Similarly, a Texas Christian University (2014) press release reported that
“TCU is aware of the confirmation of an Ebola case in Dallas, Texas
(proximity). The University is in contact with local health care officials
and will continue to monitor the situation and keep families, students,
faculty, and staff informed during this time” (compassion, relevance,
personal impact, timeliness).
Nearly every article—that is, 30 (97%) of 31—incorporated elements
of explanation. A common theme throughout them was a statement
refuting a common misunderstanding that Ebola could be spread
through the air. These refutations were then typically followed by a
statement explaining that Ebola is only spread via “direct contact with
the body fluids of a person showing symptoms of the illness” and that
the risk of contracting it was very low according to both “national and
local health officials” (source credibility; Southern Methodist University,
2014). Another common theme focused on the steps being taken by
government agencies, health care providers, and other area experts to
manage the outbreak. For example, the Governor’s Press Office (2014)
released a statement announcing “the creation of a state-of-the-art
Ebola treatment and infectious disease bio containment facility in North
Texas” that would “allow us to act quickly to limit the virus’ reach and
give patients the care they need.”
Regarding the action element, only 2 (6%) of the 31 articles proposed
specific action steps. Instead, many of them simply pointed readers to
seek such information from additional websites, such as the Tarrant
County Health Department, the Texas Department of State Health
Services, or the CDC. The reports that did offer specific action steps
tended merely to discourage “travel to the affected African counties,”
to monitor people for symptoms, and to “see a physician in a medical
setting for an evaluation” when symptoms emerged (Texas Wesleyan
University, 2014).
Finally, 7 of the 31 articles (22%) offered negative exemplars, and none
used positive exemplars. More specifically, 2 (20%) of the 10 articles
that incorporated internalization did so with the use of exemplars. For
example, one NBC Dallas–Fort Worth story described Ebola as “a fire
straight from the pit of hell” (Young, 2014). Five (16%) of the 30 articles
that focused on explanation incorporated exemplars to aid explanation.
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For example, WFAA, an ABC Dallas news affiliate, reported that the
“once-bustling” Texas Health Presbyterian hospital had turned into
a “ghost town,” accompanied by photographs of empty hallways and
waiting rooms (Lupkin, 2014). No exemplars were offered as cognitive
shortcuts for specific action steps. In sum, as was the case with the
CDC Twitter exchange, nearly all of the Dallas area news stories and
press releases emphasized explanation over internalization or action
and offered only negative exemplification.
Research Question 3

To examine the use of IDEA model elements among international health
organizations, all 38 Ebola-related articles posted on WHO, UNICEF,
and MSF websites between September 24 and October 31, 2014, were
collected and thematically coded for internalization, explanation, action, and exemplification. Of these 38 articles, 12 (31%) incorporated
internalization. For example, the MSF website discussed the negative
impact of imposing a forced quarantine of asymptomatic health workers returning from West Africa to the United States. That is, there is
no reason to quarantine asymptomatic people because asymptomatic
people with the Ebola infection do not transmit the virus. The organization also emphasized the lack of risk the U.S. population faced when
health care workers returned from fighting the epidemic in West Africa.
In a press release following Dr. Craig Spencer’s discharge from the
hospital after contracting Ebola while working with MSF, for instance,
the organization reiterated that asymptomatic people like Dr. Spencer
cannot spread the virus and that “the public must not stigmatize and
even threaten these volunteers” (Doctors Without Borders, 2014b).
A majority of the articles—36 (95%) of 38—focused on explanation.
For example, the MSF website posted this explanation about what was
being done to contain the disease and treat infected patients:
MSF will work in collaboration with organizations, academics, companies, the Ministries of Health in the affected countries, and the WHO
in order to implement fast-tracked clinical trials for some of the new
treatments for Ebola at existing treatment sites. Experimental treatments
are currently being selected and trial designs are being developed to
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ensure that disruption to patient care is minimal, that medical and research ethics are respected, and that sound scientific data is produced.
(Doctors Without Borders, 2014b)

These kinds of explanations about what Ebola is, how it is contracted,
and what is being done to contain it and treat patients were posted on
each of the websites sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF.
Of the 38 website articles, 25 (66%) proposed specific action steps.
An article posted on the WHO website (World Health Organization,
2014), for instance, explained that
WHO and its partners have recommended exit screening at airports and
land-border crossings in countries affected by Ebola, and it is now an
established practice. WHO stresses that only two categories of people
should not travel: those who are infected and those identified as their
close contacts as they may be infected with Ebola virus.

According to an article posted on the UNICEF website (Gilliam, 2014),
“avoiding shaking hands is possibly the easiest of the [behavioral]
changes” to make.
In terms of exemplification, 6 (16%) of the 38 website postings used
exemplars. More specifically, 4 (33%) of the 12 articles that integrated
internalization also used exemplars. For example, an MSF article described its “sickest patients” to be treated for Ebola and the “miracle”
of their recovery. The MSF wrote, “When Hassan was brought in, he
was almost dead. He wasn’t moving or speaking; he had constant diarrhea; he was confused, disoriented, and lethargic” (Doctors Without
Borders, 2014a). One of the 36 articles offering explanations did so
using exemplars. This article was actually an infographic by UNICEF
explaining what life-saving supplies had been delivered to Ebola-affected
countries between August and November 2014 (United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], 2014). Finally, one exemplar was also identified
as helping to convey self-protective action steps to be taken. UNICEF
(2016) emphasized the important role of handwashing in preventing
the spread of Ebola using the WASH acronym, which stands for “water,
sanitation, and hygiene.”
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FIGURE 2 Comparative analysis of CDC Twitter exchange, Dallas area reports, and inter-

national organization websites.

In sum, a majority of international articles emphasized explanation
over internalization or action, although more of these messages did
offer action steps compared to the local newspaper reports or national
CDC Twitter exchange. In addition, as was the case with the Twitter
chat and Dallas area news stories, very few exemplars were offered, and
of those that were, most were negative.
Research Question 4

Descriptive statistics from each of the distribution channels—local
news stories and press releases; national CDC live Twitter chat; and
international (WHO, UNICEF, MSF) website articles—were compared
to discover similarities and differences regarding the use of IDEA model
elements and exemplification in the Ebola crisis messages. Regarding the
IDEA model elements, Figure 2 illustrates that 21 % of the CDC Twitter
feed, 32% of Dallas newspapers, and 31% of international organization
newspaper reports incorporated internalization. The vast majority of
messages across distribution channels focused primarily on explanation
(88% of the national CDC Twitter messages, 97% of the local Dallas
news articles, and 95% of international organization website articles).
With regard to the action element of the IDEA model, only 19% of the
national CDC exchange tweets and 6% of the local Dallas area news
reports offered specific actionable instructions. However, 66% of the
international organization website articles proposed them. Finally,
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regarding exemplification, although exemplars can serve as cognitive
shortcuts for translating complex subjects, fewer than 1% of the CDC
Twitter messages, 29% of the Dallas news stories and press releases,
and 16% of the international organization website articles used them.
Moreover, those that did use exemplars tended to use negative rather
than positive ones.
Discussion

This examination of messages distributed nationally via the CDC Twitter live chat, locally via Dallas area news stories and press releases, and
internationally via website postings from the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF
when the first case of and death from Ebola occurred in the United
States yields some fruitful conclusions. Moreover, the conclusions give
rise to some interesting implications and recommendations.
Perhaps the most formidable conclusion to be drawn from this
analysis stems from the fact that messages shared by all sources via a
variety of distribution channels focused extensively on explanation over
internalization and action. Although multiple message-testing studies
have confirmed that the most effective instructional risk and crisis
messages integrate all three elements, this study reveals that current
risk and crisis reporting practices continue to privilege explanation
over internalization and action (e.g., D. D. Sellnow, Lane et al., 2015;
D. D. Sellnow et al., in press; T. L. Sellnow, Sellnow, & Helsel, 2017).
This privileging of explanation is not surprising, however, in that it
confirms the results of previous research, for example, by Frisby et al.
(2014), who focused on news reports during the 2010 nationwide egg
recall in the United States, and by D. D. Sellnow et al. (2016) regarding
blended meat contamination in Sweden. However, if the goal of such
instructional risk and crisis messages is learning, then it follows that
they ought to contain elements that research has confirmed are necessary to achieve affective and behavioral, as well as cognitive, learning
(e.g., Dewey, 1938; D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014b). In fact, failing to
do so could lead people to do nothing or to do precisely the wrong
thing, which could result in devastating consequences (D. D. Sellnow
et al., 2017).
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With regard to the Ebola outbreak megacrisis as experienced in
the United States, failing to integrate internalization and action into
most of the messages could have played a role in the level of fear felt
by nonscientific publics seeking information about the crisis and how
to protect themselves. To clarify, instructional risk messages that offer
explanation without internalization often fail to achieve compliance,
and even when specific action steps are offered, they are typically
ignored or not sustained when internalization is not also integrated
(D. D. Sellnow et al., 2017).
In the midst of a public health megacrisis like the 2014 Ebola epidemic, organizations ought to provide accurate information to diverse
publics about what the disease is and how it is spread. All sources
examined in this study (CDC Twitter exchange, Dallas area news stories and press releases, and international organization websites) did
so. However, only the international organization website articles also
offered specific self-protective action steps in a majority of them. It is
certainly possible that, because the Ebola outbreak had been going on
for some time in West Africa before it reached the United States, these
organizations were more concerned with revealing actions needed to
contain the spread of the virus than with providing general base-rate
information about the virus. In other words, because the virus was
spreading quickly in West Africa, emphasizing specific action steps may
have been a more immediate concern. It is unfortunate that the CDC
and Dallas new stories and press releases did not capitalize on sharing
the abundance of information available from these international sources
long before Ebola surfaced in the United States. Perhaps they considered it a “West African disease” and believed it would be contained
there before having a chance to migrate overseas. Thus preparing U.S.
publics to take preventative action may have appeared to be somewhat
irrelevant prior to the Dallas case. This seems plausible, given that
CDC experts reiterated many times that such an outbreak was highly
unlikely in the United States owing to the access to advanced medical
treatment centers. Regardless, previous research has suggested that
messages including specific action steps tend to be most effective when
preparing for a potential crisis as well as in response to crises (Frisby
et al., 2014; T. L. Sellnow et al., 2017; D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014b).
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With regard to exemplification, research has demonstrated that it
can be a valuable cognitive shortcut for making complex information
easier to process and retain (Spence et al., 2015). However, this analysis
reveals that, overall, very few of the messages integrated exemplars.
This is somewhat surprising, given that exemplars are commonly used
in mass media generally (Aust & Zillmann, 1996) and to achieve persuasive goals specifically (Brosius & Bathelt, 1994). Moreover, negative
exemplars were being shared throughout social media during this same
time period. Not only that, but most of the exemplars that appeared in
the Dallas area news stories were negative. The failure to offer positive
exemplars in the messages shared by the CDC, Dallas news stories, and
international organization websites as a counter to them appears to be
an unfortunate oversight. Research has reported that positive exemplars
can be effective in countering negative ones, reducing fear, and fostering self-efficacy, but only if they are actually offered and received by
target populations (D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014a; Spence et al., 2015;
Spence, Sellnow-Richmond, Sellnow, & Lachlan, 2016).
Findings from this study also suggest important recommendations
both for crisis communicators and for future research. First, none of
the three sets of messages examined offered a balanced integration of
all three message content elements (internalization, explanation, and
action) according to the IDEA model. Given conclusions drawn from
existing research, failure to include all three may have contributed to
a lack of motivation among receivers to attend to them as well as misunderstandings about the epidemic, its relevance, and what to do for
self-protection. When communicating to nonscientific publics about
risk and crisis epidemics, spokespersons reporting locally, nationally,
and internationally may be wise to take strategic measures to incorporate each of these elements into their messages. Moreover, the various
spokespersons ought to coordinate their efforts to ensure that message content and distribution efforts are consistent. To clarify, because
people seek convergence among such messages during megacrisis
events, doing so may help ensure that diverse publics (a) accurately
understand what the disease is and how it is spread and (b) engage in
appropriate actions for self-protection (Anthony & Sellnow, 2011, 2016;
T. L. Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).

An Analysis of Instructional Risk Communication in the Time of Ebola

155

Second, exemplification was rarely present in these instructional
risk messages distributed locally, nationally, or internationally. When
used strategically, exemplars can make complex information easier to
understand and remember (Zillmann, 2006; Zillmann & Brosius, 2000).
They can also be used to counter misleading negative exemplars, which
often go viral on social media (D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014a; Spence
et al., 2016). Incorporating positive exemplars may effectively reduce
fear and heighten self-efficacy among disparate nonscientific publics
receiving the messages. In the future, it may behoove crisis communicators to thoughtfully consider the strategic use of exemplification to
bolster internalization by motivating receivers to attend, explanation
by making complex information easier to comprehend and retain, and
action by serving as a cognitive shortcut for instigating appropriate
self-protective actions.
Finally, the results of this study point to the utility of doing additional
research applying the IDEA model embellished with exemplification.
Additional thematic and content analyses on existing crisis messages
across distribution channels and crisis types could add to what we know
about current practices. Surveys, interviews, and focus group studies
could enhance our understanding of the effectiveness of instructional
risk and crisis messages among various stakeholder groups. Similarly,
additional message-testing experiments could inform our understanding of the effectiveness of such messages in achieving affective, cognitive,
and behavioral learning outcomes among diverse people and groups
in various countries and regions, regarding a variety of risk and crisis
types, and distributed via a range of channels. Finally, although IDEA
model messages have been tested empirically, confirming their utility in
a variety of crisis situations, similar experiments ought to be conducted
on messages designed specifically for Ebola to confirm the validity of
potential recommendations offered to health organizations and media
professionals charged with communicating about the disease. Such
experiments could confirm the degree to which IDEA model messages
instruct nonscientific publics specifically about Ebola (i.e., what it is,
how it is spread, and what to do for self-protection) more effectively
than status quo ones like those examined here.
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Limitations

We acknowledge several limitations of this study. First, we were able
to collect more tweets than Dallas area news stories and press releases
or website content provided by international health organizations.
However, a more balanced sample of messages across sources and
channels was not possible because more messages simply did not exist
during the time frame of this case study. That said, we did examine a
comprehensive census, which included everything available from those
outlets during the time period. Moreover, if we take word count into
consideration, the tweets were quite short and the news stories, press
releases, and website articles considerably longer. Bearing this in mind
indicates less imbalance among the sources than might be perceived
by number alone. Second, the Ebola outbreak had been going on for
many months in West Africa before it emerged in the United States.
As such, the nature of the story lines was bound to be different in the
local stories compared to the international articles, which may have
complicated the results of the study. Finally, our decision to conduct a
thematic analysis was based on the lack of work done across distribution
channels (local, national, international) to date. Thus these exploratory
results ought to be considered, as they may spur future research using
different methodological approaches.
Conclusion

Indeed, effective risk and crisis communication when targeting nonscientific publics presents formidable challenges. When attempting not
only to inform the public about an event but also to instruct them to
take appropriate self-protective actions, the challenges become even
more complicated. Moreover, when the event is a megacrisis that crosses
international boundaries and impacts diverse publics, communicators
must be strategic about the content to include in their messages and
the channels through which they distribute them. The IDEA model for
effective instructional risk and crisis communication embellished with
exemplification may provide a workable framework for doing so. This
Ebola epidemic analysis revealed, however, that current risk and crisis
message practices continue to privilege explanation over internalization
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or action. Consistent messages coming from various health organizations and media outlets that integrate internalization, explanation, and
action embellished with appropriate exemplars may achieve successful
affective, cognitive, and behavioral learning outcomes among disparate
nonscientific publics. As such, we may increase the likelihood that
these messages will achieve what we intend from them—which is, of
course, to save lives.
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Appendix: IDEA Model Thematic Analysis Codebook
Internalization

Goal: To get attention and to aid retention.
Question: Am I (or those I care about) affected, and how?
a. Compassion (People don’t care how much you know, until they
know how much you care.)
• Does the message say something to this effect (e.g., empathetic
messages about supportive care being given to infected patients,
as well as to their loved ones)?
b. Personal relevance
• How likely am I (or those I care about) to be affected?
• What and how severe might the consequences be?
c. Proximity
• Where is the event occurring, and how close is that to me and/
or those I care about?
• Is location specified, and to what specificity?
d. Timeliness
• When is the event occurring?
• How much time do I have to prepare?
• How much time do I have to respond if exposed?
• How much time do I have to respond if infected?
e. Exemplification
• What if any positive exemplars are offered to get attention and
make it memorable?
• What if any negative exemplars are offered to get attention and
make it memorable?
Distribution

Goal: To get the correct message to the target audience(s).
Question: What channel or channels is/are the message(s) being sent
through?
• Convergence of multiple messages being sent through diverse
channels.
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Explanation

Goal: Provide accurate information about what is happening and being
done about the event.
Question: What is happening, and why?
a. Source credibility (international, national, local)
b. Accurate science, accurate information
c. What are the responsible agencies doing to deal with the event?
d. Intelligible translation for target audience?
e. Is exemplification used to help make complex information easier
to understand, and if so, is it positive and helpful or negative in
ways that foster misunderstanding?
Action

Goal: To empower people to take appropriate action to save lives.
Question: What should I (and those I care about) do (or not do) for
self-protection?
a. Specific preparation action steps
b. Specific response steps
c. Exemplification in action steps?
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